People v. Ventimiglia

1,000+ Citing cases

  1. People v. Spotford

    85 N.Y.2d 593 (N.Y. 1995)   Cited 94 times
    In People v. Spotford, 85 N.Y. 2d 593, 596 (1995), the New York Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant has a right, under New York law, to be present at a Ventimiglia hearing.

    Prior to trial, the People filed a notice of intent to use four prior bad acts of the defendant as part of their direct case to prove his commission of the offenses charged. The defense moved to preclude such evidence and in the presence of defendant and his attorney, the court set a Ventimiglia (People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350) hearing date to resolve the issues. At that time, the court granted the request of defendant's attorney to waive defendant's appearance at the hearing.

  2. Liggins v. Burge

    07 Civ. 2538 (VM) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding right to be present at Ventimiglia hearing was based on state -- not federal -- law

    Hearings addressing the admission of such evidence are alternatively referred to as Ventimiglia hearings. See New York v. Ventimiglia, 420 N.E.2d 59 (N.Y. 1981).I. BACKGROUND

  3. Harvey v. Portuondo

    98-CV-7371 (JG) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2002)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that petitioner's argument that appellate counsel should have sought reversal on the ground that Ventimiglia hearing should have been held was "simply absurd," because " motion to preclude [evidence of past domestic abuse and threat to do the crime ultimately charged], which plainly was admissible to prove petitioner's motive and intention to commit the crime, would have been frivolous"

    In October of 1997, petitioner filed a motion for a writ of errorcoram nobis in the Appellate Division, claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because there were a number of issues that appellate counsel had failed to address on petitioner's direct appeal. First, petitioner claimed that counsel should have raised a federal constitutional claim with respect to petitioner's written confession, and the failure to do so resulted in (a) the Appellate Division's determination that any error was harmless; (b) the New York Court of Appeals' decision to deny leave to appeal; and (c) the United States Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari. Second, petitioner alleged that appellate counsel erred in not challenging the admission of uncharged crimes evidence at trial without the benefit of a hearing under People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350 (1981). Third, he claimed that appellate counsel unreasonably failed to challenge the admissibility of opinion testimony of the People's expert psychiatric witness, Dr. Lawrence Siegel. Fourth, petitioner argued that appellate counsel should have challenged the admission of Dr. Siegel's testimony on hearsay grounds.

  4. People v. Mateo

    2 N.Y.3d 383 (N.Y. 2004)   Cited 3,541 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding criminal liability attaches to "a person concerned in the commission of a crime whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission . . ."

    In a surprise midtrial decision, the court, sua sponte, admitted Mr. Mateo's confessions to three unrelated murders, thus denying him a fair trial. ( People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264; People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72; People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350; People v. McKinney, 24 NY2d 180; People v. Lewis, 69 NY2d 321; People v. Alvino, 71 NY2d 233; People v. Zackowitz, 254 NY 192; People v. Hudy, 73 NY2d 40; People v. Vargas, 88 NY2d 856; People v. Rojas, 97 NY2d 32.) IV. The court should have severed the Avenue D charges because the prosecution never showed that evidence of those home invasions was admissible under People v. Molineux ( 168 NY 264) to prove that Mr. Mateo kidnapped and murdered Juan Matos.

  5. People v. Ely

    68 N.Y.2d 520 (N.Y. 1986)   Cited 284 times
    Reversing murder conviction on Molineux grounds

    The most damning evidence of motive, however, consisted of three tapes of recorded telephone conversations between defendant and the deceased (exhibits 39, 40 and 41). The recordings were made by the deceased at his attorney's suggestion during August and September 1981, and were intended for use as evidence in the parties' then pending divorce proceeding. Prior to commencement of the trial, defendant's attorney sought a ruling (see, People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 362) excluding the tapes on the ground of relevance, marital privilege and prejudice. The Trial Judge denied the request, reasoning that the conversations were not privileged because not made as part of an attempted reconciliation, but reserved decision as to relevancy pending proof at trial "as to what the motive is."

  6. People v. Harris

    117 A.D.3d 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 43 times

    Nevertheless, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. “It is a general rule that it is error to receive evidence as proof of the offense charged that an accused has committed a criminal offense other than that charged in the indictment” ( People v. Thompson, 212 N.Y. 249, 251, 106 N.E. 78;see Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 4–501 [Farrell 11th ed. 2008] ). “The rule excluding evidence of uncharged crimes is based upon the human tendency more readily ‘to believe in the guilt of an accused person when it is known or suspected that he [or she] has previously committed a similar crime’ ” ( People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59, quoting People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 313, 61 N.E. 286;People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 47, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 396 N.E.2d 735;see People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 198, 172 N.E. 466). It has been recognized that “[t]he natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal—whether judge or jury—is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge” ( People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. at 198, 172 N.E. 466 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Accordingly, although “[i]t may be logical to conclude from a defendant's prior crimes that he [or she] is inclined to act criminally,” this evidence is nonetheless “excluded for policy reasons because it may induce the jury to base a finding of guilt on collateral matters or to convict a defendant because of his past” ( People v. Arafet, 13 N.Y.3d 460, 465, 892 N.Y.S

  7. People v. Telfair

    41 N.Y.3d 107 (N.Y. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    "The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal -- whether judge or jury -- is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge" (People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y.192, 198, 172 N.E. 466 [1930] [Cardozo, J.]).Excluding such evidence avoids the risk of infecting jury deliberations with forbidden propensity inferences (see Molineux, 168 N.Y. at 291–293, 61 N.E. 286; People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59 [1981]). There are, however, exceptions to this rule: Evidence of prior crimes may be admissible "if it helps to establish some element of the crime under consideration or is relevant because of some recognized exception to the general rule" (People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808 [1987]).

  8. People v. Telfair

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 5965 (N.Y. 2023)

    "The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal - whether judge or jury - is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge" (People v Zackowitz, 254 NY 192, 198 [1930] [Cardozo, J.]). Excluding such evidence avoids the risk of infecting jury deliberations with forbidden propensity inferences (see Molineux, 168 NY at 291-293; People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359 [1981]).

  9. People v. Morris

    2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 6633 (N.Y. 2013)   Cited 180 times
    Holding that evidence of a 911 call accusing defendant of robbing someone at gunpoint was relevant background information that helped explain the aggressive conduct of police when arresting the defendant

    However, “[w]hen evidence of uncharged crimes is relevant to some issue other than the defendant's criminal disposition, it is generally held to be admissible on the theory that the probative value will outweigh the potential prejudice to the accused” (People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 47, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 396 N.E.2d 735 [1979] ).People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901) prescribes five well-recognized, nonpropensity purposes for which uncharged crimes may be relevant (see Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d at 242, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808 [“to show (1) intent, (2) motive, (3) knowledge, (4) common scheme or plan, or (5) identity of the defendant”]; see also e.g. People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59 [1981] ; Molineux, 168 N.Y. at 293, 61 N.E. 286 ). The Molineux categories are not exhaustive, however (see People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 425 N.Y.S.2d 77, 401 N.E.2d 199 [1980] ), and we have held that evidence of prior, uncharged crimes may also be relevant to complete the narrative of the events charged in the indictment (see e.g. People v. Till, 87 N.Y.2d 835, 837, 637 N.Y.S.2d 681, 661 N.E.2d 153 [1995] ; People v. Gines, 36 N.Y.2d 932, 932–933, 373 N.Y.S.2d 543, 335 N.E.2d 850 [1975] ), and to provide necessary background information (see e.g. Till, supra; People v. Green, 35 N.Y.2d 437, 442, 363 N.Y.S.2d 910, 323 N.E.2d 160 [1974] ; see also Resek, 3 N.Y.3d at 390, 787 N.Y.S.2d 683, 821 N.E.2d 108 ; Tosca, 98 N.Y.2d at 661, 746 N.Y.S.2d 276, 773 N.E.2d 1014 ).

  10. People v. Blanchard

    83 A.D.2d 905 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)   Cited 19 times

    We conclude that the admission of this testimony was error. Where, as here, the defendant in a criminal trial has not taken the stand or placed his character in issue, the general rule is that the prosecution is prohibited from introducing evidence of his past criminal record (People v. Mullin, 41 N.Y.2d 475 [error for the prosecution to elicit testimony that defendant's photograph was taken from the criminal file]; People v. Robbins, 38 N.Y.2d 913). This rule derives from a recognition of the human tendency to more readily believe that a person is guilty of a crime if he has a prior criminal history, and the possibility that a jury may convict a defendant on that basis even though not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the crime charged (People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350). A defendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely upon the evidence tending to prove the crime charged, uninfluenced by irrelevant and prejudicial facts and circumstances (People v. Cook, 42 N.Y.2d 204). The rule is not absolute, however, and ultimately, where the evidence of past criminality is probative of an issue in the case, its admissibility will depend upon a balance between its probative value versus its potential for prejudice (People v Ventimiglia, supra; People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241; People v Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40; People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264). As our dissenting colleague points out, the evidence of past criminality which was admitted in Ventimiglia was extremely prejudicial, but there the court found that the probative value of that evidence outweighed the resulting prejudice. The court stated (People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 355-356, supra): "[W]here defendants charged with murder, kidnapping and conspiracy have stated as part o