He was sentenced to natural life imprisonment for murder, concurrent terms of 60 years' imprisonment for armed robbery, aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion, and a concurrent term of 30 years' imprisonment for aggravated kidnapping. On direct appeal, defendant's convictions and natural life sentence for murder were upheld, and the sentences on his remaining convictions were reduced. People v. Treece, 159 Ill. App. 3d 397 (1987). Defendant subsequently filed numerous pleadings attacking his convictions and sentences, all of which were unsuccessful.

Clearly, at the time the State executed the search warrant here, Rule 413 applied and the State should have given timely notice and provided counsel with the opportunity to be present at the photographing session. In People v. Treece, 159 Ill. App. 3d 397 (1987), we held that the State properly obtained a blood sample from the defendant in compliance with Rule 413(a)(vii), although it had not obtained a search warrant, which the defendant argued was necessary. Citing People v. Jones, 30 Ill. App. 3d 562, 564 (1975), we observed that Rule 413(a)(vii) can be used following indictment or information to obtain a blood sample from a defendant, without resort to a search warrant.

We disagree. In order for defendant to argue that his sentence was substantially disparate with the sentences received by his codefendants, he must produce records of the codefendants' sentencing circumstances upon which a rational comparison can be made. ( People v. Kline (1982), 92 Ill.2d 490, 442 N.E.2d 154; People v. Treece (1987), 159 Ill. App.3d 397, 511 N.E.2d 1361.) Defendant has not provided us with the transcripts or other records pertaining to the facts and circumstances surrounding the sentencing of the codefendants. Additionally, the record reveals that the codefendants were cooperative and may have entered into plea negotiations with the State in exchange for their testimony against defendant.

( People v. Kline (1982), 92 Ill.2d 490, 508, 442 N.E.2d 154.) A disparity between sentences may be supported by either a more serious criminal record or greater participation in the offense. People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 55, 434 N.E.2d 1121; People v. Treece (1987), 159 Ill. App.3d 397, 418, 511 N.E.2d 1361; People v. Martin (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 238, 245, 401 N.E.2d 13. Judge Gillis of the circuit court presided over defendant's bench trial, and sentenced defendant to 66 years' imprisonment for murder.

• 3 In the present case, defendant is Hispanic, and it is not readily apparent from the record how many and on what basis other members of that racial group were challenged by the State. Under Batson v. Kentucky, this defendant may not establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the jury by evidence that blacks, or members of minority racial groups other than Hispanic, were excluded by peremptory challenge. See People v. Treece (1987), 159 Ill. App.3d 397. • 4 Defendant has also contended that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove black members of the venire violated his sixth amendment right to be judged by a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, citing McCray v. Abrams (2d Cir. 1984), 750 F.2d 1113. Defendant has waived this issue, which he raises for the first time on appeal, as he made no claim in the trial court that his rights under the sixth amendment had been violated.

Some courts feel that Lockhart (supra) precludes application of the fair cross section requirement to the petit jurors, and therefore to peremptory challenges of petit jurors (People v Treece, 159 Ill. App.3d 397, 111 Ill Dec 66, 511 N.E.2d 1361, lv denied 117 Ill.2d 552, 115 Ill Dec 408, 517 N.E.2d 1094; Teague v Lane, 820 F.2d 832; Lindsey v Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, reh denied 828 F.2d 775, petition for cert filed Oct. 3, 1987; United States v Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011, n 8; United States v Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1257, n 2, supra). Other courts disagree.

One of the DNA profiles matched the DNA profile of M.S. The State asserted that a buccal standard from defendant was necessary for comparison with the other DNA profile on the rectal swab. See People v. Treece, 159 Ill. App. 3d 397, 406-09 (1987) (holding that an order requiring an accused to submit, pursuant to Rule 413, to the taking of blood, hair, and other materials of the body is appropriate where probable cause is shown to justify such an order); People v. Jones, 30 Ill. App. 3d 562, 564 (1975) (same). Finally, we note that defense counsel was given notice of the State's request, provided the opportunity to file a written response and present oral argument, and was allowed to be present when the buccal sample was collected.

e of similar cases throughout the country. See, e.g. , United States v. Pipito , 861 F.2d 1006, 1009–10 (7th Cir. 1987) (comparing retrieving fingerprints to retrieving blood samples and concluding that force may be used to obtain such materials because "while it may not enhance the image of justice to force a witness kicking and screaming ... the choice has been made by the witness, not the court" (omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Simmons v. Secretary, Dept. of Corr. , No. 8:08–cv–2433–T–17EAJ, 2010 WL 1408434, at *12 (M.D. Fla. April 6, 2010) (deciding, where the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure authorized a court to require the defendant to " ‘permit the taking of samples of the defendant's blood, hair, and other materials of the defendant's body that involves no unreasonable intrusion,’ " that "the Court had the ability to require the Defendant to provide a saliva sample without needing a search warrant" (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220 )); People v. Treece , 159 Ill.App.3d 397, 111 Ill.Dec. 66, 511 N.E.2d 1361, 1367 (1987) (concluding that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413"can be used to obtain a blood sample from a defendant without resort to a search warrant following indictment or information"). ¶18 Defendant's attempts to distinguish Easthope are unavailing.

On direct appeal, the court affirmed defendant's convictions and his natural life sentence for murder but reduced the sentences on his remaining convictions. People v. Treece, 159 Ill. App. 3d 397 (1987).¶ 13 In 1998, defendant filed his first motion for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998)), seeking DNA testing of "material collected" and asserting that "[t]est results are relevant to an assertion of actual innocence."

Young adults do not qualify as a "distinctive group" whose exclusion from a petit jury through peremptory challenges invokes the sixth amendment. People v. Treece, 159 Ill. App.3d 397, 411-12, 511 N.E.2d 1361, 1369-70 (1987). Thus, we find no sixth amendment violation in the instant case.