Opinion
2d Crim. No. B161922.
10-28-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STACY AHMAD TROTTER, Defendant and Appellant.
Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Theresa A. Cochrane, Jason C. Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Stacy Ahmad Trotter appeals from the sentence imposed following his no contest plea to robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), possession of narcotics in jail (§ 4573.8), ten counts of perjury (§ 118), four counts of subornation of perjury (§ 127), and three counts of solicitation to commit a crime (§ 653f, subd. (a)). He also admitted allegations that he used a firearm in the commission of the robbery and carjacking (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that he had suffered three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)). He was sentenced to a total prison term of one hundred thirty-seven years eight months to life, consisting of nine years for the carjacking and one year for the robbery, each doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus thirteen years four months for the firearm-use allegations; twenty-five years to life for narcotics possession; twenty-five years to life for each of three of his convictions for perjury, subornation of perjury, and solicitation to commit a crime; plus four years four months for his convictions in a prior Riverside County case. He received concurrent terms on his remaining convictions. His sole contention on appeal is that the use of his prior juvenile adjudication as a strike violated his right to a jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
Because this appeal follows a no contest plea and the only issue raised is one of law, we need not recite the facts underlying the convictions. Trotter contends the trial court erred in utilizing his prior juvenile adjudication for robbery as a strike. He bases his contention on Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. at page 490, which provides that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." He contends that this rule, as interpreted by U. S. v. Tighe (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1187, requires the prosecution to relitigate the issue of the defendants guilt on the prior before a jury.
The Apprendi rule has no application here. The fact of a prior juvenile adjudication alleged to be a strike must be pleaded and proved in the current case, and the defendant has a statutory right to a jury trial on the issue of whether he or she suffered the prior adjudication. (People v. Bowden (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 392-393; see § 1025, subds. (b), (c).) Trotter was not denied his right to a jury trial on his prior, but rather expressly waived that right when he admitted the truth of the prior as part of his plea.
In any event, we reject Tighe and conclude that a prior juvenile adjudication can be treated as a strike notwithstanding the fact that a defendant has no right to a jury trial in a juvenile proceeding. (People v. Bowden, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at pp. 393-394; see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190 ["Decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts"].) We agree with those cases concluding that all constitutionally required due process rights are provided in juvenile proceedings and that such procedures satisfy the standards of Apprendi. (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1077-1079; Bowden, pp. 393-394; see also U.S. v. Smalley (8th Cir. 2002) 294 F.3d 1030, 1032-1033 [juvenile adjudications are sufficiently reliable that due process is not offended by application of Apprendis prior conviction exception]; U. S. v. Tighe, supra, 266 F.3d at p. 1200 (dis. opn. of Brunetti, J.).)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., and COFFEE, J. --------------- Notes: All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.