Opinion
Indictment No.: 16-1157
03-06-2017
TO: HON. ANTHONY A, SCARPINO, JR. District Attorney, Westchester County 111 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard White Plains, New York 10601 By: Arthur Bernardon Assistant District Attorney CLARE J. DEGNAN, ESQ. The Legal Aid Society of Westchester County 150 Grand Street, Suite 100 White Plains, New York 10601 By: Robin J. Bauer , Esq. Associate Counsel
DECISION & ORDER
Defendant, HUGO MICHALA VIZHCO, having been indicted on or about December 1, 2016 with One Count of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[3][a][I]); One Count of Driving While Intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]); One Count of Leaving the Scene of an Incident Without Reporting (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 [1][a]) and One Count of Criminal Mischief (Penal Law § 145.00 [3]). In response thereto, the People have filed an Affirmation in Opposition together with a Memorandum of Law. Upon consideration of these papers, the stenographic transcript of the grand jury minutes and the Consent Discovery Order entered in this case, this court disposes of this motion as follows: I.
MOTION for DISCOVERY, DISCLOSURE and INSPECTION
CPL ARTICLE 240
The parties have entered into a stipulation by way of a Consent Discovery Order consenting to the enumerated discovery in this case. Defendant's motion for discovery is granted to the extent provided for in Criminal Procedure Law Article 240. If there any further items discoverable pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Article 240 which have not been provided to defendant pursuant to the Consent Discovery Order, they are to be provided forthwith.
As to the defendant's demand for exculpatory material, the People have acknowledged their continuing duty to disclose exculpatory material at the earliest possible date upon its discovery (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]; Giglio v United States, 405 US 150 [1972]). The People have also acknowledged their duty to comply with People v Rosario, (9 NY2d 286 [1961]). In the event that the People are or become aware of any material which is arguably exculpatory and they are not willing to consent to its disclosure to the defendant, they are directed to immediately disclose such material to the Court to permit an in camera inspection and determination as to whether such must be disclosed to the defendant.
Defendant's motion for a further Bill of Particulars is denied. The Bill of Particulars set forth in the Consent Discovery Order provided to the defendant has adequately informed the defendant of the substance of her alleged conduct and in all respects complies with CPL 200.95.
Except to the extent that the defendant's application has been specifically granted herein, it is otherwise denied as seeking material or information beyond the scope of discovery (see People v Colavito, 87 NY2d 423 [1996]; Matter of Brown v Grosso, 285 AD2d 642 [2d Dept 2001]; Matter of Brown v Appelman, 241 AD2d 279 [2d Dept 1998]; Matter of Catterson v Jones, 229 AD2d 435 [2d Dept 1996]; Matter of Catterson v Rohl, 202 AD2d 420 [2d Dept 1994]). II.
MOTION to INSPECT, DISMISS and/or REDUCE
CPL ARTICLE 190
The court grants the defendant's motion to the limited extent that the court has conducted, with the consent of the People, an in camera inspection of the stenographic transcription of the grand jury proceedings. Upon such review, the court finds no basis upon which to grant defendant's application to dismiss or reduce the indictment. Defendant's request to dismiss the indictment in the interests of justice is denied.
The indictment contains a plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof with sufficient precision as to clearly apprise the defendant of the conduct which is the subject of the indictment (CPL 200.50). The indictment charges each and every element of the crimes, and alleges that the defendant committed the acts which constitute the crimes at a specified place during a specified time period and, therefore, is sufficient on its face (People v Cohen, 52 NY2d 584 [1981]; People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589 [1978]).
The grand jury was properly instructed (see People v Calbud, 49 NY2d 389 [1980]; People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36 [1984]; People v Burch, 108 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2013]). The evidence presented, if accepted as true, is legally sufficient to establish every element of each offense charged (CPL 210.30[2]). "Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted--and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence--would warrant conviction" (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2002]). Legally sufficient evidence means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof (CPL 70.10[1]; see People v Flowers, 138 AD3d 1138, 1139 [2d Dept 2016]). "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Jessup, 90 AD3d 782, 783 [2d Dept 2011]). "The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" (People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 526 [1998]).
Additionally, the minutes reveal a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence, that the Assistant District Attorney properly instructed the grand jury on the law, and only permitted those grand jurors who heard all the evidence to vote the matter.
Based upon the in camera review, since this court does not find release of the grand jury minutes or any portion thereof necessary to assist it in making any determinations and as the defendant has not set forth a compelling or particularized need for the production of the grand jury minutes, defendant's application for a copy of the grand jury minutes is denied (People v Jang, 17 AD3d 693 [2d Dept 2005]; CPL 190.25[4][a]). III. & V.
MOTION to STRIKE STATEMENT NOTICES
CPL Article 710
The motion to strike is denied. Said notices are in conformity with the statutory requirements of CPL 710.30. IV.
MOTION to SUPPRESS NOTICED STATEMENTS
This branch of the defendant's motion seeking to suppress statements on the grounds that they were unconstitutionally obtained is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing shall be held prior to trial to determine whether any statements allegedly made by the defendant, which have been noticed by the People pursuant to CPL 710.30 (1)(a), were involuntarily made by the defendant within the meaning of CPL 60.45 (see CPL 710.20(3); CPL 710.60[3][b]; People v Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 [1980]), obtained in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and/or obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]). VI.
MOTION to SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
CPL 710
This motion is granted to the limited extent of conducting a hearing prior to trial to determine whether the identifying witnesses had a sufficient prior familiarity with the defendant as to render them impervious to police suggestion (People v Rodriguez, 79 NY 2d 445 [1992]). In the event the Court finds that there was not a sufficient prior familiarity with the defendant on the part of the witness, the Court will then consider whether or not the noticed identifications were unduly suggestive (United States v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]). Specifically, the Court shall determine whether the identifications were so improperly suggestive as to taint any in-court identification. In the event the identifications are found to be unduly suggestive, the Court shall then go on to consider whether the People have proven by clear and convincing evidence that an independent source exists for such witness' proposed in-court identification. VII.
MOTION to SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
Defendant moves to suppress unidentified evidence, however the People contend that no evidence was seized to warrant a Mapp hearing. Defendant's motion to suppress observation made by police is denied as he does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy traveling in a car on a public roadway (People v weaver, 12 NY3d 433 [2009]). As such, the motion is denied. VIII.
MOTION for SANDOVAL and VENTIMIGLIA HEARINGS
Defendant has moved for a pre-trial hearing to permit the trial court to determine the extent, if at all, to which the People may inquire into the defendant's prior criminal convictions, prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral conduct. The People have consented to a Sandoval hearing. Accordingly, it is ordered that immediately prior to trial a hearing shall be conducted pursuant to People v Sandoval (34 NY2d 371 [1974]). At said hearing, the People shall be required to notify the defendant of all specific instances of his criminal, prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral conduct of which they have knowledge and which they intend to use in an attempt to impeach the defendant's credibility if he elects to testify at trial (CPL 240.43).
At the hearing, the defendant shall bear the burden of identifying any instances of her prior misconduct that she submits the People should not be permitted to use to impeach her credibility. The defendant shall be required to identify the basis of her belief that each event or incident may be unduly prejudicial to hers ability to testify as a witness on her own behalf (see People v Matthews, 68 NY2d 118 [1986]; People v Malphurs, 111 AD2d 266 [2d Dept 1985]).
Defendant's application for a hearing, pursuant to People v Ventimiglia (52 NY2d 350 [1981]) is denied since the People have not indicated an intention to use evidence of any prior bad act or uncharged crimes of the defendant during its case in chief (see People v Molineaux, 168 NY2d 264 [1901]). If the People move to introduce such evidence, the defendant may renew this aspect of her motion. IX.
MOTION to STRIKE PREJUDICIAL LANGUAGE
The defendant moves to strike certain language from the indictment on the grounds that it is surplusage, irrelevant or prejudicial. The language contained in the indictment merely identifies the defendant's acts as public, rather than private wrongs and such language need not be stricken on the ground that it is prejudicial. This motion is denied (see People v Gill, 164 AD2d 867 [2d Dept 1990]; People v Winters, 194 AD2d 703 [2d Dept 1993]; People v Garcia, 170 Misc. 2d 543 [Westchester Co. Ct. 1996]). X.
MOTION to STRIKE ALIBI NOTICE
Defendant's motion to strike the alibi notice is denied. Contrary to the defendant's contentions, it is well-settled that CPL 250.00 is indeed in compliance with the constitutional requirements (see People v Dawson, 185 AD2d 854 [2d Dept 1992]; People v Cruz, 176 AD2d 751 [2d Dept 1991]; People v Gill, 164 AD2d 867 [2d Dept 1990]) and provides equality in the required disclosure (People v Peterson, 96 AD2d 871 [2d Dept 1983]; see generally Wardius v Oregon, 412 US 470 [1973]).
The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision and order of this court. Dated: White Plains, New York
March 6, 2017
/s/_________
Honorable Anne E. Minihan, J.C.C. TO: HON. ANTHONY A, SCARPINO, JR.
District Attorney, Westchester County
111 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard
White Plains, New York 10601
By: Arthur Bernardon
Assistant District Attorney
CLARE J. DEGNAN, ESQ.
The Legal Aid Society of Westchester County
150 Grand Street, Suite 100
White Plains, New York 10601
By: Robin J. Bauer , Esq.
Associate Counsel