Interestingly, in McCleod the defendant took the position a person could have more than one residence within the meaning of the statute. The court in People v. Velasco[*] (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 748, 757-758, agreed with this construction of section 290. [*] Reporter's Note: Opinion (B113974) deleted upon direction of Supreme Court by order dated December 16, 1998.
at 417–18, 80 Cal.Rptr. 2d 310.] Accord People v. Velasco, 66 Cal.App. 4th 748, 757, 78 Cal.Rptr. 2d 259 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (“It would be inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of this law to allow a sex offender to have two residences, one registered and one unregistered. Any such construction would be absurd on its face.”) Similarly, in North Carolina v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E. 2d 444 (2009), the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision that had overturned the defendant's conviction for failure to register a change of address on the basis that the State failed to carry its burden that the defendant had changed her address. The defendant testified at trial that she stayed at the unregistered address of her father's “ ‘off and on over about a three week period’ ... [and] that ‘almost, everyday’ she still visited [the registered address] to care for her pets, wash clothes, or ‘hang out.’ ”