Numerous other jurisdictions recognize the fresh-complaint doctrine. (See, e.g., State v. Pollitt (1987) 205 Conn. 61 [ 530 A.2d 155]; Battle v. U.S. (D.C.App. 1993) 630 A.2d 211; People v. Lawler (1991) 142 Ill.2d 211 [154 Ill.Dec. 674, 568 N.E.2d 895]; Commonwealth v. Licata (1992) 412 Mass. 654 [ 591 N.E.2d 672]; People v. Vaughn (1977) 75 Mich. App. 540 [ 255 N.W.2d 677]; State v. Hill (1990) 121 N.J. 150 [ 578 A.2d 370]; People v. McDaniel (1993) 81 N.Y.2d 10 [595 N.Y.S.2d 364, 611 N.E.2d 265]; State v. Baker (1980) 46 Or. App. 79 [ 610 P.2d 840]; Commonwealth v. Freeman (1982) 295 Pa. Super. 467 [ 441 A.2d 1327]; Simpkins v. State (1991) 303 S.C. 364 [ 401 S.E.2d 142], 143; State v. Murley (1949) 35 Wn.2d 142 [ 212 P.2d 801].) In People v. Burton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 328, at page 351, this court set forth as follows the formulation and justification of the fresh-complaint doctrine, thereafter relied upon in numerous appellate decisions: "In a case . . . where the nonconsenting victim of a sex offense testifies to its commission, the theory of admissibility of evidence of a complaint which is consistent with her testimony and which is not a spontaneous declaration which might be excepted from the hearsay objection is this: It is natural to expect that the victim of a crime would complain of it, and the prosecution can show the fact o
See 4 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), §§ 1134-1138, pp 297-312. Accord People v Baker, 251 Mich. 322, 325; 232 N.W. 381 (1930); People v Vaughn, 75 Mich. App. 540; 255 N.W.2d 677 (1977); People v Lawson, 34 Mich. App. 620; 192 N.W.2d 60 (1971). Specifically, § 1136 states: