However, it is only in the most limited and unusual circumstances that a delay beyond one year in sentencing is justified. People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979). At the conclusion of the hearing on remand, Judge Hoffius concluded that the present case was distinguishable from Turner, supra.

Subsequent decisions of this Court have held that "absent good cause," a delay of more than a year in sentencing deprives the court of jurisdiction. People v Boynton, 185 Mich. App. 669; 463 N.W.2d 174 (1990); see also People v Dubis, 158 Mich. App. 504; 405 N.W.2d 181 (1987); People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979) (authority to sentence beyond the one-year limitation is permitted only in the "most limited and unusual circumstances"). The prosecution argues that defendant waived the one-year limitation by requesting adjournments so that the court could consider the outcome of the case before Judge Cooper.

We emphasize, however, that an unexcused violation of the one-year limit contained in the delayed sentencing statute affects only the court's authority to sentence the defendant, nothing more. People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485, 489-490; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979). Since no good cause is apparent in this case for the delay beyond the one-year statutory limit, the court did lose jurisdiction to sentence defendant.

Where, as here, the offense is a probational offense, the case law on sentencing delays has been "codified" in MCL 771.1; MSA 28.1131. People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485, 488; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979), and see Bracey, supra, holding that the enactment of this statute expressly authorizing a delayed sentence for probational offenses did not prohibit postponing sentencing for nonprobational offenses. The instant offense was a probational offense and, thus, the statutory requirements apply.

A delay in sentencing may bar a trial court from imposing sentence. People v Kennedy, 58 Mich. 372; 25 N.W. 318 (1885); People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979); People v West, 100 Mich. App. 498; 299 N.W.2d 59 (1980). No all delays, however, produce such a result.

Defendant failed to cite any authority in support of this contention, and we are aware of none. It is well-settled that a sentence may be deferred for a reasonable period and for a proper purpose. People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979). Since a sentencing judge may consider pending criminal charges in imposing sentence, People v Henry, 395 Mich. 367; 236 N.W.2d 489 (1975), we find that it is within a trial court's sound discretion to delay sentencing briefly to determine whether or not an outstanding charge results in a conviction.

" (Footnote omitted.) In People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485, 489; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979), the Court said: "Waiver of the right to be sentenced by consenting to a delay is meaningless.

By way of comparison, MCL 771.1; MSA 28.1131 permits a one-year delay to allow a defendant an opportunity to prove his eligibility for probation or other leniency. Cf. People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979). The reason for the delay provides some justification.

When the trial court in this cause became apprised of the fact that defendant was incarcerated in New York, and, when later it was requested by defendant to impose concurrent sentences, it could have and should have taken the necessary steps to sentence defendant for his armed robbery conviction. In People v Turner, 92 Mich. App. 485; 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979), a panel of this Court found that an unauthorized delay in sentencing the defendant served to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to sentence. Even though that defendant had consented to all five adjournments which occasioned the delay, this Court held that, "[t]he trial court cannot simply postpone sentencing and retain jurisdiction, except in the most limited and unusual of circumstances".

The trial court had no legal basis to trump the prosecutor's charging decision, much less dismiss the case after the defendant had pleaded to the charge and had never sought to withdraw his plea. See People v. McLott, 70 Mich.App. 524, 245 N.W.2d 814 (1976) (jurisdiction to impose sentence was not lost where the delay was only six days and because the trial court could not be present); People v. Turner, 92 Mich.App. 485, 285 N.W.2d 340 (1979); People v. Dubis, 158 Mich.App. 504, 405 N.W.2d 181 (1987); People v. Boynton, 185 Mich.App. 669, 463 N.W.2d 174 (1990)..MCR 7.215(C)(2).