Opinion
2015-08-26
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Cordell TUCKER, appellant.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Louis E. Mazzola of counsel), for appellant. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Rosalind C. Gray of counsel), for respondent.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Louis E. Mazzola of counsel), for appellant. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Rosalind C. Gray of counsel), for respondent.
RANDALL T. ENG, P.J., L. PRISCILLA HALL, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Camacho, J.), rendered June 27, 2013, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree, unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the first degree, assault in the second degree, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, grand larceny in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The County Court properly denied the defendant's Batson challenge ( see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) to the prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective African–American juror. The County Court's determination that the facially neutral explanation provided by the prosecutor for excluding this prospective juror was not pretextual, which is entitled to great deference on appeal, is supported by the record ( see People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 656, 663–665, 917 N.Y.S.2d 39, 942 N.E.2d 248; People v. Adams, 118 A.D.3d 717, 986 N.Y.S.2d 845; People v. Smith, 98 A.D.3d 533, 534, 949 N.Y.S.2d 190; People v. Waters, 81 A.D.3d 673, 673–674, 916 N.Y.S.2d 791).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of manslaughter in the second degree was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
For his conviction of assault in the second degree, the defendant was sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment of seven years plus three years of postrelease supervision. However, the Uniform Sentence and Commitment form transposed the sentence imposed for assault in the second degree with the sentence imposed for fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the first degree. The Uniform Sentence and Commitment form was later amended to reflect the sentence actually imposed by the court at sentencing, without producing the defendant for resentencing. Contrary to the defendant's contention, this procedure was proper ( see People v. Marks, 128 A.D.3d 852, 9 N.Y.S.3d 120; People v. Mercado, 74 A.D.3d 990, 904 N.Y.S.2d 451; cf. People v. Haywood, 124 A.D.3d 798, 2 N.Y.S.3d 164).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.