Opinion
H036401
12-06-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SON VAN NGO, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 150919)
The trial court extended the status of defendant Son Van Ngo as a person with a mental disorder (MDO) for one year. It also issued an order authorizing involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to him. On appeal, defendant contends that no substantial evidence supports the order for involuntary medication. We disagree and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was convicted in 1992 of felony weapons manufacture and sentenced to four years in prison. He was subsequently found to be an MDO pursuant to Penal Code section 2970 and committed to Atascadero State Hospital. After an unsuccessful period as an outpatient, he was committed to Patton State Hospital in 2008 and has since had the commitment annually extended.
On May 24, 2010, the People filed a petition to extend defendant's commitment for another year from December 14, 2010, to December 14, 2011. On December 1, 2010, the People filed a petition for an order to administer involuntary psychotropic medication to defendant. At trial on both petitions, Patton State Hospital Staff Psychiatrist Dr. Ramila Duwal testified to the following.
Defendant's underlying offense was "where he held up a bank and asked for $5,000 with a handmade gun, homemade gun and a little knife." And defendant had suffered two manslaughter convictions before that. Defendant did not take responsibility for his crimes and believed that communists or Jews controlled him. According to defendant, the communists had put a chip in the back of his head and controlled him in his dreams; and they had also put voodoo in his body. Defendant does not believe he is mentally ill, does not want medications, and wants to go back to Vietnam. Defendant speaks often about his delusions and frequently talks and laughs to himself. He also has a history of substance abuse, specifically cocaine and heroin. He is diagnosed as being a person with chronic paranoid schizophrenia. He is not in remission and medications would help him.
Dr. Duwal also recounted that defendant had recently become upset in the dining room with another patient who was also Vietnamese. Defendant had a habit of demeaning this patient. In the incident, which occurred on November 4, 2010, defendant punched the patient in the left eye causing a black eye and a laceration. Dr. Duwal opined that this incident and other factors make it more likely that defendant poses a substantial danger to others. The other factors that she cited were that he cannot read social cues and misinterprets other people's behavior, does not believe that he has a mental illness, does not believe that he has a substance abuse problem, and refuses medical treatment for his paranoid schizophrenia. She added that defendant had also recently engaged in a verbal exchange with a staff member when he was asked to leave the bathroom and refused; and the staff had also recently found metal hairclips and chopsticks in defendant's locker, which defendant was not supposed to possess given his history of making weapons. She concluded: "It's the whole picture, not just that one incident. Just his history of not taking medications, his crime history. That's why I think he would pose a danger."
Dr. Duwal opined that defendant should be involuntarily medicated so as to reduce the risk of physical danger that he poses to others: "He would be able to listen to what you are saying much more." She offered that she would like to try on defendant the medications Abilify and Zyprexa, medications that defendant had taken when he was an outpatient.
At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court granted the petition extending defendant's commitment for one year and issued an order authorizing Patton State Hospital to administer involuntary psychotropic medications.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the involuntary medication order is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he argues that no evidence supported that he was incompetent to refuse treatment, he was dangerous within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300, or that compulsory medication was necessary for institutional security. He adds that Dr. Duwal's opinion that he might benefit from medication was irrelevant. We agree that substantial evidence supports that defendant was a danger to others.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "an individual has a 'significant' constitutionally protected 'liberty interest' in 'avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.' " (Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166, 178.) "The right to refuse necessary medical treatment, including antipsychotic drugs, is a liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [Citation.] The right of a competent adult to refuse antipsychotic drugs is also protected by the common law and article I, section 1 of the California Constitution." (People v. Fisher (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012-1013.)
"The right of privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution, article I, section 1," which " 'guarantees to the individual the freedom to choose to reject, or refuse to consent to, intrusions of his bodily integrity' " "clearly extends to the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs." (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14 (Qawi); see also In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 183.)
However, the right of a person committed as an MDO "to refuse antipsychotic drugs is qualified." (People v. Fisher, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013.) The right to refuse antipsychotic drugs "may be overcome in nonemergency situations by a judicial determination either that the person is incompetent or that he or she is dangerous within the meaning of [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 5300: '[A]n MDO can be compelled to be treated with antipsychotic medication under the following nonemergency circumstances: (1) he is determined by a court to be incompetent to refuse medical treatment; (2) the MDO is determined by a court to be a danger to others within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300.' " (Ibid., quoting from Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 27; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 892.)
"We review an order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication for substantial evidence. [Citation.] In the case of the MDO, the order must be supported by evidence that either the MDO is incompetent to refuse medical treatment or that the MDO is a danger to others within the meaning of [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 5300. [Citation.] [Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection 5300 requires a particularized showing that the person is a demonstrated danger and that he or she was recently dangerous. [Citation.] In the case of an MDO, the commitment offense may establish demonstrated dangerousness and recent dangerousness consists of 'violent or threatening acts specified in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 5300 within the year prior to the commitment or recommitment.' " (People v. Fisher, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences from the record to support the judgment. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We do not weigh the evidence or decide the credibility of the witnesses. (Ibid.)
The evidence that defendant is a danger to others within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300 is substantial. Defendant's manslaughter and weapons manufacture convictions demonstrated his propensity for violence. Of additional significance is that, not long before the hearing in the present case, defendant committed a serious assault on a fellow patient. Dr. Duwal testified that defendant is driven by a paranoid, delusional belief system and auditory hallucinations. In other words, defendant's treating psychiatrist reviewed defendant's criminal and medical background as well as defendant's behavior within the year before the recommitment and opined that defendant poses a substantial danger to others, particularly without the benefits of medication. (See People v. Pace (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 795, 799 [mental health professional conducting MDO evaluations should consider patient's entire history, including his or her criminal record].) As a qualified expert, Dr. Duwal's opinion on defendant's dangerousness to others constitutes substantial evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding. (Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 24; People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 917; People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 490.) Overwhelming evidence of defendant's danger to others was presented by the People. (People v. Fisher, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1016-1017.)
DISPOSITION
The order allowing involuntary administration of psychotropic medication is affirmed.
Premo, Acting P.J. WE CONCUR:
Mihara, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.