The first is a section 8 petition for the judicial review of treatment while in the Director's custody (725 ILCS 205/8 (West 2018)), and the second is a section 9 petition alleging recovery (id. § 9). Each of those claims presents a distinct cause of action and a clear-cut, unmistakable claim for relief. A section 8 claim seeks a judicial declaration that the Director's treatment is inadequate, thus requiring a court to order a remedy (e.g., Kastman, 2015 IL App (2d) 141245). In contrast, a section 9 claim asserts that the defendant has "recovered," is no longer sexually dangerous, and may be conditionally released (e.g., Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d at 355; People v. Tunget, 287 Ill. App. 3d 533, 534 (1997)). ¶ 13 We, therefore, reject the Director's assertion that the denial of McVeay's statutory claim is akin to the denial of an injunction under Rule 307.