Opinion
A149193
08-31-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JORGE MARTINEZ VALENCIA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUKCRCR1686416)
Defendant Jorge Martinez Valencia (defendant) appeals from a final judgment after his no-contest plea to transporting methamphetamine for sale and resisting an officer. He challenges two of the conditions imposed by the trial court in its order of formal probation, arguing that they are invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and unconstitutionally overbroad. The first challenged condition requires defendant to receive prior written approval from his probation officer before leaving the state (travel condition); the second requires him to "take all medication as prescribed" (medication condition). We conclude that the travel condition is valid under Lent and within constitutional bounds, but the medication condition is not. Therefore, we will strike the medication condition and otherwise affirm the judgment and probation order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We draw our summary of the facts from the probation officer's report. Shortly after 11 a.m. on July 8, 2016, Officer Oliver of the Ukiah police responded to a call from Kenneth McBurney, who reported that defendant had followed him by car to a store and parked behind him, blocking him into a parking stall. McBurney reported that he asked defendant why he was parked in that way, but defendant would not respond.
When Officer Oliver arrived, he saw defendant sitting in his car with the engine running. Oliver noticed that defendant "was 'sweating profusely, and that his shirt was almost completely soaked in sweat.' " Defendant stared at the floorboard of his car with clenched fists, rubbing his fists with his thumbs. He refused to answer questions about why he had followed McBurney. When Oliver asked for identification, defendant told him to check the vehicle's registration. When Oliver asked for the registration, defendant told Oliver to leave him alone because he was praying. Defendant did not respond to Oliver's repeated requests that he shut off the vehicle. Oliver suspected defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance.
Defendant began to move around as a second police officer, Chapman, arrived. Fearful that defendant would put the vehicle in gear and drive away, Oliver reached into the car to shut it off. Defendant slapped at Oliver, told him to leave him alone, and punched his chest. Oliver grabbed defendant's arms and, with Chapman's help, tried to remove defendant from the car. Defendant yelled that Oliver had stolen his money, told Oliver and Chapman to leave him alone, and held tight to the steering wheel. Eventually, Oliver and Chapman removed defendant from his car and placed him on the ground. Defendant continued to resist, and as the officers handcuffed him, he scratched Oliver's hands multiple times, injuring Oliver. Defendant was taken to a hospital, where a doctor opined that defendant's "altered mental status was consistent with a person that has been binging on methamphetamine for 2-3 days."
A search of defendant's pockets revealed more than $32,000 in cash and a handkerchief containing 16.4 grams of methamphetamine.
The Mendocino County District Attorney then filed a complaint charging defendant with two felony counts: transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 69). Defendant pleaded not guilty. Defendant subsequently entered a plea of no contest to both counts in exchange for a promise of three years' probation and a maximum 365-day term in county jail.
Defendant informed the probation department that he was currently unemployed, and had worked cultivating and trimming marijuana for the past 10 years. He said he smoked three marijuana cigarettes per day, and had never tried methamphetamine before the day he was arrested. He said that on that day, he spent six hours cleaning up the lake, and while doing so he found the methamphetamine that the police later found in his pocket. He decided to dip his finger in the substance he found to taste it. He then decided to go to the store to buy a barbecue, and his car died in the store parking lot. He resisted the police because he was angry that McBurney called the police before giving him time to put his vehicle in reverse. He said he knew the police would take his life savings, which he had in his pocket and was saving for knee surgery.
At the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel objected to some of the probation conditions proposed by the probation department, including the two that are at issue in this appeal.
Counsel objected that the travel condition was "facially overbroad and unconstitutional in that regard and [sic] that it provides probation unfettered discretion to make determinations about interstate travel in violation of Mr. Valencia's constitutional rights. And I would also note that Mr. Valencia can be sufficiently supervised by with [sic] a modified term that affords probation the ability to effectively do their job while affording Mr. Valencia the least restrictive restriction on a constitutional right to interstate travel."
The condition to which counsel objected was included in numbered paragraph 5 of the terms and conditions of probation: "You shall not leave the State of California without the prior written approval of your Probation Officer. You do hereby waive extradition to the State of California from any jurisdiction in or outside the United States where you may be found and also agree that you will not contest any effort by any jurisdiction to be returned to the State of California." On appeal defendant challenges only the condition's requirement of prior written approval for interstate travel.
Counsel also objected that the medication condition "abrogates [defendant's] right to effectively work with his clinician on what is appropriate. I do not believe, absent an involuntary medication order, that this condition of probation is appropriate. [¶] The concern that probation appears to be seeking to address I think is well-founded. I don't object to the suggestion that Mr. Valencia would be well served to have an evaluation . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Nor do I believe that it is necessarily a bad idea for Mr. Valencia to potentially be under the supervision of a mental health clinician. [¶] And if the case involves prescription medications, then so be it. But I think there is a way to more narrowly tailor this condition of probation. And I believe as its currently stated, it reaches too far."
Later in the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel explained, "I fundamentally object to the suggestion that [defendant], as a condition of probation, has to concede that whatever his physician says is right for him is gospel. He should have the ability to make an independent decision about what he does and does not ingest with respect to prescribed medications. There's a reason that this court routinely orders involuntary medication orders and that is because a person in custody, incapable of making independent decisions that are in the best interests of himself are ordered to do so. That is not the case with a probationer. [Defendant] should not be in a position where he's forced to take medications as a condition of probation." The condition to which counsel objected was numbered paragraph 26 of the terms and conditions of probation: "You shall be evaluated by a licensed therapist or the Mental Health Department, at your expense, and attend counseling if deemed appropriate by the therapist and your Probation Officer. Also, you shall submit proof of enrollment, payment, and program completion to your Probation Officer, and take all medication as prescribed." On appeal, defendant challenges only the condition's requirement that he take all medications as prescribed.
The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation subject to various conditions, including the travel and medication conditions to which defendant had objected. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
"When an offender chooses probation, thereby avoiding incarceration, state law authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such release that are 'fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and . . . for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.' " (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402-403, quoting Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) Thus, "a sentencing court has 'broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1,' " and an appellate court generally reviews probation conditions for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 403, quoting People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.)
The trial court's discretion is broad but not unlimited. "[A] condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute." (People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) In addition, a probation condition must meet the "reasonableness" standard of Lent, under which conditions that relate to conduct that is not itself criminal must be "reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Under the Lent reasonableness test, there are potentially three questions to address for any probation condition: Is it unrelated to the offense at issue? Does it relate to conduct that is not in itself criminal? Does it relate to future criminality? (See People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379-380 (Olguin) [discussing Lent].) The Lent test "is conjunctive," which means that if the answer to all three questions is "yes," the condition is invalid under Lent, and conversely if the answer to any of the questions is "no," the condition is valid under Lent. (See ibid.)
An otherwise valid probation condition that fosters rehabilitation and protects public safety "may impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is 'not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens.' " (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624, quoting People v. Peck (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 351, 362.) However, "[a] probation condition that imposes limitations on a person's constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad." (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.).) We review constitutional overbreadth challenges to probation conditions de novo. (In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754.) B. Travel Condition
Defendant contends that the travel condition is invalid under Lent and constitutionally overbroad in its impact on his constitutional right to travel. We disagree.
In the trial court, defendant challenged the travel and medication conditions solely on constitutional grounds. Because he did not raise Lent objections below, he has forfeited them. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 885; People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1347.) We nevertheless consider the merits of defendant's Lent arguments because he argues that to the extent they were forfeited by his counsel's failure to object, he claims ineffective assistance of counsel. In his respondent's brief, the Attorney General addresses the merits of defendant's Lent attack on the travel condition "in the interests [of] defending [the] judgment on all available grounds, and to forgo having to respond to [defendant's] ineffective assistance of counsel claim."
Defendant was convicted of a crime involving the transportation for sale of a controlled substance, and there is a direct relationship between the sale and transport of drugs and the exercise of the right to travel. (People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1195 (Relkin).) Although there is nothing criminal about interstate travel, the travel condition is valid under Lent because the condition is reasonably related to the crime at issue and to preventing future criminality. (Ibid.) As the trial court noted in imposing the travel condition over defendant's objection here, the condition "goes directly to the supervision necessary in a felony-level probation."
Defendant relies on People v. Soto (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1219 (Soto) to argue that the travel condition is unreasonable under Lent, but we are not persuaded. In Soto, the defendant's offense was driving with a suspended license and driving with a blood alcohol level greater than 0.08 percent, which were not reasonably related to where defendant lived or influenced by whether he left the state. (Id. at p. 1226.) It does not follow from Soto that a travel condition is not related to the transportation of methamphetamine.
Nor does People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937 (Bauer), on which defendant also relies, persuade us that the travel condition is unreasonable under Lent or unconstitutional. Bauer is distinguishable from this case in several important respects. First, the defendant in Bauer was convicted on false imprisonment and assault (id. at p. 940), offenses that are entirely unlike the transportation of methamphetamine. Second, the condition that was successfully challenged in Bauer imposed a restriction on the defendant that differs significantly from the travel condition here, an effect of which is that defendant's probation officer must approve defendant's relocation outside of California. In contrast, the condition in Bauer specifically required that Bauer's residence, whether inside or outside California, be subject to his probation officer's approval. (Id. at p. 943.) Third, in Bauer the Court of Appeal was particularly concerned that the trial court imposed the condition as a result of opinions expressed by counsel that Bauer's parents, with whom Bauer lived, were very protective of him and that Bauer " 'need[ed] to grow up a little bit and away from them' " and that the condition gave the probation officer the power to prevent Bauer "from living with or near his parents—that is, the power to banish him." (Id. at p. 944.) No such concerns are implicated here.
Finally, we are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the travel condition is constitutionally overbroad because it "giv[es] probation officers the unbridled discretion to prevent [him] from visiting or relocating to places outside of California." There is nothing to suggest that defendant's reasonable requests to travel or move out of state would be disapproved. We view the travel condition here in light of our Supreme Court's admonition that probation conditions "should be given 'the meaning that would appear to a reasonable objective reader' " (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 382, quoting People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606), and presume that a probation officer will not withhold approval for reasons that are irrational or capricious. (Id. at p. 383.) A "probation department's authority to ensure compliance with terms of probation does not authorize irrational directives by probation officer[s]." (Ibid., citing People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240-1241.)
In sum, we conclude that the travel condition here is not invalid under Lent, and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. C. Medication Condition
Defendant asks us to strike the medication condition, contending that it is invalid under Lent and overbroad in its impact on his liberty interest in bodily autonomy. Defendant's argument relies on People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410 (Petty), in which this court struck a probation condition requiring a defendant to " 'comply with all directions of his/her mental health worker, including taking medications as directed' " (id. at p. 1413) on the grounds that "there was no medically-informed showing on the record before us that defendant's adherence to a particular medication regime was reasonably related to his criminal offense or his future criminality." (Id. at p. 1421.) Noting that the condition in Petty was "so broad that it could cover any form of medication, whether or not related to defendant's mental health or his criminality" (id. at p. 1420), we found that the condition was unreasonable under Lent in light of the state constitutional privacy right and a fundamental due process freedom to refuse to take antipsychotic medications. (Id. at p. 1417.)
Here, as in Petty, there is no "[m]edically-informed justification for insisting upon defendant's compliance with his mental health worker's medical decisions" (Petty, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420) and the condition is so broadly worded that it is not limited to medication related to defendant's criminality. (Ibid.) As we did in Petty, we will strike the medication condition here. (Id. at p. 1421.)
The Attorney General concedes that the record required by Petty has not been made here, but argues that instead of striking the condition, we should remand for the trial court to "determine whether a medically-informed record exists for the prescription medication condition." We see no need for such a remand, particularly where the Attorney General recognizes that no medically-informed record was made below. The Attorney General cites only one case, Relkin, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, as an example of the Court of Appeal remanding a matter to the trial court to cure defects in a probation condition, and the case is inapposite. In Relkin, the Court of Appeal considered a probation condition requiring defendant to "report to the probation officer, no later than the next working day, any arrests or any contacts with or incidents involving any peace officer," (id. at p. 1196) and remanded for the trial court to modify the condition to cure the vagueness and overbreadth of the portion of the condition requiring the reporting of "any contacts with or incidents involving any peace officer." (Id. at p. 1196-1197.) Because it involves an entirely different sort of probation condition and has nothing to do with the existence or creation of a record below, Relkin does not support the Attorney General's argument that remand for the trial court to determine whether a medically-informed record exists is appropriate here where all parties agree that the required record has not been made.
DISPOSITION
The condition of probation requiring defendant to "take all medication as prescribed" is stricken. In all other respects the judgment and order of formal probation are affirmed.
/s/_________
Miller, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Stewart, J.