Opinion
F071620
02-07-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAUL ALBERTO VALENCIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth N. Sokoler and Ryan B. McCarroll, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 1453984)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Thomas D. Zeff, Judge. Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth N. Sokoler and Ryan B. McCarroll, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Detjen, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Smith, J.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Raul Alberto Valencia appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered after police pulled over the car appellant was in. Appellant claims the trial court wrongly found reasonable suspicion existed to conduct the initial traffic stop. Appellant further contends the evidence submitted at the suppression hearing should have been rejected. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Facts concerning the traffic stop are taken from the November 18, 2013, hearing on appellant's motion to suppress.
On January 14, 2013, four robberies were reported over a roughly three-hour period of time in Stanislaus County. The first robbery was reported around 5:17 p.m. and occurred at a Millennium Food and Liquor. The victim of that robbery and a separate witness told the police that two suspects approached the store. One stood at the door while the other approached the victim, pointed a gun at him, and took both money and alcohol. A third witness, who was not contacted by the police, allegedly told the victim that the suspects fled in a black Volvo. Surveillance cameras at the store captured images of the suspects and of a black car leaving the scene under circumstances suggesting the car was used by the suspects in the robbery. A picture was taken of the surveillance video, showing the black car, and was emailed to other officers.
The second robbery was reported at approximately 5:31 p.m. and occurred at a Golden West Market. This robbery again involved two male suspects, one of which was armed with a gun. Money was taken from the register. The third robbery was reported at approximately 8:00 p.m. and occurred at a Country Market. Once again a gun was used. The fourth robbery was reported at approximately 8:33 p.m. and occurred at a Viva Market. The robbery was done by two suspects, one of which had a gun. The suspects fled in a used, but newer, black car, which was believed to be a Volvo.
At approximately 9:04 p.m., Modesto Police Officer William Jones and his partner, Officer Watson, were patrolling an area very near to three of the reported robberies. Officers Jones and Watson had received a notice to be on the lookout for a black Volvo and had received and viewed the image of the vehicle emailed after the first robbery. As Officer Jones was driving, he saw a black Volvo approach from the opposite direction. This was the first black Volvo Officer Jones had seen while on patrol and it closely matched both the description and the picture of the car believed to be involved in the reported robberies. Although the windows were tinted, Officer Jones believed he saw three individuals in the car. Based on these facts, Officer Jones initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle.
After hearing this evidence from Modesto Police Officers Alejandro Rivera and William Jones at the suppression hearing, the trial court asked the parties if they had any further arguments. Appellant's counsel submitted, raising as the sole issue "whether there was sufficient evidence to stop that particular vehicle at that time not knowing the number of specific individuals" in the car. The trial court denied the motion. Following a jury trial, appellant was ultimately convicted of three counts of robbery and acquitted of a fourth. This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Our standard of review for a motion to suppress is governed by well-established principles. (People v. Ormonde (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 282, 290.) "As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable." (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) "We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard." (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134.) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679.)
"A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity." (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties." (People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 (Flores).) "Where there is a rational belief of criminal activity with which the suspect is connected, a detention for reasonable investigative procedures infringes no constitutional restraint." (Ibid.)
Where officers rely upon information transmitted to them through official channels, the evidence offered to support the credibility of the information transmitted must be sufficient to show " 'the source of the information is something other than the imagination of an officer who does not become a witness.' " (In re Richard G. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1259 (In re Richard G.).) Articulable Facts Support a Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity
In this case, prior to identifying the vehicle in question, Officer Jones was made aware of several similar robberies, at least three occurring within a very close proximity to his patrol location. At least two of the robberies utilized a newer model, used, black Volvo, of which Officer Jones had been provided a picture from video surveillance at one of the robberies. Less than 30 minutes after the fourth robbery was reported, Officer Jones saw a vehicle matching both the witness description of the vehicle and the picture Officer Jones had seen driving in the vicinity of the robberies. Officer Jones had seen no similar vehicles on his patrol. We conclude these articulable facts support a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was involved in criminal activity. (See Flores, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 91-92 [vehicle meeting general description of vehicle used in robbery seen four nights after crime and containing people meeting general description of suspects constituted sufficient facts to detain where vehicle was sufficiently unique to be identifiable], People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384, 389 [presence in a residential area at 11 p.m. and general similarity between defendant's appearance and description of suspects sufficient to satisfy good faith suspicion and rational belief of criminal activity standards].) Evidence Presented Was Sufficiently Reliable
Appellant contends the evidence offered at his suppression hearing was not sufficiently reliable to pass the so-called "Harvey/Madden" rule, which generally requires the People prove information relayed through official channels and relied upon by officers was not the result of a nontestifying officer's imagination. We do not agree. Assuming this issue was properly preserved, the People presented testimony from Officer Rivera, who had personally viewed security footage and interviewed witnesses from the first robbery, which indicated that a newer model, used, black Volvo was likely utilized in the robberies. It was this evidence that was transmitted through official channels and relied upon by Officer Jones. The testimony of Officer Rivera was sufficient to demonstrate the video surveillance and witness statements were authentic and not the product of fantasy. (See In re Richard G., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1257-1258, 1260 [noting Harvey/Madden rule would be satisfied by calling the police dispatcher that received anonymous telephone report of criminal activity].) Accordingly, the evidence offered was sufficient to satisfy the Harvey/Madden rule.
See People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516, People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017. --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.