Opinion
D074031
10-19-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH ANDREW VAUGHN, Defendant and Appellant.
David A. Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16CR-020543) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, William Jefferson Powell IV, Judge. Affirmed. David A. Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Joseph Andrew Vaughn appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury convicted him of the first degree murder of Seth Fendelander, based on an altercation during which Vaughn stabbed the victim three times. According to Vaughn, the court committed prejudicial error in permitting the prosecutor to comment during closing argument on the defense's failure to call to the stand Echo Youell, Vaughn's girlfriend at the time of the incident, whom another witness had identified as the perpetrator of the stabbing. Vaughn also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that he acted with premeditation and deliberation in committing the murder.
We conclude that even if the court erred in permitting the prosecutor to comment on the defense's failure to call Youell to testify, any such error was harmless in the context of the evidence presented at trial. Abundant evidence demonstrated that Vaughn is only the person who stabbed the victim.
In addition, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's factual determination that Vaughn acted with premeditation and deliberation in killing Fendelander. Although the evidence of premeditation and deliberation is not overwhelming, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the evidence does not support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
1. The altercation and stabbing
On May 17, 2016, B.V. and his wife J.P. visited with friends at the home of another friend. Once there, B.V. and J.P. spent some time with Brandi Bruno-Payne and her fiancé, Fendelander.
Although B.V. had known Bruno-Payne for about five years, he met Fendelander for the first time that day. About 20 minutes after B.V. and J.P. arrived, Youell and Vaughn arrived at the house. Youell yelled at Bruno-Payne, "Come downstairs, we have something to finish up."
Although B.V. did not specifically testify that Vaughn had arrived at the house with Youell, it is reasonable to infer that Vaughn did so because when B.V. came downstairs to speak with Youell, he saw Vaughn standing a few feet away from Youell.
B.V. told Bruno-Payne and Fendelander to stay where they were, and B.V. went downstairs to talk to Youell. When B.V. came downstairs, he noticed Vaughn standing several feet away from the front door where B.V. and Youell were standing and saw Vaughn cleaning his fingernails with a knife. B.V. told Youell and Vaughn to leave, but Youell refused to do so.
Bruno-Payne and Fendelander came downstairs and attempted to leave the property. As Bruno-Payne and Fendelander exited the house, Fendelander tried to shield Bruno-Payne from Youell by holding the screen door open and making room for Bruno- Payne to pass. Fendelander and B.V. stood with their backs almost touching, between Bruno-Payne and Youell. During this time, Vaughn remained in the same location, close to Youell.
As Bruno-Payne was walking out of the house, Youell reached under Fendelander and B.V. and managed to grab Bruno-Payne's hair. B.V. attempted to separate the two women by grabbing Youell by her shoulders, but he was unsuccessful. Fendelander also tried to separate the women by grabbing one of Youell's shoulders and one of her arms, in an attempt to pull her away from Bruno-Payne. Both men were holding onto Youell, but they could not get her to let go of Bruno-Payne.
According to B.V., he was being "more aggressive" than Fendelander in attempting to separate the two women. B.V. testified that he did not see Fendelander attack, strike, or kick Youell. He also testified that he never saw Fendelander grab Youell by the head.
While B.V. and Fendelander were trying to separate Bruno-Payne and Youell, Vaughn grabbed Fendelander by his clothing. The two men then "twirled off the porch." B.V. testified that Vaughn and Fendelander, who appeared to be approximately the same size, held on to each other as each tried to get the other to the ground. B.V. did not see either man throw punches as they went around and around, toward a parked car. Vaughn and Fendelander fell to the ground, still entwined and holding on to each other's clothing.
While the two men were trying to wrestle each other to the ground, Bruno-Payne and Youell were also fighting with each other.
Vaughn was the first to get up from the ground and stand up. Just before Vaughn stood up, B.V. saw that Vaughn was holding a knife in his hand. The handle of the knife was dark, and it had a silver, shiny design on it.
B.V. then saw Fendelander sit up; Fendelander grabbed his shirt and said, "I'm bleeding." B.V. saw blood on Fendelander's left arm. Fendelander's shirt appeared to be ripped and was soaked in blood. At that point, Vaughn was approximately six feet away from Fendelander.
Another witness, J.J., had been passing through the area and had parked his car to make a phone call. J.J's fiancée C.C. was in the car with him and pointed out two men who were having a face-to-face confrontation. Initially, the men were standing inches away from one another, with their arms stretched out in front of them, toward each other. J.J. testified that he saw Fendelander trying to get away from Vaughn, and indicated that at one point, the men were approximately five feet away from each other. J.J. saw Vaughn holding a knife in his right hand, pointed downward. As Fendelander turned to get away, Vaughn pursued him. J.J. described the confrontation as looking like a game of "cat and mouse," with Fendelander stepping toward Vaughn when Vaughn would look back toward the house for a moment, and then stepping back from Vaughn as soon as Vaughn looked at him. To J.J., it appeared that Fendelander was keeping his "attention on the knife the whole time" during this part of the altercation.
C.C. also saw Vaughn holding something in his hand; she said that "[t]he way he had his hands at his side, it's like he was holding an object, you know, kind of - - something like if he was holding the knife," and that "maybe the blade would have been pointing towards the back of him because he kind of had his hands as if you hold a briefcase or suitcase."
Both J.J. and C.C. saw blood on the left side of Fendelander's back. C.C. saw the blood after the men had been wrestling, had fallen to the ground once or twice, and had gotten up for the last time. CC. described the fight between the men as "silly," and indicated that in her opinion, "[n]either one of them [was a] fighter[ ]."
At some point, Vaughn began to walk back toward the house. Fendelander went to Bruno-Payne's car. According to Bruno-Payne, Fendelander tried to get into the driver's seat, and Bruno-Payne got into the passenger seat. B.V. also saw Fendelander attempt to get into the driver's side of Bruno-Payne's car. Fendelander then stopped and yelled, "Where are my keys?" Youell responded, "They are in the bush." J.J. testified that he thought that Bruno-Payne was "irate" as she sat in the car, because although he could not hear her, he could see that she was "screaming" and "yelling" and looked upset. According to J.J., it was at this point that Bruno-Payne was "realizing more how bad the scenario is."
J.J. testified that Fendelander got into the passenger side of Bruno-Payne's car, and that he saw Bruno-Payne get into the driver's seat.
At some point in time, B.V. realized that Fendelander was hurt; B.V. called out to J.P. to call 911. Because J.P. was standing behind him, B.V. turned away from Fendelander to look toward her. According to B.V. he looked away for a "split second," and as he looked away, Fendelander got out of the car and walked toward the bushes. B.V. testified that Fendelander was never within 10 feet from Youell once he got out of the car.
Fendelander "proceed[ed] to the middle of" the street and started to "walk[ ] down the road." J.J. saw Vaughn go after Fendelander and "grab[ ] him and stop [ ]him." Fendelander was trying to get away. Fendelander eventually managed to get away, but collapsed in the street. Fendelander was face down in the street, and B.V. could see the wound to his back. B.V., J.J., and C.C. all heard Fendelander say "I'm dying" multiple times.
B.V. testified that he could see "a stab wound or a hole in his back."
B.V. stated that based on what he saw, there was no time when Youell could have stabbed Fendelander in the back. J.P. similarly testified that Youell was never close enough to Fendelander to touch him. J.J. testified that he did not see either of the women whom he had observed fighting ever hit, strike or touch Fendelander when he was near the car, and he did not see anyone other than Vaughn stab Fendelander. C.C. also testified that she never saw any of the women at the scene touch Fendelander prior to his falling to the ground in the street.
2. Events after the stabbing
Vaughn and Youell left the scene, walking past Fendelander as he was lying in the road. They did not stop to help Fendelander.
As this was happening, J.P. was placing a call to 911. By the time Fendelander was on the street and B.V. had made it over to Fendelander, J.P. handed the phone to Bruno-Payne. On the call, Bruno-Payne referred to "the people that stabbed him [Fendelander]" and identified Vaughn and Youell as those people. However, in another portion of a call with a 911 operator, Bruno-Payne said to someone else, "He stabbed him." When an unknown person asked, "Who?" Bruno-Payne responded, "Joe."
In the meantime, Vaughn walked "at a rapid pace" to his house, which was a short distance from where the altercation took place. A friend of Vaughn's family had seen the altercation and followed Vaughn in her car. When the friend got close to Vaughn, she asked him what had happened. His response was either, "I don't want to go to prison," or "I'm going to prison." The woman noticed blood on Vaughn's pants.
Vaughn made it back to his house, where his brother was sleeping upstairs. Vaughn's brother heard Vaughn and Youell as they came upstairs. Vaughn's brother heard Vaughn say, " 'I hit him, I hit him.' " Vaughn was covered in blood. Vaughn's brother did not recall Youell having blood on her. He did not see Vaughn in possession of a knife at that time. However, it was not uncommon for Vaughn to carry a knife at his hip, for various "functional purposes."
Police arrived at Vaughn's house and ordered him to come outside. When he went outside, he was not wearing the bloody clothing that he had on when he entered his brother's room. Youell did not have any blood on her body or clothing, and had no injuries except for a very light abrasion near her elbow. Vaughn did not appear to have any injuries. Police arrested Vaughn.
3. Physical evidence
During the investigation, officers found blood on the driver's seat of Bruno-Payne's car; there was blood on the seat cushion, the backrest, and the side of the seat. There was also blood on the ground near the driver's side of the car, and by the base of a nearby tree.
A folded pocketknife was found in Vaughn's house, between his brother's bed and a closet door. The blade of the knife had red dried liquid that was consistent with blood on it. The knife measured approximately one inch in width, and the blade was approximately three inches in length. Police also found a pair of men's pants with blood on them inside the other bedroom of the home—the room that Vaughn's brother identified as Vaughn's. Police did not find bloody female clothing.
Vaughn's brother testified that he had not kept a bloody knife in his room in the gap between his bed and closet door.
The autopsy performed on Fendelander's body revealed that he had suffered three stab wounds—one on the front of the left upper arm; one on the left lower back; and one on the mid-left lower back. The wound to Fendelander's upper arm was one inch long, and three and three-quarter inches deep. The blade had traveled slightly left to right and slightly upward. The stab wound to the left lower back, above Fendelander's buttock, was one inch long and two-and-a-quarter inch deep. The blade had traveled slightly upward.
The stab wound to Fendelander's left mid-back punctured his spleen and left kidney. The pathologist determined that this stab wound was the one that had caused Fendelander's death. This wound was seven-eighths of an inch long and three inches deep; it penetrated Fendelander's back, entered the left chest cavity and went into the abdomen, where it continued in a downward direction, puncturing Fendelander's spleen and left kidney. The blade that caused this wound traveled back to front, left to right, and slightly downward. The pathologist opined that this wound was consistent with one caused by a knife held in a manner where the blade came down toward the pinky; the knife would have been held by someone who reached around Fendelander's body from the front and stabbed him in the back.
The pathologist explained that when the knife punctured Fendelander's spleen and kidney, it caused him to suffer excessive internal bleeding. The wound also caused external bleeding, once Fendelander's blood had filled his chest cavity. Because of this significant blood loss, Fendelander's body did not have enough blood to carry oxygen and nutrients to his organs—specifically, the brain and heart. Once Fendelander's brain and heart shut down, he died. The dying process under this scenario would have caused Fendelander to gasp for air before he would have become unresponsive due to the lack of oxygen. His brain and heart would then have shut down. The pathologist estimated that Fendelander died within minutes of sustaining the wound that punctured his spleen and left kidney.
According to the pathologist, the size of a wound does not necessarily reveal the size of the blade that caused it; a blade may not have entered the flesh entirely, or a struggle could, for example, cause a blade to cut skin in a wider swath than the width of the blade.
Fendelander had also suffered some abrasions to his forehead and right elbow; the pathologist opined that these injuries were likely caused by blunt force trauma on the day of his death.
4. Bruno-Payne's statements and testimony regarding Youell
A Sheriff's deputy spoke with Bruno-Payne at the scene after an ambulance took Fendelander away. Bruno-Payne told the deputy that Youell had come to the house and was confrontational with Bruno-Payne. When Bruno-Payne tried to leave, Youell grabbed her by the hair, and the two of them began to fight. Bruno-Payne explained that Fendelander had tried to pull Youell away from Bruno-Payne, and that this is when Vaughn intervened. Vaughn and Fendelander got into a physical altercation. It was during this altercation that Fendelander "was stabbed." Bruno-Payne said nothing at that time to suggest that Youell had stabbed Fendelander.
In a subsequent interview with police, however, and later, at trial, Bruno-Payne stated that she saw Youell stab Fendelander in the back when Fendelander was trying to get into the driver's side seat of Bruno-Payne's car. At trial, Bruno-Payne testified that Fendelander had initially yelled out, "[H]e stabbed me." Bruno-Payne then helped Fendelander stand up, and she did not see blood on his back or left side of his arm at that time. She also did not see any cuts or tears in the back of his shirt. She did see some blood on his hands and lips, however. Fendelander then told her to get in the car, and she proceeded to get into the passenger seat. According to Bruno-Payne, she saw Youell, who is "very short," making a " slanted upward" motion toward Fendelander's back. Bruno-Payne did not see a weapon or anything else in Youell's hand, but she stated that she saw "something go into [Fendelander's] back." Bruno-Payne testified that Youell stabbed Fendelander one time. After this, Fendelander gasped for air and stumbled backward into the street, where he collapsed. Bruno-Payne caught him before he hit the pavement. Bruno-Payne tried to tend to Fendelander, and attempted to make a tourniquet for his arm. Fendelander told Bruno-Payne that he loved her. He then stopped breathing. B. Procedural background
The San Bernardino District Attorney charged Vaughn with one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and further alleged that Vaughn personally used a deadly weapon—a knife—in committing the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
A jury convicted Vaughn of first degree murder and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense.
The trial court sentenced Vaughn to a term of 26 years to life. Vaughn filed a timely notice of appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Even assuming that the prosecutor's comment regarding the defense's failure to call Youell as a witness constituted prosecutorial misconduct, the comments did not prejudice Vaughn and reversal is therefore not required on this ground
Vaughn contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct that requires reversal of his conviction by "impl[ying] that Vaughn's attorney could have procured Youell's testimony if she thought it would have helped the defense, thereby inviting the inference that Vaughn knew Youell's testimony would have hurt his case."
1. Additional background
Neither party called Youell to testify. Toward the end of his initial closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
"Tomorrow you are going to hear from the defense. I will get a chance to give a rebuttal. What I would ask you to think about during the defense argument [is] reasonableness. Early on we talked about it. If it is unreasonable, we reject it. Any ideas of Echo doing this is purely unreasonable. It is imaginary doubt. The evidence doesn't even support possible doubt given the independent witnesses and physical evidence. But once again, my burden is not beyond possible doubt.
"And there is no doubt to me that the defense will say something along these lines. So let's bring it out now. Well, if they wanted beyond a reasonable doubt, why didn't they call Echo. Right? You've also got to think this, if I somehow decided I'm going to call the witnesses to help me, I don't want to call the witnesses that hurt me. I want to hide the guys I don't want you guys to see. I would not have called Brandi Bruno-Payne. I tell you that.
"You think about this too. Sure I have the burden, proof beyond any reasonable doubt. No doubt that is my burden. But I'm not the only one that can call a witness. Ms. Quill is a talented and effective attorney. If she thought that Echo Youell would provide exculpatory
evidence, she could have her on that stand. She could have her sitting there and she didn't."
There was no discussion prior to closing argument about Youell's availability.
Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor's comments amounted to shifting the evidentiary burden to the defendant. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the prosecutor to continue. The prosecutor then said, "The reality of the situation is Brandi is the best they've got. And Brandi's story does not hold water. Reasonableness carries through."
During defense counsel's closing argument, Vaughn's attorney argued that CALCRIM No. 373 did not allow the jurors to speculate as to why Youell was not a defendant in this trial. She further argued, "I think it is unfair to suggest that I have not in some [way] answered that for you, not allowed to answer for you why she is not here, not allowed to tell you that. And you are not allowed to consider that. I just wanted to make sure that's made clear."
In rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed the comments that defense counsel made during her closing argument regarding Youell:
"[Defense counsel] said something at the end. I am sure she wasn't trying to do it for this reason. She said, I am not allowed to tell you, and she pointed to an instruction that says, hey, there is some evidence out there that maybe somebody else was involved, I am not allowed to tell you.
"That's in no way, and I don't think she was doing this, she wouldn't do this, inferring [sic] that something happened. The reason Echo Youell didn't testify is simple, I didn't call her and she didn't call her. Case closed on that."
2. Legal standards
" 'The standards governing review of misconduct claims are settled. "A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal Constitution when they infect the trial with such ' "unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." ' [Citations.] Under state law, a prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial." [Citation.] "In order to preserve a claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for review." [Citation.] When a claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor's comments before the jury, " 'the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.' " [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1275 (Gonzales).)
"[I]t is neither unusual nor improper to comment on the failure to call logical witnesses." (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1275.) "A prosecutor may fairly comment on and argue any reasonable inferences from the evidence. [Citation.] Comments on the state of the evidence or on the defense's failure to call logical witnesses, introduce material evidence, or rebut the People's case are generally permissible. [Citation.] However, a prosecutor may not suggest that 'a defendant has a duty or burden to produce evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her innocence.' " (People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 112; People v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 475-476 ["It is now well established that although Griffin[ v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609] prohibits reference to a defendant's failure to take the stand in his own defense, that rule 'does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses' "].)
"Error with respect to prosecutorial misconduct is evaluated under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [(Chapman)] to the extent federal constitutional rights are implicated, and People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [(Watson)] if only state law issues were involved. [Citation.]" (People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 564.)
3. Analysis
Although the parties vigorously dispute whether the prosecutor's comments constituted misconduct or instead were appropriate commentary on the failure of the defense to call a logical witness, we need not definitively determine whether the prosecutor committed misconduct because even if we assume that the prosecutor's comments constituted misconduct, we nevertheless further conclude that the comments did not affect the jury's verdict, and that any error related to these comments was therefore harmless.
Under the Chapman standard of prejudice review, the beneficiary of the error must " ' "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." [Citation.] "To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." ' " (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463 (Pearson).) Under the Watson standard of prejudice review, we ask whether it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the complained-of error not occurred. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
The prosecutor's comments regarding the defense not calling Youell as a witness were minimal in the context of the prosecutor's closing arguments, as well as in the context of the trial as a whole. Given that fact, we do not believe that they could have "undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute[d] to a miscarriage of justice," such that they would implicate the Chapman standard of prejudice review. (United States v. Young (1985) 470 U.S. 1, 16, fn. omitted.) However, we need not determine definitively that this presumed error should be reviewed under the Watson standard of prejudice review because we would reach the same conclusion whether we applied the more stringent Chapman standard of prejudice review or the less stringent Watson standard.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the evidence that Vaughn stabbed Fendelander three times, and was the person who caused Fendelander's fatal wound, was overwhelming. One independent witness described Vaughn displaying a knife just before the altercation. Four independent eyewitnesses, B.V., J.P., C.C., and J.J., all described seeing Vaughn and Fendelander engage in a physical fight. Three of these witnesses saw Vaughn with a knife in his hand during this altercation. At least three of the witnesses testified to seeing Fendelander with blood on him after he separated from Vaughn. One of these witnesses also testified to hearing Fendelander say, "I'm bleeding" immediately after he separated from Vaughn. None of these witnesses saw Youell touch Fendelander during or after the altercation with Vaughn, before he died. Nor did any of these witnesses see Youell in possession of a knife. The only person who the witnesses saw holding a knife was Vaughn.
Even Bruno-Payne acknowledged at trial that she never saw Youell in possession of a knife or other weapon.
Beyond this, the physical evidence conflicted with Bruno-Payne's testimony regarding Youell having stabbed Fendelander. Specifically, Bruno-Payne contended that Youell had stabbed the much taller Fendelander in an upward motion. However, the autopsy revealed that the fatal wound that Fendelander suffered had been inflicted in a slightly downward direction, with the blade coming down toward the pinky finger of the holder's hand. In addition, Vaughn was covered in blood when he returned home; Youell had no visible blood on her and police did not find any women's clothing with blood on it.
At trial, Bruno-Payne testified that Youell is "very short," and that Fendelander was "like 6'2", 6'4" " and was "[a] tall guy."
Further, Bruno-Payne's own earlier statements regarding the altercation conflicted with her later statements regarding the stabbing. In Bruno-Payne's initial statements to police, she did not indicate at any point that Youell had stabbed Fendelander. In addition, during a recorded 911 call, Bruno-Payne can be heard saying that "Joe" was the person who had stabbed Fendelander. She did not mention Youell at that time.
Because there was overwhelming evidence that Vaughn was the only person who stabbed Fendelander, and in view of the fact that all of this evidence was in direct conflict with Bruno-Payne's later-provided statements and testimony to the effect that Youell had stabbed Fendelander a single time, we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's comments regarding the defense's failure to call Youell as a logical witness did not contribute to the jury's verdict.
Given this record, we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict was unaffected by the prosecutor's comments regarding the failure of the defense to call Youell as a witness. These comments were so " 'unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue' " of Vaughn's guilt " 'as revealed in the record' " that we conclude that no prejudice resulted from them. (Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 463.) B. Substantial evidence supports the jury's determination that Vaughn's killing of Fendelander was willful, deliberate, and premeditated
1. Legal standards
"In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court's role is a limited one. ' "The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]" ' [Citations.] [¶] ' "Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness's credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]" ' " (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739.)
" 'Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.' [Citation.] Unless it describes facts or events that are physically impossible or inherently improbable, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. [Citation.]" (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585.)
2. Analysis
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought. (§ 187.) To prove one variety of first degree murder—the one that formed the prosecution's theory of the case here—the prosecution must show that the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated. (§ 189.) " 'An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.' [Citation.] The reflection may be arrived at quickly; it need not span a specific or extended period of time. [Citation.]" (People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 235.)
A defendant deliberates if he or she carefully weighs the considerations for and against the choice and, knowing the consequences, decides to kill. (CALCRIM No. 601.) A defendant acts with premeditation if he or she decides to kill before completing the act of attempted murder. (Ibid.) It is not necessary, however, to prove that a defendant "maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her act" in order to prove that an attempted killing "was 'deliberate and premeditated.' " (§ 189.) "The length of time the person spends considering whether to kill does not alone determine whether the attempted killing is deliberate and premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and premeditation may vary from person to person and according to the circumstances. A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration of the choice and its consequences is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not the length of time." (CALCRIM No. 601; People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (Anderson); People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2 [" 'The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . .' "].)
In Anderson, the Supreme Court identified three basic categories of evidence that are pertinent to the determination of premeditation and deliberation in the context of murder: (1) facts that may be characterized as planning activity; (2) facts about the defendant and victim's relationship that support a motive for the killing; and (3) facts about the manner of killing. (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27.) However, these factors are not the only means for establishing premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1127; People v. Shamblin (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 16 [the Anderson factors are "not prerequisites for proving premeditation and deliberation, nor must the factors ' "be present in some special combination or . . . be accorded a particular weight" ' "]; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 (Thomas) ["[u]nreflective reliance on Anderson for a definition of premeditation is inappropriate"].) "In identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and deliberation, Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation." (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) In other words, "[t]he Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive." (Ibid.) Rather, a court's ultimate duty is to assess " 'whether the evidence is supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse.' [Citation.]" (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812.)
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Vaughn premeditated Fendelander's death. Vaughn and Youell sought out the location where Fendelander and Bruno-Payne were. As Youell became aggressive toward Bruno-Payne, Vaughn stood nearby with his knife out and visible. After Fendelander attempted to help Bruno-Payne escape from Youell's aggression, Vaughn was very quickly upon him. As B.V. testified, B.V. believed that he, B.V., was being far more aggressive toward Youell than Fendelander, yet Vaughn went straight for Fendelander. Vaughn grabbed Fendelander and as the two tussled, Vaughn reached around and stabbed Fendelander three separate times. In addition, J.J. testified that he watched as Fendelander tried to get away from Vaughn, while Vaughn pursued Fendelander in a "cat and mouse" type of scenario.
The facts regarding how Vaughn and Youell arrived at the house, and Vaughn's display of the knife at that point, as well as Vaughn's decision to become involved in a physical altercation with Fendelander rather than with B.V., even though B.V. believed that Fendelander had been less aggressive with Vaughn's girlfriend than B.V., himself, had been, are facts from which one could reasonably infer some planning on Vaughn's part. In addition, it is clear that there was some sort of long-standing feud between Youell and Bruno-Payne, and that Youell and Vaughn came to the house that day intent on being violent toward Bruno-Payne and those affiliated with her. This evidence demonstrates that even if Vaughn may not have had a direct relationship with Fendelander, Fendelander's relationship with Bruno-Payne could have provided a motive for Vaughn's killing of Fendelander. Finally, the nature of the killing also supports the finding of premeditation and deliberation. (See People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247 [a violent death sustained as a result of multiple stab wounds may be consistent with a finding of premeditation].) Although the nature of the killing, alone, might not be sufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation in this case, the nature of the killing, placed in the context of these other facts, meets the threshold necessary to support the jury's findings.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. HUFFMAN, J.