The appellate court reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that "summary judgment is a civil remedy that has no place in sexually dangerous person proceedings." 312 Ill. App.3d 860, 862. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the appellate court, which remanded the cause for a jury trial on defendant's application.
This argument was specifically rejected by the Appellate Court, Fourth District, inPeople v. Savage, 277 Ill. App.3d 63 (1995), appeal denied, 166 Ill.2d 551 (1996). However, we note that the Appellate Court, Third District, has recently held that summary judgment proceedings are improper in sexually dangerous person proceedings.People v. Trainor, 312 Ill. App.3d 860 (2000), appeal allowed, 189 Ill.2d 678 (2000). We decline to follow Savage and elect to follow Trainor.
The appellate court reversed, concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate for applications brought pursuant to the Act because it deprives a respondent of his "statutory method of regaining his liberty." People v. Trainor, 312 Ill. App. 3d 860, 862 (2000). The State appealed, and our supreme court affirmed.
Had this court intended to so provide, it certainly would have done so, particularly since the appellate court in Trainor specifically addressed the issue and held that a defendant in a recovery proceeding is not entitled to the appointment of an expert of his own choosing. See People v. Trainor, 312 Ill. App. 3d 860, 862 (2000). Instead of reversing the appellate court's ruling, Trainor twice quite clearly stated that a trial court is not required to provide an independent psychiatrist during recovery proceedings under the SDPA.
On appeal, this court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See People v. Trainor, 312 Ill. App.3d 860, 728 N.E.2d 74 (2000) (summary judgment is inappropriate in sexually dangerous persons proceedings). Our supreme court affirmed.