Opinion
C082291
02-24-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC VILLARREAL, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CRF152734)
Defendant Eric Villarreal pleaded no contest to unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) He also admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction under the Three Strikes law and had served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of five years in prison.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 20, 2015, Jorge Menchaca's ex-girlfriend Olivia Herrera asked him for a ride to Sacramento so she could purchase a car. When Menchaca arrived to pick up Herrera in Yuba City, she was with defendant. Both Herrera and defendant got into the backseat of Menchaca's car.
Because defendant pleaded no contest, our statement of facts is taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing. --------
On the way to Sacramento, Menchaca drove off the road a couple of times because he was tired. After they arrived in Sacramento, Menchaca stopped for gas. At the gas station, defendant opened the front passenger door of Menchaca's car, grabbed the keys from the ignition, and told Menchaca that he was going to drive because Menchaca was too tired. When Menchaca indicated that he was okay to drive, defendant got out of the car and went to Menchaca's door. In an intimidating tone, defendant told Menchaca he was going to drive the car. Defendant then opened Menchaca's door and insisted he was going to drive the car. Although Menchaca repeatedly told defendant he felt okay to drive, he eventually got out of the car. When he did so, defendant drove off with Herrera. Menchaca explained that he got out of the car because he believed that a physical altercation might have occurred if he continued to argue with defendant. After defendant drove off, Menchaca called the police and reported that his car had been stolen.
On November 30, 2015, defendant was charged by complaint with carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) and possession of a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)). It was also alleged that defendant had a prior conviction for aggravated mayhem (§ 205), a serious and/or violent felony (§§ 667, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)), and three prior convictions within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), including a conviction for attempted vehicle theft (§ 664; Veh. Code, § 10851). Defendant entered not guilty pleas and denied the allegations.
Prior to the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court granted the prosecutor's motion to amend the complaint to add a charge of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851.) Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded no contest to this charge, and admitted he had a prior strike based on his conviction for aggravated mayhem and had served a prior prison term based on his conviction for attempted vehicle theft. Defendant also agreed to a five-year prison sentence. The trial court scheduled a sentencing hearing for January 25, 2016.
After several continuances of the sentencing hearing and the substitution of defense counsel, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea on May 6, 2016. In his motion, defendant argued that there was good cause to withdraw his plea because, due to mistake and ignorance, he was misled by his former attorney into believing he did not have a meritorious defense and his free will was overcome by psychological pressure. In support of his motion, defendant filed a declaration attesting that he had explained to his prior counsel he was innocent of the charged offenses, and that Menchaca, if truthful, would testify at trial that he had permission to take the vehicle and he did not take it against Menchaca's will. Defendant further attested that his counsel scared him into taking the plea bargain, and that if he had known he had a valid defense, he would not have entered a no contest plea.
On May 13, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest plea. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court noted that it had been handed a piece of paper, "folded into eights," purporting to be a declaration executed by Menchaca on March 16, 2016. In his declaration, Menchaca attested that "it is not correct that [defendant] took possession of my vehicle against my will and without my permission." Menchaca further attested that he gave defendant permission to take his vehicle. Defense counsel explained that Menchaca had delivered the declaration to him the previous day through a third party, and that Menchaca's attorney had assured him Menchaca would appear at the hearing. Menchaca, however, did not appear at the hearing.
The trial court denied defendant's motion and sentenced him to five years in prison. In denying the motion, the trial court noted that it was not "impressed" by Menchaca's declaration.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court subsequently granted defendant's request for a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his no contest plea. According to defendant, Menchaca's declaration provided good cause to withdraw the plea because it showed he was innocent of the charged offenses. We disagree.
On application of the defendant at any time before judgment, the court may, for good cause shown, permit a plea of no contest to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. (People v. Ramirez (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1506.) " 'Good cause' means mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence." (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 917.) In addition to showing good cause, the defendant must also show prejudice in that he would not have accepted the plea agreement absent the mistake, ignorance, etcetera. (People v. Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416 (Breslin).)
"[A] reviewing court must adopt the trial court's factual findings [on a motion to withdraw a plea] if substantial evidence supports them." (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) " ' "On appeal, the trial court's decision will be upheld unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. [Citations.]" [Citation.] "Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Nocelotl (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1096.) " 'A trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless it "exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that results in a manifest miscarriage of justice." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 71.)
We conclude that defendant has failed to satisfy his burden to show the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Our review of the record does not disclose that the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner. To the contrary, the record reflects that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying defendant's motion. Defendant failed to demonstrate that he entered his no contest plea under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming his exercise of free judgment.
Defendant's circumstances are analogous to those in Breslin and we reach the same result. In Breslin, the defendant was charged with, among other things, inflicting corporal injury upon her boyfriend. (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1413-1414.) The police observed dried blood on the victim, and a roommate of the couple told the police the victim and Breslin had been arguing and he had seen blood running down the victim's neck when the victim used his phone to call the police. (Id. at p. 1413.) After Breslin entered a guilty plea to the corporal injury charge, the victim provided a declaration to defense counsel stating that he tripped, grabbed Breslin, and was injured when Breslin accidentally fell on top of him. (Id. at p. 1414.) The victim claimed that he had previously gone to the prosecutor's office to explain this, but a receptionist had told him no one was available to speak to him. (Ibid.) Breslin moved to withdraw her guilty plea and the trial court denied the motion. (Id. at p. 1415.)
On appeal, Breslin argued that her plea was not a knowing and intelligent waiver of her constitutional rights because, at the time of the plea, she was unaware that the victim had fundamentally changed his account of the incident. (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1415.) She further claimed that her plea was not made voluntarily because her former appointed counsel failed to investigate her case and failed to discover--prior to her plea--that the victim had tried to recant his statements about the incident. (Ibid.) In denying Breslin's motion to withdraw her plea, the appellate court reasoned: "Breslin contends that she presented 'uncontroverted evidence' to show that at the time of her plea she was unaware of 'crucial facts' that would have provided her with 'a strong, potentially meritorious defense to the charged crime.' Breslin's argument is not supported by the record. The 'evidence' of such 'crucial facts' is contained in the victim's declaration, in which he stated that he wanted to talk to the district attorney about recanting his statement soon after Breslin was arrested, but no one was available to speak with him. The timing of the victim's eventual recantation is somewhat suspect. Indeed, the first time anyone learned of the victim's new version of the incident was after Breslin had entered her guilty plea and just days before the then scheduled sentencing hearing. There is no evidence anywhere in the record, and certainly not clear and convincing evidence, that Breslin had a potentially meritorious defense at the time she pleaded guilty to the charged crime. Breslin's argument ignores the obvious--the victim's undisclosed change of heart was not known until after Breslin entered her guilty plea." (Id. at p. 1416.)
The court further reasoned that, "Although the prosecution's case might have been slightly weaker than it appeared when Breslin pleaded guilty, this does not invalidate her plea. It might be a different matter if there were actually persuasive, independent evidence the victim had committed perjury or if the prosecution had withheld critical evidence. But we emphasize that there is good reason to believe the victim's new account was the product of latent misgivings about Breslin facing criminal punishment. [¶] After evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the trial court acted well within its discretion in ruling that Breslin failed to meet her burden by clear and convincing evidence to show that she entered her guilty plea under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming her exercise of free judgment." (Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1417-1418.)
Here, prior to ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court reviewed the plea form, noting that defendant had signed the form and initialed various paragraphs, including the paragraph that indicated he offered his plea freely and voluntarily and the paragraph that stated he took Menchaca's car without Menchaca's consent and with the intent to temporarily deprive Menchaca of possession of the car. Nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that his attorney misled him into entering a plea of no contest when he had a meritorious defense. At the time defendant pleaded no contest, Menchaca had testified in detail at the preliminary hearing regarding defendant's conduct in taking his car without permission. There was no evidence introduced at the hearing suggesting that defendant had a meritorious defense. Menchaca's recantation of his preliminary hearing testimony did not occur until after defendant pleaded no contest. Menchaca did not execute his declaration until nearly three months after defendant entered his plea. The declaration was delivered to defense counsel the day before the continued sentencing hearing and Menchaca failed to appear at the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Menchaca's declaration, which consists of four paragraphs spanning less than one page, provides no explanation for why he did not testify truthfully at the preliminary hearing, and there is no independent evidence showing that Menchaca committed perjury.
Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court to view Menchaca's declaration with skepticism. In denying defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest plea, the trial court impliedly found that Menchaca's recantation was not credible. Substantial evidence supports the implied finding, and this court must adopt the finding as its own. (People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1254; Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, at p. 1416.) Accordingly, because defendant failed to show good cause to withdraw his plea by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Blease, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Nicholson, J. /s/_________
Butz, J.