Opinion
November 23, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Greenberg, J.).
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
According to the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing in connection with the crimes charged under Indictment No. 4290/89, a vehicle, in which the defendant was a passenger, was stopped by the police upon the police officers' reasonable belief that one of the passengers in the vehicle was a "wanted dangerous felon". One of the officers who approached the vehicle observed that despite the warm temperatures that day, the defendant wore a heavy quilted jacket which was completely closed, and a sweatjacket zipped up to his neck. Moreover, the officer observed a bulge in the defendant's jacket near his stomach area. The defendant also appeared nervous and was sweating. The officer directed the defendant to exit the vehicle. As the defendant exited the vehicle the officer grabbed the defendant's arm and told the defendant to place his hands on the vehicle. However, as the officer attempted to place the defendant's hands on the vehicle to conduct a protective pat-down frisk, the defendant punched the officer and attempted to flee. The police subdued the defendant and recovered a gun and ammunition clip from his waistband. Additionally, they recovered a bag which the defendant had in his hand as he exited the vehicle.
The defendant correctly contends that he was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officer grabbed his arm and attempted to conduct a pat-down frisk (see, Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; People v Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 111). However, we find no merit in the defendant's contention that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initially detain him. Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's presence with a suspected felon, his inappropriately heavy clothing, his nervousness, and the bulge near his waistline, which is a telltale sign of a weapon (see, People v De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 221), the police reasonably suspected danger to themselves and possibly others (see, People v Bush, 171 A.D.2d 801). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the gun, the ammunition clip, and the bag, which was later found to contain cocaine.
Moreover, the Supreme Court properly allowed expert testimony regarding the pricing and packaging of cocaine, since this subject is not within the knowledge of the average juror (see, People v Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430; People v Gallego, 155 A.D.2d 687).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including that raised in connection with his judgment of conviction under Indictment No. 3023/90, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Sullivan, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.