Opinion
B334210
11-26-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KARINA BRIANEY GONZALEZ VERDE, Defendant and Appellant.
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VA153258, Lisa S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SIGGINS, J. [*]
INTRODUCTION
After appellant Karina Gonzalez Verde hit a police officer's vehicle while fleeing from police, a jury convicted him of multiple crimes related to the incident, including misdemeanor hit-and-run driving in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) (section 20002(a)) He argues the misdemeanor hit and run must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that he knew he damaged the police vehicle. We affirm.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An information charged appellant with the following counts: felony reckless driving while fleeing a police officer (§ 2800.2, count one); two misdemeanor counts of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1), counts two and three); and leaving the scene of an accident causing property damage, a misdemeanor (§ 20002(a), count four).
Violations of section 20002(a) are commonly referred to as misdemeanor hit-and-run driving. (See People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1118 (Carbajal).)
A jury trial commenced on December 13, 2023, and appellant was found guilty as charged on all counts. The court sentenced appellant to the mid-term of two years in state prison for felony reckless driving on count one, consecutive terms of 364 days in county jail on each of counts two and three for resisting or obstructing an officer, and a consecutive term of 180 days in county jail on count four for leaving the scene of an accident causing property damage. Appellant was given credit for time served, released from custody, and ordered to report for parole. His appeal is timely.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant challenges only his conviction on count four, the hit-and-run charge. Accordingly, we will only discuss the evidence relevant to that charge. The People presented the following evidence in their case in chief.
On April 24, 2020, at approximately 11:20 p.m., officer Charlie Cano of the Bell Gardens Police Department (BGPD) responded to a call pertaining to a disturbance at a residence on Quinn Avenue. The call stated that someone was banging on vehicles nearby. Cano did not locate them, but a witness provided a description of the person and their vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, Cano received a second dispatch call regarding a woman and a vehicle matching the description of the original suspect. She was said to be stopped on the street a few blocks away. The vehicle, a dark-colored Kia SUV, was stopped in a traffic lane next to the left-turn lane and appellant appeared to be putting gas into the vehicle. Several police officers approached the vehicle and asked to speak with appellant, but he refused and turned up the music in the car. Appellant refused further directions from the officers and instead drove away. Cano and several other officers followed. The prosecution played video of the incident from the officers' bodyworn cameras and vehicle dashboard cameras.
BGPD lieutenant John Acosta and officer Erich Oertel also followed appellant as he left the intersection and drove through a residential neighborhood. When appellant turned onto a street that ended in a cul-de-sac, Oertel and two other officers positioned their vehicles to block appellant's exit. Acosta testified that appellant turned around, then drove onto the curb in an attempt to leave the cul-de-sac. Appellant drove "head on" into Oertel's vehicle. Acosta testified that while he did not see the collision, he "observed the vehicle get close" and thought he heard the sound of a collision. He also heard Oertel say that appellant had hit his vehicle.
Oertel testified that as appellant approached the police blockade, appellant's vehicle "momentarily stopped, the driver and I - I believe we made eye contact, and then [he] continued past my unit hitting my unit." Oertel estimated that appellant was traveling 10 to 15 miles per hour at the time of the collision and that he felt the "jolt" from the impact. Appellant hit the front left part of the "push bar" on the front of Oertel's vehicle, leaving scuff marks. The jury was shown photographs of the damage. Immediately after the collision, Oertel advised the other officers over the radio that his vehicle had been struck. He then remained with his vehicle and did not pursue appellant in accord with police protocol following a collision.
After hitting Oertel's vehicle, appellant drove out of the cul-de-sac, followed by the other police officers. Appellant ultimately stopped, exited his vehicle, and attempted to run away. Police officers tackled him to the ground, handcuffed, and then arrested him.
Appellant presented no testimony in his defense. He entered two exhibits into evidence consisting of a photograph of the cul-de-sac involved in the incident, and the County of Los Angeles COVID 19 control order in effect in April and May 2020. The defense then rested.
DISCUSSION
Appellant does not dispute that he hit or damaged Officer Oertel's vehicle. Instead, he argues count four must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that he knew he had damaged the officer's vehicle as required for a hit-and-run conviction. We affirm.
I. Standard of Review
We review claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a judgment under the substantial evidence standard. We review "the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find [the elements of the crime] beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128; see also People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 243.) "In so doing, a reviewing court 'presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.'" (People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 244, quoting People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933, quoting People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 702.)
II. Analysis
Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove he had actual or constructive knowledge that he damaged the police vehicle when he hit it with his car. Under our standard of review, the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction under section 20002(a).
Section 20002(a) requires "[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to any property, including vehicles," to "immediately stop" their vehicle at the nearest safe location and provide their name and address to the owner of the damaged property. Thus, "[t]he essential elements of a violation of section 20002, subdivision (a) are that the defendant: (1) knew he or she was involved in an accident; (2) knew damage resulted from the accident; and (3) knowingly and willfully left the scene of the accident (4) without giving the required information to the other driver(s)." (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1123, fn. 10, citing People v. Crouch (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 21 (Crouch).)
"The question of knowledge [is] a factual question for the determination of the" trier of fact. (People v. Wolf (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 735, 740 (Wolf).) Actual knowledge of property damage is not required. Constructive knowledge may be imputed to the defendant based on the surrounding circumstances. (People v. Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 241-242 (Carter).)
Here, the parties agree that the cases analyzing a defendant's knowledge of causing injury under the felony hit-and-run statute, section 20001, are useful in analyzing a defendant's knowledge of causing property damage under section 20002(a). (See Crouch, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 18-21.) As one court explained in that context, "Usually . . . such knowledge must be derived from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the accident. [Citation.] Yet the driver who leaves the scene of the accident seldom possesses actual knowledge of injury; by leaving the scene he forecloses any opportunity to acquire such actual knowledge. Hence a requirement of actual knowledge of injury would realistically render the statute useless. We therefore believe that criminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person." (Wolf, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 740, quoting People v. Holford, 63 Cal.2d 74, 80, fn. omitted; see also People v. Harbert (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 42, 55 [courts "look to the actual circumstances of the accident" to determine whether the evidence supports a finding of knowledge].)
Appellant argues that there was no evidence showing that he knew he damaged Oertel's patrol car. He acknowledges that the collision was "audible and jolting" but contends that the only damage to the vehicle was "mere scuff marks." Thus, he argues that his knowledge of the damage "cannot be inferred." Not so.
Our Supreme Court has made clear that any property damage, no matter how slight, may satisfy the statute. In Carbajal, the court explained, "'the cost of a "hit and run" violation is paid for by every law-abiding driver in the form of increased insurance premiums. The crime with which the defendant is charged is complete upon the "running" whether or not his conduct caused substantial or minimal (or indeed any) damage or injury; it is the running which offends public policy.'" (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1124; see also People v. Dimacali (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 822, 829, quoting Carbajal; People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1102 ["'the act made criminal' under the statute 'is not the "hitting" but the "running"'"].)
Here, appellant disputes neither that he hit Oertel's patrol car nor caused the scuff marks on the push bar. There was evidence that appellant was driving 10 to 15 miles per hour at the time, attempting to escape the cul-de-sac blocked by police cars, and that the collision caused a sound heard by other officers and jolted Oertel's body. Oertel knew immediately that his vehicle had been hit, and he reported the collision to the other officers. Appellant continued his attempt to flee from officers following the collision. The jury could have relied on this evidence to conclude that appellant knew not only that he collided with another car, but that he also knew he caused damage, however slight. Appellant's argument amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal. (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
Appellant relies upon Carter, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d 239, which involved a minor collision between two vehicles. As appellant notes, the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant knew of any injuries sustained in the accident to support a conviction for felony hit-and-run under section 20001. In Carter, the injuries were minor and the victims denied any injury when they were asked by the defendant at the scene. (Id. at p. 241.) But even though the court reversed the conviction under section 20001, it concluded there was "ample evidence" to support a conviction for misdemeanor hit-and-run under section 20002(a), based on the slight damage sustained by both vehicles in the collision. (Id. at pp. 240, 242.) Thus, Carter does not support appellant's argument.
Considering the record as a whole and the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the jury's conviction for hit-and-run with property damage under section 20002(a).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
We concur: MORI, ACTING P. J., ZUKIN, J.
[*] Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.