Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SF08209
ROBIE, J.
Nevada County law enforcement officers followed a minivan believing the driver was the registered owner of the vehicle, who was on searchable probation. Instead, the driver was defendant Chris Votino, Jr. Defendant gave one of the officers permission to get his driver’s license out of his truck (parked in front of the minivan) to confirm his identity. Upon learning defendant was driving the minivan with a suspended license, the officers asked him for permission to search him and the minivan. Defendant consented to both requests and officers found methamphetamine and cocaine on him.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming the evidence seized was the fruit of an illegal detention, arrest, and search. The trial court denied his motion, and he pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine and received Proposition 36 probation.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. He claims the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving either that his initial detention was supported by articulable facts suggesting that he was involved in criminal activity or that the officers were entitled to stop the minivan based on probation search terms imposed on another person. He also contends the duration of the “detention” extended beyond what was reasonably necessary under the circumstances that purportedly made its initiation permissible, and the prosecution failed to prove that his consent to the search for his identification in his truck was free and voluntary. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the night of June 17, 2008, officers of the Nevada County narcotics task force were conducting searches of probationers throughout Nevada County. The officers included Sergeant Alicia Milhous and Probation Officer Pamela Minyard in one vehicle, Officer Clint Bates and Detective Justin Martin in a second vehicle, and Detective Jason Spillner and Detective Matt Gross in a third vehicle. The officers wore street clothes and black vests with “Sheriff” printed across the front and back. All the cars were unmarked but were equipped with enforcement lights, which were not visible unless activated.
While conducting a separate investigation, the officers passed Steven White’s house, which was already under surveillance for suspected drug sales and distribution. Prior investigation indicated White would never let anybody pull into his driveway, he would keep his gate shut, and the vehicles were to stay outside the gate. All the drug activity would take place inside White’s residence.
After conducting another investigation, the officers passed back by White’s residence and noticed there was a minivan parked just outside the locked gate, consistent with the information they received regarding suspected drug activity at White’s house. Detective Spillner radioed dispatch the license plate number of the minivan and learned it was registered to Todd Pinkham. Pinkham was on active probation in Nevada County with search conditions. The officers decided to set up surveillance of the minivan without disturbing White’s residence. After approximately 5 to 10 minutes of surveillance, the minivan drove away from White’s house and the officers followed.
While following the minivan, the officers did not activate their flashing lights. After approximately a mile and one-half of travel, the driver of the minivan pulled into the driveway of a residence. Sergeant Milhous attempted to pull in behind the minivan, but she “realized that there wasn’t enough room once [she had] already made the turn to get [her] vehicle all the way in.” As a result, she activated the strobe lights on her vehicle to alert any passing traffic that the rear end of her vehicle was sticking out into the street. Officer Bates and Detective Martin parked their vehicle roughly three car lengths down the road.
Defendant, who had been driving the minivan, remained in the parked vehicle with the driver’s door open. Sergeant Milhous walked up to him and, using only her flashlight to illuminate him, said, “‘Hi. Are you Todd Pinkham?’” Defendant responded, “no.” Sergeant Milhous next asked if the minivan belonged to Todd Pinkham and defendant said, “yes.” Defendant eventually identified himself as “Chris Votino.” Sergeant Milhous made no statements telling defendant to stay where he was or not to get out of the car. Sergeant Milhous asked defendant, however, to talk to Detective Spillner, who was then at the rear of the minivan. Defendant got out of the vehicle without making any statements or objections. At this point, Sergeant Milhous left to move her vehicle.
During the conversation between Sergeant Milhous and defendant, Officer Bates walked up on the passenger’s side of the vehicle. He overheard defendant give his name to Sergeant Milhous. Officer Bates vaguely recalled a prior encounter with Pinkham, but did not remember what he looked like and did not recognize defendant. To confirm defendant’s name, however, Officer Bates asked defendant if he had any identification. Defendant told him that his identification “was in his truck inside the wallet and underneath some paperwork.” The truck was parked in front of the minivan in the driveway. Defendant gave Officer Bates permission to retrieve the identification from the truck, which he did. Officer Bates then ran the license and learned it was suspended. Officer Bates testified it was only two to three minutes from when Sergeant Milhous contacted defendant to the time he learned about defendant’s driving status.
On appeal, defendant repeatedly states that he gave the officers consent to search his minivan for identification. The record, however, indicates that defendant stated his license was in his “truck.”
Shortly after defendant got out of the minivan and walked to the back of the vehicle, Detective Spillner recognized him “as one of the Votinos.” Because it was dark, it took Detective Spillner some time to recognize which Votino brother defendant was. Detective Spillner testified, however, that he realized who defendant was “right about the same time” Officer Bates walked back toward him and the “radio traffic was being radioed back” that defendant had a suspended license. After Officer Bates told Detective Spillner defendant had a suspended license, Detective Spillner looked at Officer Bates and “basically told him, okay, well, then he’s in custody for driving on a suspended.”
Officer Bates asked for permission to search defendant and his vehicle. Defendant consented to both. In searching defendant, officers found baggies containing cocaine and methamphetamine.
DISCUSSION
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure.” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922; see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327.)
I
Assuming Defendant Was Detained, The Detention Was Reasonable And Not Unduly Prolonged
On appeal, defendant first contends he was unreasonably detained by officers to determine whether he was Pinkham (and therefore subject to a probation search) because “police officers cannot detain the driver of a vehicle whose owner is subject to probation search terms unless they know the driver or an occupant of the vehicle is the person subject to those search terms.” Defendant also contends that even if generally the police can stop a car owned by a person on probation/parole with search terms that cover the vehicle, here the prosecution failed to prove that the search terms of Pinkham’s probation covered Pinkham’s vehicle.
The trial court found the officers detained defendant by blocking his vehicle and illuminating their police lights, but also found the detention reasonable. The trial court held that no reasonable person would feel free to leave in the presence of five or six armed officers and three police vehicles, two of which had their lights flashing.
“A detention occurs ‘[o]nly when [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen....’” (In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 562.) Assuming for the sake of argument that what happened here was a detention (rather than a consensual encounter), we agree with the trial court that it was reasonable under the circumstances.
“Although police officers may not arrest... a suspect without probable cause..., they may temporarily detain a suspect based only on a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime. [Citations.] Such detentions are permitted, notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment’s requirement[] of probable cause..., because they are ‘limited intrusions’ that are ‘justified by special law enforcement interests.’” (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 386-387.)
“The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person... rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of ‘the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ [Citation.] We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than probable cause.” (United States v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 703 [77 L.Ed.2d 110, 118].)
Here, the officers had a legitimate interest in determining whether the individual driving the minivan they were following was the registered owner of the vehicle, who was a probationer with search conditions. The intrusion on defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests necessary to make this determination was minimal. The officers did not interrupt defendant’s journey in the minivan by conducting a normal traffic stop; instead, they waited until he had arrived at his apparent destination and only then approached him in the driveway where he had parked. There, they asked whether he was Todd Pinkham and then conducted a brief further inquiry to verify his response that he was not. This inquiry ended when Detective Spillner recognized defendant “as one of the Votinos” right about the same time the “radio traffic was being radioed back” that he had a suspended license.
Although the officers did not have any basis for reasonably suspecting that defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime, under the circumstances, a brief detention to determine whether he was the owner of the minivan he was driving -- and therefore subject to a warrantless probation search -- was minimally invasive and therefore reasonable.
Defendant contends we “must deem the actions of the officers in this matter to be unreasonable because Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights.” In his view, the officers did not have the right to conduct a traffic stop of him simply because Pinkham was on searchable probation. As we have concluded already, however, the “seizure” of defendant that occurred here -- if any at all -- was minimally intrusive and justified by the fact that defendant was driving a vehicle that belonged to a searchable probationer. Thus, defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the “detention.”
We express no opinion whether a full blown traffic stop, by which defendant’s journey in the vehicle would have been interrupted, would have been permissible under the circumstances presented here; instead, we limit our conclusion that the “detention” was permissible to the actual facts of this case.
Defendant complains there was nothing “in this record demonstrating that the officers were aware of any specific probation orders in Pinkham’s case authorizing the seizure or search of Pinkham’s vehicle.” But there did not have to be to justify what occurred here. To the extent the officers detained defendant at all, they did so only to confirm whether he was the owner of the minivan, who was subject to searchable probation, which, at the very least, means he could be personally searched without a warrant. The officers did not need to have, let alone be aware of, a probation order specifically authorizing the search and/or seizure of Pinkham’s vehicle in order to conduct the minimally invasive “detention” of defendant that occurred here to determine if he was Pinkham.
We also reject defendant’s argument that his “detention” “extended beyond what [wa]s reasonably necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation permissible.” Defendant parses the testimony of the various officers in an effort to demonstrate that they asked for his identification only after Detective Spillner had already determined he was not Pinkham. In his view, when the detective recognized him, “[t]he detention should have ceased and the officers should have left the scene” without ever asking him to produce identification.
As we noted above, however, Detective Spillner testified that he realized who defendant was “right about the same time” Officer Bates walked back toward him and the “radio traffic was being radioed back” that defendant had a suspended license. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the evidence established that the officers sought and obtained defendant’s identification before Detective Spillner recognized who he was. Moreover, the moment the basis for their original “detention” of him disappeared -- through the verification that he was not Pinkham -- they acquired a new basis for detaining him -- because he was driving with a suspended license. Under these circumstances, the duration of the detention was not unduly prolonged.
II
The Search Of Defendant’s Truck Was Consensual
Defendant claims the permission he gave to Officer Bates to obtain his wallet, containing his driver’s license, was not free and voluntary.
The determination of whether consent was voluntary is a factual determination that requires an analysis of the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Aguilar (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 632, 639-640, citing People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106.) Unlike in People v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, the case on which defendant relies, here there was no unlawful detention and consent was not given under “inherently coercive circumstances.”
Defendant claims there was a coercive atmosphere because there were five or six armed officers and three police vehicles, flashing lights, and no reasonable person would feel free to leave. Furthermore, defendant claims this coercive atmosphere was increased when Sergeant Milhous illuminated defendant with her flashlight and asked him questions to find out who he was.
There was no show of authority that led to “inherently coercive circumstances.” The fact that there was an officer’s vehicle parked behind the minivan did not require defendant to give his consent to allow an officer to get his license out of another vehicle. Also, it was not until after defendant had already consented to Officer Bates getting his driver’s license that he encountered more than two of the six officers.
There was no restraint or use of force against defendant. He was asked only simple questions as a means for the officers to confirm his identity. The officers had a right to see his driver’s license to confirm his identity because he was driving a vehicle. (Veh. Code, §§ 4462, 12951.) These facts do not suggest a coercive atmosphere.
After defendant was asked to go to the back of the minivan and speak with Detective Spillner, Officer Bates asked defendant if he had any identification. Defendant told Officer Bates his identification “was in his truck inside the wallet and underneath some paperwork.” Officer Bates then asked defendant if he could go get his identification and did so after defendant consented. This conduct cannot be characterized as a show of authority sufficient to support the conclusion that defendant did not freely consent.
There is also no evidence of Officer Bates searching defendant’s truck, except to get his license. Defendant told Officer Bates specifically where the license was in his truck and Officer Bates found it in that particular spot. Defendant could have easily gotten the license himself, but instead told Officer Bates where it was and allowed the officer to get it for him. Defendant’s consent was voluntary and not the product of an illegal or unduly prolonged detention.
Defendant’s suspended license gave the officers independent probable cause to detain defendant and ultimately search his person.
The motion to suppress was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., BUTZ, J.