Opinion
A169882
08-29-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL MARK VANSYCKEL, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. Nos. SCN223988, CT15007849
STREETER, J.
Defendant Paul Mark Vansyckel, who was convicted of attempted murder and other offenses, appeals a trial court order requiring him to pay $13,408.62 in restitution to the victim, Aliaksandr Rainchyk, for medical expenses. Vansyckel contends there is an insufficient factual basis for the award. We reject this argument and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Vansyckel was convicted in late 2022 of attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and aggravated mayhem, as well as related enhancements. (People v. Vansyckel (Apr. 12, 2024, A166980) [nonpub. opn.] (Vansyckel I).) The charges were based on allegations that, on April 2, 2015, after a verbal disagreement, Vansyckel deliberately threw hot oil on Rainchyk and stabbed him with a knife. (Ibid.) The trial court sentenced Vansyckel to six years in prison. (Ibid.) We affirmed the judgment in an April 2024 unpublished opinion. (Ibid.)
Penal Code sections 664, 187, subdivision (a), 245, subdivision (a)(1), 205, 12022, subdivision (b)(1), 12022.7, subdivision (a). Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
As a result of the incident, Rainchyk sustained severe burns and multiple stab wounds. (Vansyckel I, supra, A166980.) He underwent extensive medical treatment, including a weeks-long hospitalization and several skin graft surgeries. (Ibid.)
At a postconviction restitution hearing on December 6, 2023, the trial court considered evidence of Rainchyk's medical expenses. The probation report, which the court admitted into evidence, stated that, on October 26, 2022, Rainchyk sent an email to the probation officer requesting restitution for the following: $872 for Looking Glass Plastic Surgery (March 18, 2016), $908.62 for Looking Glass Plastic Surgery (May 30, 2016), $8,400 for medical bills in 2015 that were sent to collection, and $4,100 for medical bills (also in 2015) that were sent to collection. Rainchyk provided two bills from Looking Glass Plastic Surgery. He also provided invoices from Dignity Health (some or all of which relate to his hospital stay) in the amounts of $1,222,301.69, $3,230.08, and $97,552.04.
The trial court concluded that Rainchyck's out-of-pocket costs for the bills from Dignity Health (which the court referred to as copays) were the $8,400 and $4,100 sent to collections. As to the bill for $1,222,301.69, the court stated: "The Court is assuming here on these medical bills that the request was for that which was not covered by insurance. But there is evidence of medical bills. The victim is not asking for $1,222,301.69, and we do know that insurance, when it covers, it does negotiate those prices down. But this does not seem unreasonable that there may have been co-pay of $8,400 for that hospital stay."
Then, referring to the $97,552.04 bill, the court stated: "And so it seems that, again, the victim is not asking for the total. They are asking for that which was their co-pay amounts that they were unable to pay and ended up going into collections. So that was 4,100." The court continued: "Now, the Court does note that, you know, the victim didn't provide to the Court the collections bill to substantiate that. But given that-how high the medical bills were, neither of these amounts seem that high for co-pays. The Court is inclined to award for the 8,400 and the 4,100 for the medical bills."
Separately, because the two bills from Looking Glass Plastic Surgery were dated close in time, the court concluded that those bills were likely for the same underlying treatment (i.e., that the May 2016 bill requesting $908.62 included the $872 from the March 2016 bill, perhaps with interest added due to late payment). The court therefore awarded Rainchyk restitution of $12,500 for his Dignity Health expenses and $908.62 for his bills from Looking Glass Plastic Surgery, for a total of $13,408.62.
II. DISCUSSION
Vansyckel argues there is not an adequate factual basis to support the restitution award. He asserts that, because the Dignity Health bills themselves do not state what amounts were ultimately Rainchyk's responsibility, the court could not rely on the amounts provided by Rainchyk in his email to the probation officer. We disagree.
Vansyckel states in his reply brief that he does not challenge the portion of the award pertaining to Looking Glass Plastic Surgery.
A. Legal Standards
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) provides: "[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." Restitution "shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct" (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)), including medical expenses (id., subd. (f)(3)(B)).
"The victim must make a prima facie showing of the loss, which the defendant is entitled to rebut. 'Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant's criminal acts, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed by the victim.'" (People v. Pittman (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1258 (Pittman).)"' "The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion.
'A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.' [Citation.]' "When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court." '" '" (Pittman, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1258.)
B. Analysis
The trial court's restitution award here was proper. First, the court could consider Rainchyk's statement to the probation officer as to the amount of his medical expenses. A prima facie case for restitution may be based on a victim's statement of loss. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f) [award may be "based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court"]; People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26 ["At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim's testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or her economic loss."].) As we recently recognized, this may include information that is provided by a victim and included in a probation report or similar document. (Pittman, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1260; accord, e.g., People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275 [" 'When the probation report includes information on the amount of the victim's loss and a recommendation as to the amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with contrary information to challenge that amount.' "].) We reject Vansyckel's suggestion that the medical expense amounts that Rainchyk provided by email to Vansyckel's probation officer could not support a restitution award.
Second, and in any event, the court did not rely solely on Rainchyk's statement of his losses. Instead, as the Attorney General notes, Rainchyk's claim that he incurred medical expenses as a result of the incident (in amounts totaling $12,500 that were sent to collections) was corroborated by the bills from Dignity Health reflecting much higher amounts billed for very extensive medical treatment, and the court expressly relied on those bills as well as Rainchyk's statement. Taken together, Rainchyk's statement and the Dignity Health bills were sufficient to make a prima facie showing of loss. Vansyckel did not carry his burden to show that the claimed amount was overstated or that Rainchyk had not incurred any medical expenses. The court's award was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
Vansyckel argues the court made an unsupported assumption when it stated the $8,400 and $4,100 amounts identified by Rainchyk appeared to be copays for which Rainchyk was responsible (i.e., his share of the much larger totals reflected in the Dignity Health bills). Vansyckel notes the Dignity Health bills do not refer to copays or identify a portion for which Rainchyk is responsible. Vansyckel also points out that Rainchyk's email to the probation officer (as described in the probation report) did not specify that the amounts sent to collections were copays or that they were a portion of the Dignity Health bills. Finally, Vansyckel notes the trial court's statement that Rainchyk had not provided a collections bill reflecting the $8,400 and $4,100 amounts.
These criticisms do not persuade us the court abused its broad discretion. To the extent Vansyckel is quibbling with the court's use of the specific term "co-pays," we think the court's statements are fairly read as referring to any amounts that were not covered by insurance (which could also include categories such as deductibles or coinsurance). And the record supports the court's inference that the $8,400 and $4,100 represented uncovered medical expenses (whatever their specific type) that were sustained by Rainchyk as a result of Vansyckel's offenses. The charged incident occurred on April 2, 2015; the Dignity Health bills cover a months-long period beginning on that date; and Rainchyk stated the $8,400 and $4,100 in medical bills that went to collections were from 2015.
Finally, although the court mentioned that Rainchyk had not provided the collections bill itself to "substantiate" his statement of loss, that did not require the court to reject Rainchyk's claim. As discussed, Rainchyk's statement of the medical expenses he incurred, in conjunction with the bills showing he received extensive treatment, were sufficient to make out a prima facie case for restitution.
As noted, section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) states that, to the extent possible, a restitution order shall "fully reimburse" the victim for economic losses, including medical expenses. "To 'fully reimburse' the victim for medical expenses means to reimburse him or her for all out-of-pocket expenses actually paid by the victim or others on the victim's behalf (e.g., the victim's insurance company). The concept of 'reimbursement' of medical expenses generally does not support inclusion of amounts of medical bills in excess of those amounts accepted by medical providers as payment in full." (People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 27.) The trial court emphasized that Rainchyk was not requesting the full amounts listed in the Dignity Health bills, and the court noted that insurers often "negotiate those prices down." And, although a restitution order may include reimbursement to a victim for amounts that were paid by the victim's insurer (Millard, at p. 27), Rainchyk apparently did not request those amounts either. Instead, the record supports the court's inference that the amounts requested by Rainchyk were out-of-pocket expenses arising from his medical treatment that were his responsibility to pay and that ultimately were sent to collections. The court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the requested amounts.
III. DISPOSITION
The December 6, 2023, restitution order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BROWN, P. J., DOUGLAS, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.