Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CM024239
ROBIE, J.
In exchange for dismissal of other counts against him, defendant Martin Velarde, Jr., pled guilty to making criminal threats and cruelty to a child by inflicting injury and admitted a special allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon. After initially sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of three years, the trial court recalled defendant’s sentence and instead placed him on probation for four years subject to various terms and conditions, including that he refrain from the use or possession of alcohol, enroll in an in/out patient substance abuse treatment program, attend daily AA/NA meetings for 90 days (as directed by his probation officer or treatment staff), and reside in a clean and sober living environment as approved by his probation officer.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court: (1) abused its discretion in imposing conditions of probation that required him to refrain from using or possessing alcohol, enroll in a substance abuse treatment program, and attend daily AA/NA meetings; (2) violated his right to due process by imposing the vague condition that he reside in a “clean and sober living environment”; and (3) erred in imposing a $1,760 “Child Abuse Prevention Fine.” We will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During a physical altercation between defendant and the victim, his girlfriend of four years, defendant slapped her in the face. When she tried to escape by running into the bedroom and locking the door, defendant threatened to kick the door in. When she opened the door, defendant charged her and began punching her in the face, saying, “‘You deserve to get hit.’” She ran from defendant, jumped on the bed, and covered her face. Defendant pulled a knife from a sheath on his belt and plunged it three times into the mattress next to her, telling her he was going to “‘slice her fucking face.’”
The victim’s nine-year-old daughter, A. V., told defendant to leave her mother alone. Defendant pushed A. V. against the wall, causing her to strike her ear. When the victim tried to run to the kitchen, defendant followed her and continued to strike her. She ran back to the bedroom and tried, unsuccessfully, to call the police from her cell phone. She told A. V. to run to the neighbor’s house and call the police. Meanwhile, defendant continued to break things in the victim’s kitchen. She told him to leave. As defendant got into his vehicle and started to leave, she threw a stereo speaker at his windshield, breaking it. Defendant retaliated by breaking the kitchen window. He left, but returned a short time later and broke several bedroom windows.
When police arrived, they spoke with A. V., who declined medical attention but said she heard her mother and defendant “screaming at each other” and heard her mother tell defendant to stop hitting her. She also said defendant pushed her against the wall when she tried to intervene, causing her to hit her ear.
Police also spoke with the victim’s six-year-old child, J. V., who said he ran and hid when he heard his mother screaming because he was afraid of defendant and feared he would be hurt if found.
Defendant was later arrested and charged with corporal injury to a spouse, a felony; making criminal threats; cruelty to a child by inflicting injury; and assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to produce great bodily injury. As to the charge of making criminal threats, it was alleged defendant personally used a deadly weapon, a knife.
Defendant pled guilty to making criminal threats and cruelty to a child by inflicting injury and admitted the special allegation in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts with a Harvey waiver. The court denied probation and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of three years in prison.
People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.
Several months later, the trial court, on its own motion, recalled defendant’s sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) and granted formal probation for four years under terms and conditions which included the requirement that defendant refrain from the use or possession of alcohol, enroll in an in/out patient substance abuse treatment program, attend daily AA/NA meetings for 90 days as directed by probation or treatment staff, and reside in a clean and sober living environment as approved by the probation officer. The court also imposed financial terms that included a $1,760 fine. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
DISCUSSION
I
Forfeiture Of Objections To Probation Conditions
Defendant first contends the court abused its discretion in imposing probation conditions requiring him to refrain from the use or possession of alcohol, enroll in a substance abuse treatment program, and attend daily AA/NA meetings for 90 days. Defendant claims he preserved his objections to these conditions for review on appeal when he asserted in the trial court that there was no “‘evidence or issues of drug or alcohol.’” We disagree.
As the trial court began imposing special conditions of probation on defendant, defense counsel stated there were “a couple of things” he wanted to address. He then stated (among other things), “In this particular case, I don’t think there is evidence or issues of drug or alcohol. And so I’m concerned about [special condition No.] eight” (the in/out patient substance abuse treatment program). Defense counsel specifically confirmed that his objection applied only to special condition No. 8 (“[j]ust eight”) and was based on the fact that, “in this case everyone claims that everyone was sober. They were angry. They were emotional, but they were sober.” Defense counsel did not connect this assertion to special condition No. 5 (refrain from use or possession of alcohol) or special condition No. 32 (daily AA/NA meetings for 90 days) or any other objection to those conditions.
The supplemental probation report also included another special condition (No. 20) providing for enrollment in a residential substance abuse treatment program at the discretion of the probation officer. Defense counsel specifically stated that his objection did not encompass special condition No. 20.
The court imposed special condition No. 5 without objection, then, as to special condition No. 8, ruled that “if his [defendant’s] probation officer feels that’s appropriate, I am going to order eight. That is a mandatory condition. That is giving probation authorization as determined that if there is a suspicion that his domestic violence problems or his relationship problems are connected to his substance abuse, probation then can have him take care of that in a substance abuse treatment program. And I think it’s appropriate.” Defense counsel interjected, “I do, your Honor, yes.” The court later imposed special condition No. 32 without objection.
Generally, the lack of a timely and meaningful objection to a criminal sentence results in forfeiture of the claim on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351; see also People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434, [a defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable].)
Here, defendant contends he preserved his challenge to the special probation conditions when his attorney asserted there was no “‘evidence or issues of drug or alcohol.’” What defendant fails to note is that counsel limited that assertion to special condition No. 8 only -- that defendant attend an in/out patient substance abuse treatment program. Counsel offered no objections to the conditions that he refrain from using or possessing alcohol and that he attend daily AA/NA meetings for 90 days. Accordingly, any challenge to those conditions was forfeited.
As for the challenge to the condition that defendant attend an in/out patient substance abuse treatment program, while defense counsel did initially raise the claim that there was no “‘evidence or issues of drug or alcohol’” supporting that condition, that claim was later forfeited when defense counsel agreed with the court’s assertion that that condition was appropriate by saying “I do, your Honor, yes.” Accordingly, we conclude that defendant failed to preserve for appellate review any argument that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring him to refrain from the use or possession of alcohol, enroll in a substance abuse treatment program, and attend daily AA/NA meetings for 90 days.
II
Clean And Sober Living Environment Condition
Defendant contends that special condition No. 38 -- the requirement that he reside in a clean and sober living environment -- is vague and therefore violates his right to due process.
Defendant does not argue that the court abused its discretion in imposing this condition like he did with the other alcohol-related conditions discussed above.
As a preliminary matter, we note that with regard to special condition No. 38, defense counsel noted that defendant “intend[ed] to be clean and sober, but it won’t be a program necessarily” and expressed a lack of understanding as to whether the special condition “mean[t] a program.” When the court confirmed it did not, counsel made no further inquiry and did not object for vagueness or otherwise. As the People correctly concede, however, defendant’s claim of constitutional vagueness of a probation condition is not forfeited by his failure to object at trial. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887-889.)
Defendant contends the requirement that he “must reside in a clean-and-sober environment” is unconstitutionally vague because “a reasonable person would not understand what was expected or required of him or her.” We agree with the People, however, that the term “clean and sober living environment” has attained a generally accepted meaning, as established by individual and group counseling and residential programs for substance abuse treatment. We note that there are hundreds of cases, published and unpublished, that use the term “clean and sober” presumptively without objection. The principal characteristic appears to be the absence of drugs and alcohol in the individual’s system and in the environment in which he or she resides. Construed with reference to this common understanding of the term “clean and sober,” special condition No. 38 is not vague and its imposition did not violate defendant’s due process rights.
III
The “Child Abuse Prevention Fine”
Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred in its imposition of a $1,760 “Child Abuse Prevention Fine” because “even if the amount is found to be statutorily authorized, the court erred in failing to clarify the basis for imposing the selected sum.” We agree the court erred in imposing this fine without specifying its basis; however, because the basis for the selected sum can be determined from the record on appeal, remand is unnecessary. We will simply order the trial court to modify its minute orders to reflect the basis for the fine (which, as will be shown, is actually multiple fines aggregated together).
The minute order from the resentencing hearing shows that the court imposed a “$1,760.00 Child Abuse Prevention Fine - PC 294(a).” Similarly, page four of the “Terms & Conditions of Formal Probation” shows that the court ordered a $1,760 “CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION FINE PER PC294(a).”
In ordering fees and fines, the trial court referred to page eight of the supplemental probation report. By reference to this report, from which the trial court derived this $1,760 amount “as broken down,” it can readily be determined that what the court was imposing was not -- as the court documents suggest -- a single $1,760 fine under section 294, subdivision (a). Rather, this $1,760 figure is actually the total of a number of different fines, surcharges, and penalty assessments, which appear as follows in the supplemental probation report: “Child Abuse Prevention Fine PC §294(a) $500.00 fine; $100.00 Court Surcharge (§1465.7 PC), $250.00 State Court Facilities Construction Fund (§70372(a) GC); $500.00 State Penalty Assessment (§1464 PC), $350.00 County Penalty Assessment (§76000 GC), $50.00 DNA Identification Fund (§76104.6 GC), $10.00 Collection Fee (§294(d) PC). total: $1,760.00.”
In light of this entry in the supplemental probation report, it is clear that what the trial court was attempting to impose were the following fines, surcharges, and penalty assessments, which total $1,760: a $500 restitution fine under section 294, subdivision (a); a $100 state surcharge under section 1465.7; a $250 state court facilities construction fund fine under Government Code section 70372, subdivision (a); a $500 state penalty assessment under section 1464; a $350 county penalty assessment under Government Code section 76000; a $50 DNA identification fund penalty assessment under Government Code section 76104.6, and a $10 collection fee under section 294, subdivision (d).
Although the trial court should have specifically identified each separate fine, surcharge, and penalty assessment on the record at sentencing (see People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200), its failure to do so does not require remand inasmuch as we have been able to determine what the trial court meant to order.
However, the November 9, 2006, minute order and the “Terms & Conditions of Formal Probation” both must be modified to properly reflect each of the fines, surcharges, and penalty assessments (set forth above) that make up what is now erroneously shown on those documents as a $1,760 “child abuse prevention fine.”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to modify its November 9, 2006, minute order and the “Terms & Conditions of Formal Probation” consistent with this opinion.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., MORRISON, J.