He was found guilty of attempted escape in the first degree for, after having been arrested for a class B felony, "[attempting] escape from custody" (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 205.15). Inasmuch as the "attempt to escape from custody" and the "intent to prevent a . . . police officer . . . from performing a lawful duty" describe essentially the same act, the charges of attempt to escape in the first degree and assault in the second degree necessarily involved the same material element ( see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05; § 205.15 [2]; People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640, 643; People v Tyce, 160 AD2d 1033, 1035). Accordingly, we modify the sentences on these convictions to run concurrently with each other ( see Penal Law § 70.25; People v Laureano, supra).

Thus, not only is this contention unpreserved for review (see, CPL 470.05), reversal in the interest of justice is not warranted (see, CPL 470.15) as the reference was not so egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial (cf., People v. Grice, 100 A.D.2d 419 [pervasive prosecutorial misconduct, which included reference to the defendant's failure to take a polygraph test, deprived the defendant of a fair trial]) and was harmless error in any event (see, People v. Tyce, 160 A.D.2d 1033, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 867). As a final matter, we reject defendant's contention that his sentence — 1 1/2 to 3 years in prison — is harsh and excessive given the nature of this crime. Defendant's remaining contentions, including the argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, have been reviewed and rejected.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered. The hearing court properly determined that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made statements to the police (see, People v. Centano, 76 N.Y.2d 837; People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, cert denied 400 U.S. 851; People v. Tyce, 160 A.D.2d 1033; People v. Bailey, 140 A.D.2d 356) and there is no reason to disturb that determination on this record. However, the People correctly concede that reversal of the defendant's conviction is required because the trial court submitted a verdict sheet to the jury which listed a statutory element of each murder count (see, People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356; People v. Kelly, 76 N.Y.2d 1013; People v. Taylor, 76 N.Y.2d 873; People v. Percinthe, 200 A.D.2d 773; People v. Vargas [Raymond], 199 A.D.2d 291).

Therefore, suppression of such oral statement is denied. After speaking with the detective, and giving him an oral statement, the defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany him to the 105th Precinct. Defendant voluntarily accompanied the police to the police station, was cooperative, and was never handcuffed, and the police conducted only investigatory rather than accusatory questioning... . People v Murphy, 43 AD3d 1276,1277 (4th Dept. 2007). As in People v Tyce, 160 AD2d 1033,1034 (2d Dept. 1990), ...the defendant was never handcuffed, no guns were drawn, and he never objected to accompanying the detective to the precinct . Once at the police precinct, the defendant agreed to write out his version of the shooting.

Defendant voluntarily accompanied the police to the police station, was cooperative, and was never handcuffed, and the police conducted only investigatory rather than accusatory questioning. . . . People v Murphy , 43 AD3d 1276, 1277 (4th Dept. 2007). As in People v Tyce, 160 AD2d 1033, 1034 (2d Dept. 1990), . . . the defendant was never handcuffed, no guns were drawn, and he never objected to accompanying the detective to the precinct . Once at the police precinct, the defendant agreed to write out his version of the shooting.