Notably, "not every misstep by a juror rises to the inherently prejudicial level at which reversal is required" ( id. at 1154, 72 N.Y.S.3d 639 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). "Each case must be examined on its unique facts to determine the nature of the misconduct and the likelihood that prejudice was engendered" ( People v. Irizarry, 83 N.Y.2d 557, 561, 611 N.Y.S.2d 807, 634 N.E.2d 179 [1994] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; seePeople v. Douglas, 57 A.D.3d 1105, 1106, 869 N.Y.S.2d 272 [2008], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 783, 879 N.Y.S.2d 59, 906 N.E.2d 1093 [2009] ). County Court "is ‘vested with discretion’ in deciding [such] motion, and its factual findings – including credibility determinations – typically are upheld ‘if they are supported by evidence in the record’ " ( People v. Tubbs, 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1012, 981 N.Y.S.2d 830 [2014], quoting People v. Rodriguez, 100 N.Y.2d 30, 35, 760 N.Y.S.2d 74, 790 N.E.2d 247 [2003] ).After the deputy informed County Court and counsel of the juror's letter, a hearing was held, wherein the juror testified that she did not know the deputy prior to the trial, she judged the deputy's testimony based on credibility and not by his physical appearance, and she did not speak to any jurors about the deputy; after the trial, she learned of the deputy's exemplary work with K–9s by searching the Internet.

The juror's remark that she had observed people like defendant during her employment was not suggestive of any expertise "in examining and weighing the evidence" (People v Torres, 189 A.D.3d 898, 899 [2d Dept 2020]). Moreover, the juror's purported reference to defendant having been previously arrested was validated by the evidence of defendant's prior conviction, which was fleshed out during defendant's cross-examination, thus supporting County Court's conclusion that there was no impact on the jury's determination (see People v Edwards, 188 A.D.3d 1763, 1764-1765 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 955 [2021]; compare People v St. Louis, 20 A.D.3d 592, 595 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 N.Y.3d 856 [2005]). Altogether, defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice to a substantial right and, accordingly, we find that County Court properly denied defendant's motion to set aside the verdict (see People v Tubbs, 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1012-1013 [3d Dept 2014]).

Furthermore, the court ameliorated any prejudice by giving a limiting instruction during the final charge (see People v. Doane, 212 A.D.3d 875, 881, 181 N.Y.S.3d 364 [3d Dept. 2023], lv denied, 39 N.Y.3d 1154, 190 N.Y.S.3d 702, 211 N.E.3d 1155 [2023]). Defendant’s assertion that the court deprived him of a fair trial based upon statements that it made to prospective jurors during voir dire is unpreserved in the absence of an objection to the challenged statements (see People v. Tubbs, 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1011–1012, 981 N.Y.S.2d 830 [3d Dept. 2014]). Defendant also did not object to the court’s Sandoval compromise ruling and, therefore, any challenge thereto is likewise unpreserved (see People v. Casey, 214 A.D.3d 1121, 1123, 186 N.Y.S.3d 409 [3d Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 927, 192 N.Y.S.3d 505, 213 N.E.3d 647 [2023]). [12, 13] As to the denial of the request for a mental competency examination under CPL 730.30(1), whether to order such examination is a matter resting in the discretion of the trial court (see People v. Morgan, 87 N.Y.2d 878, 879, 638 N.Y.S.2d 942, 662 N.E.2d 260 [1995]).

Furthermore, the court ameliorated any prejudice by giving a limiting instruction during the final charge (see People v Doane, 212 A.D.3d 875, 881 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1154 [2023]). Defendant's assertion that the court deprived him of a fair trial based upon statements that it made to prospective jurors during voir dire is unpreserved in the absence of an objection to the challenged statements (see People v Tubbs, 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1011-1012 [3d Dept 2014]). Defendant also did not object to the court's Sandoval compromise ruling and, therefore, any challenge thereto is likewise unpreserved (see People v Casey, 214 A.D.3d 1121, 1123 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 927 [2023]).

"A verdict may be set aside if during the trial there occurred, out of the presence of the court, improper conduct by a juror, which may have affected a substantial right of the defendant and which was not known to the defendant prior to the rendition of the verdict" ( People v. Bush, 184 A.D.3d 1003, 1009, 126 N.Y.S.3d 570 [3d Dept. 2020] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted]), lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1093, 131 N.Y.S.3d 296, 155 N.E.3d 789 [2020] ). The trial court is vested with discretion in deciding the motion and each case must be examined on its unique facts (seePeople v. Quinn, 210 A.D.3d 1284, 1290, 178 N.Y.S.3d 623 [3d Dept. 2022], lv. denied 39 N.Y.3d 1079, 184 N.Y.S.3d 295, 204 N.E.3d 1076 [2023] ; People v. Tubbs, 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1012, 981 N.Y.S.2d 830 [3d Dept. 2014] ). Defendant's motion was predicated upon the allegation that juror No. 7 engaged in improper conduct by failing to disclose his family's history of animosity and altercations with defendant's family.

"A motion to set aside a verdict under CPL 330.30 (2) may be granted where it is shown that improper conduct by a juror prejudiced a substantial right of the defendant" (People v Gonzales, 228 AD2d 722, 722 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 1021 [1996]; see People v Irizarry, 83 NY2d 557, 561 [1994]). Upon our review of the evidence from the hearing, however, we conclude that the record supports the court's conclusion that the actions of the jurors at issue had no impact on the jury's determinations and thus did not prejudice a substantial right of defendant (see People v Tubbs, 115 AD3d 1009, 1012-1013 [3d Dept 2014]; People v Carmichael, 68 AD3d 1704, 1705-1706 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 798 [2010]). We have reviewed defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it does not warrant reversal or modification of the judgment.

isstep by a juror rises to the inherently prejudicial level at which reversal is required automatically" ( People v. Brown , 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 399 N.E.2d 51 [1979] ; seePeople v. Bell , 307 A.D.2d 1047, 1047-1049, 763 N.Y.S.2d 762 [2d Dept. 2003], lv denied 1 N.Y.3d 568, 775 N.Y.S.2d 785, 807 N.E.2d 898 [2003] ). "A motion to set aside a verdict under CPL 330.30(2) may be granted where it is shown that improper conduct by a juror prejudiced a substantial right of the defendant" ( People v. Gonzales , 228 A.D.2d 722, 722, 643 N.Y.S.2d 707 [3d Dept. 1996], lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 1021, 651 N.Y.S.2d 20, 673 N.E.2d 1247 [1996] ; seePeople v. Irizarry , 83 N.Y.2d 557, 561, 611 N.Y.S.2d 807, 634 N.E.2d 179 [1994] ). Upon our review of the evidence from the hearing, however, we conclude that the record supports the court's conclusion that the actions of the jurors at issue had no impact on the jury's determinations and thus did not prejudice a substantial right of defendant (seePeople v. Tubbs , 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1012-1013, 981 N.Y.S.2d 830 [3d Dept. 2014] ; People v. Carmichael , 68 A.D.3d 1704, 1705-1706, 891 N.Y.S.2d 574 [4th Dept. 2009], lv denied 14 N.Y.3d 798, 899 N.Y.S.2d 133, 925 N.E.2d 937 [2010] ). We have reviewed defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it does not warrant reversal or modification of the judgment.

The jury nevertheless credited the victim's testimony, which was corroborated in important points by other evidence and was not, contrary to defendant's suggestion, incredible as a matter of law (seePeople v. Wright, 155 A.D.3d 1452, 1454, 66 N.Y.S.3d 66 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1121, 77 N.Y.S.3d 346, 101 N.E.3d 987 [2018] ; People v. Blond, 96 A.D.3d 1149, 1152, 946 N.Y.S.2d 663 [2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 1101, 955 N.Y.S.2d 556, 979 N.E.2d 817 [2012] ). To the extent that a different verdict was a reasonable possibility, "[a]fter reviewing the proof in the record and finding no reason to disregard the jury's credibility determinations, we are unpersuaded that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence" ( People v. Tubbs, 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1010, 981 N.Y.S.2d 830 [2014] ; seePeople v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 [2006] ; People v. Peart, 141 A.D.3d 939, 941, 36 N.Y.S.3d 281 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1074, 47 N.Y.S.3d 233, 69 N.E.3d 1029 [2016] ). Defendant next alleges the existence of unspecified defects in the grand jury proceeding.

As to defendant's claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, where, as here, an alternative verdict would not have been unreasonable, we must, "like the trier of fact below, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). Defendant contends that the victim's testimony was uncorroborated by any other evidence and that her narrative of the incidents is incredible because she continued to place herself around defendant in vulnerable settings. However, "[w]here, as here, credibility issues are presented, ‘deference is accorded to the fact-finder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor’ " ( People v. Tubbs, 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1010, 981 N.Y.S.2d 830 [2014], quoting People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 644, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ), and, significantly, "[w]hen reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we do not consider what the victim could or should have done" ( People v. Luckette, 126 A.D.3d at 1046, 4 N.Y.S.3d 720 ; seePeople v. Jackson, 290 A.D.2d 644, 646, 736 N.Y.S.2d 715 [2002], lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 711, 749 N.Y.S.2d 8, 778 N.E.2d 559 [2002] ). While the testimony of the victim's brother was limited to confirming that he and the victim were overnight guests at defendant's home numerous times during the time period in question and did not provide any further details regarding the sexual offenses, the jury was entitled to, and did, credit the victim's testimony in which she described in detail the eight incidents of sexual misbehavior by defendant. After conducting our independent and neutral review of the trial testimony and according, as we must, great d

The verdict ultimately depended on whether the jury believed the victim's or defendant's testimony. Deferring to the jury's credibility determinations and viewing the evidence in a neutral light, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence as the proof supports a finding that the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse with defendant (see People v. Stocum, 143 A.D.3d 1160, 1163, 40 N.Y.S.3d 585 [2016] ; People v. Tubbs, 115 A.D.3d 1009, 1010, 981 N.Y.S.2d 830 [2014] ). Accepting the victim's version of events, as it appears the jury primarily did, a neutral observer in defendant's position would have understood the victim's words and actions to convey a lack of consent, and the victim's behavior after the incident further supports the conclusion that defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with her against her will (see People v. Manigault, 150 A.D.3d at 1333, 54 N.Y.S.3d 193 ; People v. Simonetta, 94 A.D.3d 1242, 1244, 942 N.Y.S.2d 270 [2012], lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 1029, 953 N.Y.S.2d 562, 978 N.E.2d 114 [2012] ). Defendant argues that the verdict is repugnant because the jury acquitted him of rape in the first degree, apparently reflecting disbelief of the victim's testimony regarding forcible compulsion, but convicted him of rape in the third degree.