Opinion
1653-2020
02-23-2021
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Selena VEGA, Defendant.
Legal Aid Society, New York City (Paul Beyder of counsel), for defendant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Daniela Adao of counsel), for plaintiff.
Legal Aid Society, New York City (Paul Beyder of counsel), for defendant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Daniela Adao of counsel), for plaintiff.
Matthew J. D'Emic, J.
The defendant moves for an order, pursuant to CPL § 190.50, to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the People deprived her of an opportunity to testify before the grand jury. Upon due consideration of the papers, the defendant's motion is denied.
On July 29, 2020, the defendant was arraigned in Criminal Court on a felony complaint, under Kings County Docket Number CR-014197-20KN, which charged her with assault in the first degree and other related offenses. At that time, the People served written CPL § 190.50 notice upon defense counsel, who thereafter served reciprocal CPL § 190.50 notice, informing the prosecution of defendant's intent to testify before the grand jury.
The following facts are essentially undisputed by either party. At the defendant's criminal court arraignment, the court set bail, entitling the defendant to a preliminary hearing to determine whether there exists reasonable cause to believe that she committed the offenses charged. However, the defendant posted bail on July 31, 2020, rendering the hearing unnecessary. Prior to convening a grand jury, the People sent defense counsel an email, dated October 5, 2020, notifying counsel that the defendant was scheduled to testify in the grand jury at 11:30 a.m. on October 13, 2020. Defense counsel made no effort to postpone or reschedule the defendant's testimony, and the defendant did not appear in the grand jury on October 13, 2020. The grand jury subsequently returned Indictment Number 1653-2020, and the defendant was arraigned thereon in Supreme Court on November 18, 2020.
There is no Federal or State Constitutional right to testify before a grand jury ( People v. Smith, 87 N.Y.2d 715, 642 N.Y.S.2d 568, 665 N.E.2d 138 [1996] ; People v. Lighthall , 6 A.D.3d 1170, 776 N.Y.S.2d 404 [4th Dept. 2004] ). An individual's right to appear as a witness before a Grand Jury convened to consider charges against him or her is purely statutory (see CPL § 190.50 ). Where a defendant timely serves the People with written notice of his or her desire to testify before the grand jury, the People must accord defendant a reasonable opportunity to do so ( People v. Sawyer, 96 N.Y.2d 815, 727 N.Y.S.2d 381, 751 N.E.2d 460 [2001] ; People v. Pugh, 207 A.D.2d 503, 615 N.Y.S.2d 912 [2d Dept. 1994] ). What constitutes a reasonable opportunity is determined on a case-by-case basis ( Sawyer at 816, 727 N.Y.S.2d 381, 751 N.E.2d 460 ; People v. Jordan , 153 A.D.2d 263, 550 N.Y.S.2d 917 [2d Dept. 1990] ).
The defendant argues that the People's alleged failure to turn over automatic discovery prior to her scheduled appearance date effectively deprived her of a reasonable opportunity to testify before the grand jury despite her timely service of cross CPL § 190.50 notice. In opposition, the People argue that the defendant's claim is without merit because her failure to testify before the grand jury was of her own creation.
CPL § 245.10 (1) (c) provides
"The prosecution shall disclose statements of the defendant as described in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 245.20 of this article to any defendant who has been arraigned in a local criminal court upon a currently undisposed of felony complaint charging an offense which is a subject of a prospective or pending grand jury proceeding, no later than forty-eight hours before the time scheduled for the defendant to testify at a grand jury proceeding pursuant to subdivision five of section 190.50 of this part."
Notably, it is the only subsection of the statute that explicitly refers to a defendant's right to appear before the grand jury, which reflects legislative intent to limit application of the prospective disclosure obligation imposed under the provision to those discoverable materials specifically enumerated therein. Consequently, it is only necessary to consider the defendant's claim in the context of the purported non-disclosure of statements the defendant may have uttered to law enforcement officers (see CPL § 245.20[1][a] ).
Regardless, the People have demonstrated that they provided defense counsel with initial discovery via email and OneDrive on July 30, 2020 (see People's Ex. People's Ex. 2)
The defendant acknowledges that the People served CPL § 710.30 (1) (a) notice at her criminal court arraignment, which contains the defendant's statement to Detective Christopher Hinton Kelly at approximately 5:30 (a.m.) on July 28, 2020, in sum and substance, my child's name is [S.V.] and his date of birth is X/X/2019." The People also furnished the defendant with a copy of the Miranda warning sheet, which indicates that Detected Hinton Kelly administered the warnings at approximately 11:30 a.m. on July 28, 2020. Based on those circumstances, defense counsel concludes that the People's statement notice memorializes only a fragment of an hours-long interrogation.
Preliminarily, the People clarify that the defendant made the statement in question at 5:30 p.m. on June 28th, 2020. They further explain that the information was elicited from the defendant at the request of the ECAB screener, and that no additional communication transpired. The People maintain that the defendant was not interrogated due to her initial refusal to waive her Miranda rights and submit to questioning. The defendant's speculative claims fail to demonstrate that there is reason to doubt the People's representation to the court.
Due to a ministerial error, the People's CPL§ 710.30 (1) (a) notice informs that the defendant uttered the statement at 5:30 a.m. on June 28, 2020.
In the defendant's reply, defense counsel concedes that he was mistaken in his belief that the People failed to provide any discovery. The defendant now argues that the People should be deemed to have withheld additional statements the defendant made to officers because to hold otherwise would force the court to take the incredulous position that the defendant's arrest was "effected in complete silence." This claim is completely without merit as the People are not required to provide notice of any pedigree information the defendant may have provided.
In any event, the People aver that "my child's name is [S.V.] and his date of birth is X/X/2019" was the only statement the defendant made to law enforcement officers. The People's CPL § 710.30 (1) (a) notice provided the substance of the statement and was served well prior to the 48-hour period immediately preceding the defendant's scheduled appearance in the grand jury. Consequently, the People satisfied the requirements of CPL § 245.10 (1) (c).
Emphasizing the fact that the defendant is charged with endangering the welfare of a child, the defendant argues that the question posed by Detective Hinton Kelly was designed to elicit an incrimination response from the defendant. It is not necessary for the court to consider that claim at this juncture.
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As the People observe, despite being concerned that the People had not disclosed all custodial statements, defense counsel did not reach out to the People to address the matter. The defendant scoffs at the People's suggestion, noting that defense counsel is not required to apprise the People of a procedural deadline before it arrives, which would allow the People the opportunity to cure any defects — a fact which cannot reasonably be disputed. However, as this case shows, that approach can be precarious; here, the defendant opted not to appear before the grand jury based on an erroneous assumption that the People had not turned over all of the defendant's statements to law enforcement.
Moreover, that concern does not excuse the defendant's decision not to appear on the grand jury date. If the People had introduced an undisclosed statement, defense counsel would have been able to stop the proceeding and seek a ruling by the court.
Where "[t]he record supports the conclusion that [defendant's] failure to testify was based on his own actions," the People are not required to reschedule his appearance to satisfy their obligations under CPL § 190.50(5)(a) ( People v. McKay , 85 A.D.3d 821, 822, 924 N.Y.S.2d 844 [2d Dept. 2011] ; People v. Quinones , 280 A.D.2d 559, 720 N.Y.S.2d 531 [2d Dept. 2001] ). Thus, because the People furnished defendant with a reasonable opportunity to testify before the grand jury, dismissal of the indictment is not warranted (see People v. Simmons, 10 N.Y.3d 946, 862 N.Y.S.2d 852, 893 N.E.2d 130 [2008] ; People v. Boswell, 163 Misc. 2d 529, 621 N.Y.S.2d 482 [Sup. Ct., Kings County 1994] ).
Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied.
This decision shall constitute the order of the court.