Here, the court's submission to the jury of the count of rape in third degree was not an improvident exercise of discretion (seePeople v. Urbina, 99 A.D.3d 821, 822, 951 N.Y.S.2d 753 ). Moreover, even if the verdict was motivated by leniency, this is not a ground for reversal, as the verdict was not repugnant as a matter of law (seePeople v. Rayam, 94 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 708 N.Y.S.2d 37, 729 N.E.2d 694 ; People v. Barrow, 103 A.D.3d 745, 746, 959 N.Y.S.2d 284 ; People v. Donovan, 58 A.D.3d 640, 641, 871 N.Y.S.2d 349 ; People v. Vitta, 220 A.D.2d 468, 469, 631 N.Y.S.2d 917 ). Additionally, the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by the testimony of a prosecution witness which may have created an inference that he had a criminal record.
Defendant further contends that the verdicts are repugnant. Although the charges of sexual abuse in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child stemmed from the same incident, defendant's acquittal of the charge of sexual abuse in the second degree and his conviction of the charge of endangering the welfare of a child did not constitute repugnant verdicts (see People v. Vitta, 220 A.D.2d 468 [1995] ; People v. Martinez, 201 A.D.2d 671 [1994] ). The two offenses share no common elements, and, thus, defendant could readily be found guilty of one and not the other.
As charged to the jury, the two offenses shared no common elements, and, thus, defendant could readily be found guilty of one and not the other. Consequently, the verdicts were not repugnant (see People v. Vitta, 220 A.D.2d 468 [1995] ; People v. Martinez, 201 A.D.2d 671 [1994] ). In addition, any inconsistencies in the testimonies of the People's witnesses did not render their accounts incredible as a matter of law (see People v. Baksh, 43 AD3d 1072, 1073 [2007] ; People v. Almonte, 23 AD3d 392, 393 [2005] ; People v. Davis, 299 A.D.2d 420, 422 [2002] ).
The defendant concedes that the verdict was not repugnant ( see e.g. People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1, 6–7, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d 617), but argues that it was irrational and, therefore, against the weight of the evidence. Although the verdict appears to have been motivated by leniency, this fact is not grounds for reversal provided the verdict is not repugnant as a matter of law ( see People v. Donovan, 58 A.D.3d 640, 641, 871 N.Y.S.2d 349;People v. Vitta, 220 A.D.2d 468, 631 N.Y.S.2d 917;People v. Farrell, 190 A.D.2d 746, 747–748, 593 N.Y.S.2d 333;People v. Montgomery, 116 A.D.2d 669, 670, 497 N.Y.S.2d 737). Further, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.
d 749;People v. Miller, 199 A.D.2d 692, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 928). Here, the finding of guilt pertaining to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was not inconsistent with the acquittal of assault in the first degree. As pertinent to this case, a person commits assault in the first degree when he or she intentionally causes serious injury to another by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument (Penal Law § 120.10), while criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree contemplates the possession of a loaded firearm with the intent to use it unlawfully against another (Penal Law § 265.03). The acquittal of the former clearly did not negate the elements of the latter because one can intend to use a weapon unlawfully against another without necessarily intending to inflict serious physical injury on that person (see, People v. Rust, 233 A.D.2d 778, 780, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 988; People v. Garcia, 194 A.D.2d 1011, 1012-1013, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 895; see also, People v. Vitta, 220 A.D.2d 468, 469, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 852; People v. Bebee, 210 A.D.2d 243; People v. Coleman, 123 A.D.2d 440, 441, appeal dismissed 69 N.Y.2d 826). In addition, we find no inconsistency in the jury having found defendant guilty of assault in the second degree.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: We reject the contention of defendant that County Court erred in denying his request to charge the defense of justification ( see, Penal Law § 35.15). No reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that defendant's actions were those of a reasonable man acting in self-defense ( see, People v. Jackson, 236 A.D.2d 821, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 893; People v. Thompson, 224 A.D.2d 950, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 886; People v. Vitta, 220 A.D.2d 468, 469, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 852). Additionally, in his pro se supplemental brief, defendant contends that the court erred in failing to charge the defense of intoxication. Because defendant never requested that charge, his contention has not been preserved for our review ( see, CPL 470.05; People v. Clarke, 222 A.D.2d 1035, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 934).
The jury may have found that defendant engaged in sexual contact but did not engage in deviate sexual intercourse. We also reject the speculative contention of defendant that the jury, by acquitting him of counts one through six, reached a compromise verdict ( see, People v. Bombard, 203 A.D.2d 711, 712-713, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 823). "[A] `compromise' verdict is not a ground for reversal provided the verdict is not repugnant" ( People v. Vitta, 220 A.D.2d 468, 469, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 852; see, People v. Martinez, 201 A.D.2d 671, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 874). The jury was entitled to believe any or all of the testimony presented at trial ( see, People v. Tucker, supra, at 8). Further, the delay of little more than an hour between the receipt of the note from the jury and its verdict does not support the contention that the verdict was coerced.