Opinion
F042076.
10-31-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHARLES ALLEN TROUT, Defendant and Appellant.
Rita L. Swenor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Charles Allen Trout appeals his conviction for receiving stolen property contending there is insufficient evidence establishing that he knew the property was stolen. We will affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
In November and December 2000, Christopher Brown and his parents, Lisa and Randall Brown, were in the process of repairing and rebuilding a 1987 Jeep Wrangler. A new engine, new tires and wheels and new seats were put into the Jeep. In addition, a hardtop that they sanded and painted was added.
The Jeep was stolen in December 2000. It was later recovered with several parts missing. Among the parts missing were the wheels and tires, doors, hardtop, front seats, tailgate, motor parts and the fuel injection. After the Jeep was recovered, the Browns decided to repair and reconstruct the Jeep with various used parts. Randall Brown was told by a friend that Trout had used Jeep parts for sale, so arrangements were made to meet with Trout and possibly purchase replacement doors and a hardtop.
When Randall Brown arrived at Trouts, there was a Jeep in the driveway. Trout told him the doors on that Jeep were for sale, but the hardtop was at another location. Brown and Trout went to inspect the hardtop. When Brown inspected the Jeep with the hardtop, he saw evidence that it was the hardtop that had been taken from his Jeep. Trouts hardtop had been sanded smooth, as was the stolen hardtop, although they are manufactured with a rough finish; the top was the exact shade of gray as the stolen hardtop; there were blue felt tip pen markings in the same locations as those in the stolen hardtop; the same latch was missing; washers had been attached in the same location as on the stolen hardtop; and certain bolts had been changed from the standard Torx to hex bolts, as in the stolen hardtop.
Brown didnt say anything to Trout about the hardtop being stolen. While driving back to Trouts house, Trout mentioned he also had some wheels and tires for sale. When Trout brought the wheels and tires out for Brown to inspect, Brown recognized them as having been stolen from his Jeep. The tires had distinctive scuff marks and labels that said "Fun and Muds," just as on the stolen tires. The Jeep doors that Trout was attempting to sell also had distinctive markings, such as bolt holes drilled for a custom mirror and animal skin residue, which were identical to the doors stolen from Brown.
Brown left Trouts residence and contacted the police. Brown gave the officer who responded a key that he had that went to his stolen hardtop. When the officer tried the key in the hardtop in Trouts possession, the key turned the lock. The officer questioned Trout about how he had come into possession of the items claimed by Brown. Trout claimed he had owned the Jeep with the hardtop on it for about three years and the hardtop came with the Jeep. Trout claimed the Jeep with the doors had been stolen from him and, when it was recovered, the doors were on it. As for the wheels and tires, Trout claimed he got them from a friend in Sacramento. Trout could not quite recall the friends name, and he was vague about when his Jeep had been stolen and when it was recovered. Although Trout claimed he had filed a police report when his Jeep was stolen, he couldnt recall which police department he had contacted, and a check of all law enforcement agencies in Stanislaus County disclosed no report made by Trout.
At trial Trout had different explanations as to how he had come into possession of the parts claimed by Brown. Trout also acknowledged that he had lied to the police officer. It was established at trial that Trout had twice been convicted of crimes of moral turpitude.
The jury found Trout guilty of a violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), receiving stolen property. In a bifurcated trial, it was found true that Trout had
suffered two prior convictions. On motion of the district attorney, one of Trouts prior convictions was struck in the interests of justice. Trout was sentenced to the midterm of two years, doubled to four years pursuant to section 667, subdivision (d).
DISCUSSION
In order to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the prosecution must prove three elements: (1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew the property was stolen; and (3) the defendant had possession of the stolen property. (People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223.) Trout challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his knowledge that the property was stolen. Contrary to Trouts assertion, the record contains abundant evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Trout knew the items in his possession were stolen property.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, this court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.)
Trouts false statements to the police officer evidenced a consciousness of guilt, which allowed the trier of fact to conclude that Trout knew he possessed stolen property. Deliberately false statements to police about matters that are within the persons knowledge may be the basis for an inference of wrongdoing. (People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166.) Such statements have long been considered evidence of a consciousness of guilt because deliberately false statements suggest there is no honest explanation for incriminating circumstances. (Id. at pp. 1167-1168.)
In Trouts case, he admitted at trial that he had lied to the police officer regarding where he obtained the wheels and tires. He did not get them from a friend in Sacramento as he told the officer. He claimed instead to have purchased them at a flea market. As for the hardtop, Trout told the officer it came with the Jeep, which he had owned for three years. At trial, however, he claimed instead to have purchased the hardtop in early 2001. As for the stolen Jeep doors, Trout told the officer that they were on his Jeep after his own Jeep was recovered after being stolen. While he claimed to have reported the theft, Trout couldnt remember to which agency the report was made or when the Jeep was stolen, and a check of all the law enforcement agencies in the county revealed no such report was made by Trout.
The jury determines the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of facts upon which a determination depends. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303.) The lapse of time between the theft of the Browns property and its discovery in Trouts possession, the price at which Trout was attempting to sell the stolen items, and the lack of evidence placing Trout at the scene of the theft of the Browns Jeep are circumstances for the jury to evaluate in conjunction with the evidence. (Ibid.) The jury reasonably could have determined that Trouts false and evasive statements to the police officer and inconsistent testimony at trial demonstrated a consciousness of guilt and provided substantial evidence that Trout knew he was in possession of stolen property. (People v. Williams, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1167-1168.)
There is substantial evidence supporting the jurys verdict. (People v. Barnes, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 303.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. --------------- Notes: References to code sections are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.