People v. McNichols (1986), 139 Ill. App.3d 947, 955. The defendant relies on People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, a case in which the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery based upon testimony relating that the victim's siblings stated the defendant "`kept throwing [Laura] [the victim] in the water.'" ( 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 341.)
In so finding, we note that it is unlikely that a five-year-old or three-year-old girl either would know that manipulation of her vaginal area would result in secretions or would be able to fabricate in 24 hours a story that a man placed his finger in her vagina and caused it to be wet. In rejecting the defendant's argument we also note that in the instant case, unlike in People v. Harris (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 705, 480 N.E.2d 1189, and People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 439 N.E.2d 95, upon which the defendant relies, the relevant statements were made by occurrence witnesses, not by victims. As noted by the court in Van Scyoc, victims are more likely to remain startled for a longer period of time than are mere witnesses.
This court has also recognized that child victims or witnesses are more likely than adults to remain startled for a longer period of time and less likely than adults to fabricate. ( People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 342, 439 N.E.2d 95, 97.) However, even if we consider complainant a child witness and apply the general rule of permitting a greater lapse of time to occur before a statement loses its spontaneity, the statements complainant made in the videotape do not constitute excited utterances.
The Parisie court stated that factors to be taken into consideration include length of time, condition of the declarant, influence of intervening occurrences, presence or absence of self-interest, and the nature and circumstances of the statement. Parisie, 5 Ill. App.3d at 1029-30; see also People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 341. In the case at bar, the statements related to the circumstances of the occurrence (the alleged sexual assault).
• 13 So, too, we hold in the instant case that the decedent's statement to Officer Morrison was not the product of a deliberate attempt to fabricate an occurrence, but rather, in light of the totality of the circumstances, should be considered inherently reliable and admissible as a spontaneous utterance. See People v. Sanchez (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 488, 434 N.E.2d 395; People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 439 N.E.2d 95; People v. Watson (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 691, 438 N.E.2d 453; People v. Fenderson (1987), 157 Ill. App.3d 537, 510 N.E.2d 479; E. Cleary M. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 803.3, at 552 (4th ed. 1984). • 14, 15 A dying declaration is a statement of fact by a victim concerning the cause and circumstances of his death and may be admissible into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when it appears to have been made by the victim under the belief that death is impending and immediate.
Another critical consideration is the fact that the State failed to present any observable manifestations that would demonstrate that Willie's declaration was made while he was still under the stress of the startling event. (See People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 439 N.E.2d 95.) Willie was home for some 12 hours prior to his declaration. Within that time span, Willie was exposed to his mother, father, two sisters, a brother and the police.