People v. Van Scyoc

6 Citing cases

  1. People v. Merideth

    152 Ill. App. 3d 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 31 times

    People v. McNichols (1986), 139 Ill. App.3d 947, 955. The defendant relies on People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, a case in which the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery based upon testimony relating that the victim's siblings stated the defendant "`kept throwing [Laura] [the victim] in the water.'" ( 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 341.)

  2. People v. Bitler

    146 Ill. App. 3d 477 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    In People v. Bitler, 146 Ill. App.3d 477, 497 N.E.2d 137 (1986), the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed its adoption of the Padilla court's analysis.

    In so finding, we note that it is unlikely that a five-year-old or three-year-old girl either would know that manipulation of her vaginal area would result in secretions or would be able to fabricate in 24 hours a story that a man placed his finger in her vagina and caused it to be wet. In rejecting the defendant's argument we also note that in the instant case, unlike in People v. Harris (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 705, 480 N.E.2d 1189, and People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 439 N.E.2d 95, upon which the defendant relies, the relevant statements were made by occurrence witnesses, not by victims. As noted by the court in Van Scyoc, victims are more likely to remain startled for a longer period of time than are mere witnesses.

  3. People v. Velasco

    216 Ill. App. 3d 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 20 times
    Finding that because "criminal sexual assault does not require physical penetration," the fact that defendant touched the victim's genitals with his mouth was sufficient to satisfy the element of penetration

    This court has also recognized that child victims or witnesses are more likely than adults to remain startled for a longer period of time and less likely than adults to fabricate. ( People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 342, 439 N.E.2d 95, 97.) However, even if we consider complainant a child witness and apply the general rule of permitting a greater lapse of time to occur before a statement loses its spontaneity, the statements complainant made in the videotape do not constitute excited utterances.

  4. People v. Sommerville

    193 Ill. App. 3d 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 44 times
    Finding spontaneity and immediacy required for spontaneous declaration removed when rape victim responded to several questions posed to her on the telephone by her fiance, including: "What's wrong?" "By who?" "Are you okay?" and "is he there with you now?"

    The Parisie court stated that factors to be taken into consideration include length of time, condition of the declarant, influence of intervening occurrences, presence or absence of self-interest, and the nature and circumstances of the statement. Parisie, 5 Ill. App.3d at 1029-30; see also People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 341. In the case at bar, the statements related to the circumstances of the occurrence (the alleged sexual assault).

  5. People ex Rel. Hatch v. Elrod

    190 Ill. App. 3d 1004 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 8 times

    • 13 So, too, we hold in the instant case that the decedent's statement to Officer Morrison was not the product of a deliberate attempt to fabricate an occurrence, but rather, in light of the totality of the circumstances, should be considered inherently reliable and admissible as a spontaneous utterance. See People v. Sanchez (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 488, 434 N.E.2d 395; People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 439 N.E.2d 95; People v. Watson (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 691, 438 N.E.2d 453; People v. Fenderson (1987), 157 Ill. App.3d 537, 510 N.E.2d 479; E. Cleary M. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 803.3, at 552 (4th ed. 1984). • 14, 15 A dying declaration is a statement of fact by a victim concerning the cause and circumstances of his death and may be admissible into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when it appears to have been made by the victim under the belief that death is impending and immediate.

  6. People v. Harris

    134 Ill. App. 3d 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 20 times

    Another critical consideration is the fact that the State failed to present any observable manifestations that would demonstrate that Willie's declaration was made while he was still under the stress of the startling event. (See People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 339, 439 N.E.2d 95.) Willie was home for some 12 hours prior to his declaration. Within that time span, Willie was exposed to his mother, father, two sisters, a brother and the police.