Opinion
2022–06307 Ind. No. 1150/21
04-19-2023
The PEOPLE, etc., appellant, v. Milo TYLER, respondent.
Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Jonathan D. Estreich, Marion Tang, Glenn Green, and Pilar O'Rourke of counsel), for appellant. Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Felice B. Milani and Matthew Hereth of counsel), for respondent.
Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Jonathan D. Estreich, Marion Tang, Glenn Green, and Pilar O'Rourke of counsel), for appellant.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Felice B. Milani and Matthew Hereth of counsel), for respondent.
BETSY BARROS, J.P., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JOSEPH A. ZAYAS, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Richard Ambro, J.), dated June 29, 2022, which, after a hearing, granted those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed.
The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, among other crimes, and moved, inter alia, to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials. At a suppression hearing, a police officer testified that he effected a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle after observing him driving at what the officer estimated to be a high rate of speed, and cross a double yellow line. The officer further testified that, during the traffic stop, he detected the smell of marihuana and saw an empty firearm holster in the rear pocket of the passenger-side seat, as well as a marihuana cigar and the corner of a plastic bag with a powdery substance in the center console. The officer directed the defendant to exit his vehicle and searched him, at which time the officer felt a firearm in the defendant's waistband. Following the suppression hearing, in an order dated June 29, 2022, the Supreme Court determined that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was not justified, and granted those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials. The People appeal.
"On a motion to suppress physical evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance" ( People v. Hernandez, 40 A.D.3d 777, 778, 778, 836 N.Y.S.2d 219 ; see People v. Harris, 192 A.D.3d 151, 138 N.Y.S.3d 593 ). "Once the People have met their initial burden, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of the search and seizure" ( People v. Brown, 198 A.D.3d 803, 805, 156 N.Y.S.3d 276 ). "[A] vehicular stop requires probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic violation" ( People v. Wyatt, 153 A.D.3d 1371, 1372, 61 N.Y.S.3d 606 ; see People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 752, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785 ; People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 348–349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ). Probable cause exists when "an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed" ( People v. Maldonado, 86 N.Y.2d 631, 635, 635 N.Y.S.2d 155, 658 N.E.2d 1028 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "A police officer who can articulate credible facts establishing reasonable cause to believe that someone has violated a law has established a reasonable basis to effectuate a [traffic] stop" ( People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 354, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ; see People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 133, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 ).
Here, the People failed to meet their burden of establishing the legality of the stop through the officer's testimony (see People v. Harris, 192 A.D.3d at 151, 138 N.Y.S.3d 593 ; People v. Dixon, 184 A.D.2d 725, 587 N.Y.S.2d 185 ). There was no evidence that the officer had been trained in visual speed estimation prior to the stop, or that the defendant's speed was imprudent or unreasonable under the conditions then existing (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180[a] ; cf. People v. Wyatt, 153 A.D.3d at 1373, 61 N.Y.S.3d 606 ; People v. Scott, 189 A.D.3d 2110, 2110–2111, 138 N.Y.S.3d 780 ; People v. Miller, 57 A.D.3d 568, 570, 869 N.Y.S.2d 150 ). Moreover, in making its suppression ruling, the Supreme Court, in effect, made a credibility assessment as to whether the officer saw the defendant's vehicle cross over the double yellow line (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128[a] ; People v. McGreal, 190 A.D.2d 869, 593 N.Y.S.2d 868 ; People v. Anderson, 118 A.D.2d 788, 788, 500 N.Y.S.2d 296 ), or had merely heard the defendant's vehicle hit a rumble strip separating the lanes of traffic. The court's credibility assessment in this regard is entitled to great deference on appeal (see People v. Wilson, 211 A.D.3d 973, 179 N.Y.S.3d 788 ), and we see no reason to disturb that finding.
Accordingly, the physical evidence and the defendant's statements to law enforcement officials were properly suppressed.
BARROS, J.P., MALTESE, ZAYAS and DOWLING, JJ., concur.