In resolving issues concerning applications for recovery, however, courts, including this court, have used the phrase "petition for recovery" when discussing an "application" for recovery. See, e.g., People v. Cooper, 132 Ill.2d 347 (1989); Shiro, 52 Ill.2d at 282; People v. Sizemore, 311 Ill. App.3d 917 (2000); People v. Tunget, 287 Ill. App.3d 533 (1997). People v. Hannan, 184 Ill. App.3d 937 (1989); People v. Parrott, 108 Ill. App.3d 222 (1982).
The first is a section 8 petition for the judicial review of treatment while in the Director's custody (725 ILCS 205/8 (West 2018)), and the second is a section 9 petition alleging recovery (id. § 9). Each of those claims presents a distinct cause of action and a clear-cut, unmistakable claim for relief. A section 8 claim seeks a judicial declaration that the Director's treatment is inadequate, thus requiring a court to order a remedy (e.g., Kastman, 2015 IL App (2d) 141245). In contrast, a section 9 claim asserts that the defendant has "recovered," is no longer sexually dangerous, and may be conditionally released (e.g., Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d at 355; People v. Tunget, 287 Ill. App. 3d 533, 534 (1997)). ¶ 13 We, therefore, reject the Director's assertion that the denial of McVeay's statutory claim is akin to the denial of an injunction under Rule 307.
¶ 68 We note that a respondent may file and proceed on a new application notwithstanding the fact that an appeal is pending on a previous application. People v. Tunget, 287 Ill. App. 3d 533, 535, 678 N.E.2d 1246, 1247 (1997). We sincerely hope respondent was able to file a new application and proceed on it while this appeal has been pending. If he has, and if he has been conditionally discharged, then a trial on his original application is not required. If not, a trial on his application showing recovery must be conducted. (In the event of a trial, we remind the trial court that the relevant inquiry is whether respondent is a sexually dangerous person on the date of the trial court's decision.
We have previously acknowledged that the Act imposes a significant burden on this State's limited resources. People v. Tunget, 287 Ill. App.3d 533, 678 N.E.2d 1246 (1997); People v. Burk, 289 Ill. App.3d 270, 682 N.E.2d 352 (1997). However, we must conclude that the Act was violated when the trial court dismissed the defendant's petition by means of summary judgment.
We have previously noted that the statutory scheme imposes a significant burden on this State's limited judicial resources. See People v. Tunget, 287 Ill. App.3d 533 (1997). However, for purposes of this case, we must conclude that the Act was violated by conducting a bench trial without the defendant's knowing waiver of a jury.