Opinion
2002-237 QCR.
Decided April 1, 2004.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Criminal Court, Queens County (W. Erlbaum, J.), rendered January 7, 2002, which convicted him of promoting prostitution in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 230.20) and imposing sentence.
Judgment of conviction unanimously reversed on the law and information dismissed.
PRESENT: ARONIN, J.P., GOLIA and RIOS, JJ.
The defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint which was later replaced on August 1, 2000 by a prosecutor's information. Under CPL 30.30 (5) (c), the People had 90 days to declare readiness for trial from the filing of the new accusatory instrument. On November 6, 2000, the People declared readiness for trial. It is the adjournment from October 20th until November 6th which is the subject of the instant appeal. A review of the minutes of the October 20, 2000 hearing establishes that the People were not ready to proceed to trial on that day with respect to the case at bar as well as on another case in which the defendant was being charged. The People stated that they "can be ready" for trial on the instant case on October 25th and could be ready for trial on the other case on November 1st. For its own convenience and scheduling purposes, the court stated that it would adjourn both matters to the same date. Defense counsel indicated that November 1st was inconvenient for him and requested an adjourned date of November 6th.
Since the People did not make a present declaration of readiness on October 20th, but merely made a "prediction or expectation of future readiness" ( People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337), and the court's adjournment of the case due to scheduling purposes and for its own convenience did not prevent the People from either declaring readiness or filing a statement of readiness ( see People v. Smith, 82 NY2d 676, 678; People v. Brothers, 50 NY2d 413), we are of the opinion that the People are chargeable with the time period from October 20th through October 30th, the 90th day. Therefore, defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 should be granted and the information dismissed.
In light of the foregoing, this court does not reach defendant's remaining contention on appeal.