Opinion
February 27, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pesce, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The court acted within its discretion when it limited defense counsel's cross examination of the People's rebuttal witness (see, People v. McGriff, 201 A.D.2d 672; People v. Rodriguez, 191 A.D.2d 723; People v. Ashner, 190 A.D.2d 238, 246). The court also properly prevented defense counsel from raising the issue of fingerprint evidence during summation since there was no testimony at trial concerning fingerprints or the lack thereof (see, People v. Miller, 168 A.D.2d 642; People v. Hernandez, 143 A.D.2d 842; People v. Reina, 94 A.D.2d 727) and from commenting during summation on the absence of a witness whose testimony would have been cumulative (see, People v. Kitching, 78 N.Y.2d 532; People v. Williams, 133 A.D.2d 717).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the court's charge to the jury was adequate because the charge as a whole properly defined the concept of reasonable doubt (see, People v. Canty, 60 N.Y.2d 830; People v. Taik Kwung, 186 A.D.2d 365; People v Jones, 156 A.D.2d 718).
The court properly rendered consecutive sentences for the convictions of attempted murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree since the offenses were committed through separate and distinct acts (see, People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 361, 364; People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839, 843). Finally, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that his sentence was unduly harsh and excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Pizzuto, J.P., Santucci, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.