The defendant's contention that his conviction under Penal Law — 265.02(4), which provides that a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when he or she knowingly possesses any loaded firearm, except where the possession takes place in the defendant's home or place of business, is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, is not preserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Trinidad, 237 A.D.2d 635; People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245). In any event, the contention is without merit (see, People v. Powell, 54 N.Y.2d 524, 530; People v. Tolbert, 253 A.D.2d 832, 833).
Defendant admitted to the arresting officers that he lived elsewhere, and another witness testified to that same effect. The evidence thus is legally sufficient to establish that defendant possessed the weapon in other than his home or place of business, in violation of Penal Law § 265.02 (4) ( see, People v. Rodriguez, 266 A.D.2d 160, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 924; People v. Trinidad, 237 A.D.2d 635, 636, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1102; People v. Oakman, 215 A.D.2d 596, 597, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 799). Moreover, we cannot conclude that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should have been accorded on that issue ( see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495; People v. Rodriguez, supra, at 160; People v. Trinidad, supra, at 636). Supreme Court did not err in allowing evidence of defendant's threats against a prosecution witness, despite the People's failure to seek a Ventimiglia ruling (see, People v. Pugh, 236 A.D.2d 810, 812, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1099; People v. Sherman, 156 A.D.2d 889, 891, lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 970).