Opinion
2014BX010064
05-28-2015
The People of the State of New York, v. Omar Vigueras, Defendant.
The People - Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County by Rajbir S. Datta, Assistant District Attorney Defendant — The Bronx Defenders by Camilla Hsu
The People - Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County by Rajbir S. Datta, Assistant District Attorney
Defendant — The Bronx Defenders by Camilla Hsu
Armando Montano, J.
The motion by the People for an order, pursuant to CPL §§ 100.45, 200.20(2)(c), and 200.20(4), consolidating docket numbers 2014BX010064, 2014BX064050, and 2015X011069 for trial is denied.
Docket No.: 2014BX010064
By misdemeanor complaint filed under Docket No.: 2014BX010064, defendant is charged with one count of Driving While Intoxicated (VTL § 1192[3]) and one count of Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1]).
The complaint alleges that Officer Johnfran Tullo observed defendant operating a 2012 black Honda Suburban on or about February 22, 2014 at approximately 3:48 a.m. at the corner of Metcalf Avenue and Westchester Avenue in Bronx County. Officer Tullo further alleges that when he asked defendant to exit the motor vehicle, he observed defendant to have bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech, a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath, and to be unsteady on his feet. Defendant was placed under arrest and taken to the 45th Precinct. There, defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test.
Docket No.: 2014BX064050
By misdemeanor complaint filed under Docket No.: 2014BX064050, defendant is charged with one count of Driving While Intoxicated (VTL § 1192[3]) and one count of Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1]).
The complaint alleges that Officer Josue Sepulveda observed defendant operating a 2001 Chevrolet Tahoe on or about December 2, 2014 at approximately 4:20 a.m. at the southwest corner of Bruckner Expressway and Pelham Parkway in Bronx County. Officer Sepulveda alleges that he asked defendant to exit the motor vehicle and he observed defendant to have watery eyes, slurred speech, a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath, and to be unsteady on his feet. Defendant was placed under arrest and taken to the 45th Precinct. There, defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test.
Docket No.: 2015BX011069
By misdemeanor complaint filed under Docket No.: 2015BX011069, defendant is charged with one count of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle (VTL § 511[1][a]), one count of Driving While Intoxicated (VTL § 1192[3]), and one count of Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1]).
The complaint alleges that Officer Ronald Hobson observed defendant operating a 2001 Chevy Tahoe on or about March 8, 2015 at approximately 5:20 a.m. at the southeast corner of East Fordham Road and Jerome Avenue in Bronx County. Officer Hobson alleges that he observed defendant to have an odor of alcohol on his breath, slurred speech, and to be unsteady on his feet. Defendant stated the following to Officer Hobson, "Alright, I had two beers." Officer Hobson further alleges that he conducted a search of the Department of Motor Vehicles records which revealed that defendant's license was suspended pending a hearing. Defendant was placed under arrest and taken to the 45th Precinct. There, defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test.
The People move to consolidate the above-captioned dockets under CPL § 200.20(c). Not only are the dockets joinable, the People argue that consolidation is in the public interest to avoid duplicative, lengthy, and expensive trials. The People also assert, in a wholly conclusory fashion, that defendant would face no prejudice should the dockets be consolidated.
Defendant argues that this Court should not exercise its discretion to consolidate as it would prove to be unduly prejudicial and unfair to him. First, defendant asserts that while all three cases involve driving, the commonalities end there. Defendant points out that the cases involve different witnesses, locations, conduct, and as such, judicial economy would not be served by consolidation. Second, defendant argues that his right to a fair trial would be severely compromised should the dockets be consolidated. Defendant avers that consolidation would allow the People to submit to a single trier of fact evidence that would not be admissible if the offenses were tried separately. Consequently, defendant contends that he will be forced to present a generically applicable defense as to all charges so as not to confuse the jury. Furthermore, defendant asserts that he is likely to testify in one case and not the others. Therefore, consolidation would force him to forgo either his right to testify on his own defense or to be free from being forced to testify. Finally, defendant argues that a jury would likely convict based upon the cumulative effect of evidence of three unrelated DWI cases rather than on the strength of the specific evidence regarding each case.
In a motion to consolidate, the movant has the burden of showing that 1) the offenses charged in the separate indictments are joinable pursuant to CPL § 200.20(2) and 2) combination for a single trial is a prudent exercise of judicial discretion. People v. Lane, 56 NY2d 1 (1982). The decision to grant consolidation is committed to the sound discretion of the Court. In exercising its discretion, the Court should "generally weigh the public interest in avoiding duplicative, lengthy and expensive trials against the defendant's interest in being protected from unfair advantage. Id. at 8. Although the Court is "afforded reasonable latitude in exercising discretion", the Lane Court cautioned that "compromise of a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial free of undue prejudice as the quid pro quo for the mere expeditious disposition of criminal cases will not be tolerated." Id. "The test, which is fact specific, requires the court to foretell whether granting of consolidation will result in a situation that causes undue prejudice at trial. Id. at 7-8.
This Court finds that the People have met their burden of demonstrating that the charges set forth in the three dockets are properly joinable pursuant to CPL § 200.20(2)(c) as they allege offenses "defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar law." In each docket, defendant is charged with VTL § 1192(3) and related charges stemming from his alleged drunk driving. However, the People have failed to establish that consolidation would be a proper exercise of this Court's discretion in light of the prejudice defendant will undoubtedly face during a single trial.
Joinder under CPL § 200.20(2)(c) "is one only of convenience, usually to the State, and, notwithstanding instructions to the jury to compartmentalize the evidence relating to each of the separate criminal incidents being tried, there is a real danger that evidence relating to one crime will improperly affect consideration of the other or others." People v. Yuk Bui Yee, 94 Misc 2d 628, 630 (Sup Ct, NY County 1978). Here, the benefits of judicial economy are minimal, at best.
It bears emphasizing that "[t]he general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment, either as a foundation for a separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged." People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264, 291 (1901). "The basis for the rule is the fear that a jury might convict not for the crime charged, but because, as evidenced by other criminal conduct, the accused is a person deserving of punishment." People v. Fiore, 34 NY2d 81, 84 (1974). "It is axiomatic that propensity evidence invites a jury to misfocus, if not base its verdict, on a defendant's prior crimes rather than on the evidence—or lack of evidence—relating to the case before it." People v. Rojas, 97 NY2d 32, 37 (2001). "While such evidence may be marginally relevant to the question of the accused's guilt, its probative value is deemed to be outweighed by its potential for prejudice, and, accordingly, the evidence is excluded as a matter of judicial policy." People v. Santarelli, 49 NY2d 241, 247 (1980).
Nevertheless, where the evidence sought to be introduced is relevant to a material fact in the case, other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crimes charged, then such evidence may be admissible. People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981). The Molineux rule provides that evidence of a defendant's prior crimes or bad acts is inadmissible unless it is probative of a material issue other than criminal propensity and its probative value outweighs the risk of prejudice to the defendant. People v. Alvino, 71 NY2d 233 (1987); People v. Alweiss, 48 NY2d 40 (1979); Molineux, 168 NY 264. The Molineux Court identified the following five exceptions under which evidence of prior crimes or bad acts may be introduced to prove: 1) motive; 2) intent; 3) the absence of mistake or accident; 4) a common scheme or plan; or 5) the identity of the person charged. Molineux, 168 NY2d at 293. This list of exceptions is not exhaustive and are merely illustrative of the instances where evidence of prior criminal conduct may be admissible. People v. Alvino, 71 NY2d 233 (1987); People v. Vails, 43 NY2d 364 (1977).
Although the offenses charged are "defined by the same or similar statutory provisions", each of the three alleged drunk driving incidents constitutes three separate criminal transactions. The cumulative effect of a single trier of fact considering evidence of three unrelated drunk driving incidents would unduly prejudice defendant. In addition, there is no indication that proof from one case would be material and admissible as evidence upon trial of the others, i.e, none of the Molineux exceptions apply herein. Notwithstanding instructions to the jury to consider the evidence of each crime separately, there is a substantial likelihood that a jury would be swayed by evidence of defendant's general propensity to commit the offenses charged. This Court will not impinge upon defendant's right to a fair trial for the sake of expediency.
Accordingly, the People's motion for an order, pursuant to CPL §§ 100.45, 200.20(2)(c), and 200.20(4), consolidating the above-captioned dockets is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated:May 28, 2015
Bronx, New York
_______________________________
Hon. Armando Montano