People v. Turner

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Sykes

    47 A.D.3d 501 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 3 times

    The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. There is no basis for disturbing the jury's determinations concerning credibility ( see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495), notwithstanding minor discrepancies in the accounts of the People's witnesses. There was ample evidence of defendant's intent to sell, including his possession of 49 cellophane twists of crack cocaine secreted in his buttocks, along with cash that included 29 single dollar bills ( see People v Daley, 281 AD2d 244, lv denied 96 NY2d 827; People v Turner, 228 AD2d 331, lv denied 88 NY2d 996).

  2. People v. Resek

    307 A.D.2d 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 9 times

    The police officer's testimony regarding the packaging and pricing of heroin involved in unlawful drug transactions was plainly admissible as matters not readily known or understood by a lay person (see e.g. People v. Lacend, 216 A.D.2d 112, 113, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 923;People v. Hinton, 178 A.D.2d 279, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 948). Similarly admissible as evidence of defendant's intent was the testimony establishing that 23 glassine envelopes of heroin were recovered from defendant's person and the car he was driving when arrested (see People v. Ramos, 248 A.D.2d 334, 335, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 859 [testimony regarding the large quantity of drugs recovered from defendant was properly admitted as relevant to the issue of intent]; see also People v. Turner, 228 A.D.2d 331, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 996). However, the testimony that an individual who possessed 23 bags of heroin "would mean that person was probably a dealer," clearly exceeded the allowable and impermissibly intruded upon the jury's ultimate fact-finding responsibility (see e.g. People v. Wright, 283 A.D.2d 712, 713, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 926; People v. Pratt, 266 A.D.2d 318, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 883; People v. Lamont, 227 A.D.2d 873; People v. Williams, 224 A.D.2d 725, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 855; People v. Goodwine, 177 A.D.2d 708, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 920).

  3. People v. Matos

    255 A.D.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

    Were we to review this claim, we would find that the identity and unchanged condition of the cocaine were reasonably assured by the fact that it was under police control and in an identifiable container the entire time ( People v. Julian, 41 N.Y.2d 340; People v. Harris, 181 A.D.2d 578, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 895). There was ample evidence of defendant's intent to sell, including the police witnesses' observation of him exchanging objects for money and engaging in other conduct consistent with drug trafficking on a street corner known for that activity, his possession upon arrest of 10 bags of cocaine, and his inculpatory statements to the arresting police officer ( People v. Ranson, 251 A.D.2d 263; People v. Turner, 228 A.D.2d 331, 332, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 996). We see no reason to disturb the court's findings concerning the credibility and reliability of the police testimony.

  4. People v. Williams

    255 A.D.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 6 times

    The evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Under the circumstances presented, including defendant's conduct indicative of selling, and his possession of a substantial amount of cocaine, the evidence was clearly sufficient to establish his intent to sell ( People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233; People v. Turner, 228 A.D.2d 331, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 996). The comments of the prosecutor during summation did not deprive defendant of a fair trial since they constituted proper inferences to be drawn from the testimony at trial and proper responses to the summation of defense counsel ( People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396; People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105).

  5. People v. Ramos

    248 A.D.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 2 times

    In any event, defendant's application for a Sandoval modification following the close of the prosecution's case belies his current claim that the ruling precluded his testimony. Further, the testimony was properly admitted as relevant to the issue of intent regarding the large quantity of drugs recovered from defendant ( see, People v. Turner, 228 A.D.2d 331, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 996), and to refute defendant's related claim, presented through cross-examination of the People's witnesses and in summation, that he was a drug user and not a drug seller. In any event, the court struck the testimony, as promised, immediately after defendant indicated that he would not testify or present any evidence at trial and it is presumed that the jury understood and followed the court's instruction ( People v. Davis, 58 N.Y.2d 1102, 1104).

  6. People v. Sanchez

    248 A.D.2d 306 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 9 times

    The eventual resignation of her fellow officer and the circumstances related thereto, which were not properly before the suppression court, do not require any particular conclusions as to Detective Jacqueline Brown's testimony and we do not find that such affects her credibility. Since the credible evidence undermines, at the least, any objective indication that defendant had retained an expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents ( People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99), he lacks standing ( People v. DeLaCruz, 242 A.D.2d 410; People v. Turner, 228 A.D.2d 331) and has no further basis to challenge the bag's recovery ( Matter of Devon H., 225 A.D.2d 135, 140-141). In any event, by dropping the bag and running inside upon the mere approach of police, without further interaction between defendant and police ( People v. Adams, 173 A.D.2d 207, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 1073), defendant voluntarily abandoned the contraband ( People v. Bartley, 219 A.D.2d 566, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 898; People v. Butler, 184 A.D.2d 305, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 927), and we reject his claim that the seizure of the bag was derivative of unlawful police conduct ( People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, supra, at 108, 110).

  7. People v. Riley

    246 A.D.2d 469 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

    Rather, the test is whether a person retains an expectation of privacy in the property, which has both a subjective prong, that the person intended such, and an objective prong, that such an expectation is reasonable under the circumstances ( People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 108). Under the present circumstances, in which the defendant left his "stash" in a location "`readily accessible to * * * scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public [citation omitted]'" ( People v. Mims, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 112-113), in a crumpled brown paper bag, on one of the City's busiest pedestrian streets in close proximity to a major transportation hub in a vicinity notorious for drug trafficking, any expectation of privacy would be manifestly unreasonable ( see, People v. Hunt, 235 A.D.2d 374, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1094; People v. Garcia, 232 A.D.2d 272; People v. Wolf, 232 A.D.2d 263; People v. Turner, 228 A.D.2d 331, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 996). In any event, the totality of the officers' observations, including furtive behavior by defendant, who utilized a stash from which items were exchanged for currency in a drug-prone location, established probable cause ( Matter of Devon H., 225 A.D.2d 135, 138-139), notwithstanding the officers' inability to identify the item exchanged ( People v. Jones, 219 A.D.2d 417, 420-421, affd 90 N.Y.2d 835; People v. Schlaich, 218 A.D.2d 398, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 994; People v. Graham, 211 A.D.2d 55, 58-59, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 795) so that the seizure would have been incidental to a lawful arrest.