Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD214244, Katherine A. Bacal, Judge.
IRION, J.
A jury convicted Daniel Schorn Trahan of one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)); one count of driving with more than a.08 percent blood alcohol level (§ 23152, subd. (b)); and, with respect to each count, found that Trahan's blood alcohol level was in excess of.15 percent (§ 23578). After Trahan waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations of the amended information, the court found Trahan had three priors within the preceding 10 years for driving under the influence, including two convictions in Maricopa County, Arizona, and one in San Diego County. (§§ 23550, subd. (a), 23626.) The trial court sentenced Trahan to two years eight months in state prison.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
On appeal, Trahan's sole contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he is the individual who suffered the prior Arizona convictions. We affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 20, 2008, Trahan was driving in San Diego at approximately 2:00 a.m. when officers on routine patrol observed him swerving and directed him off the highway. Based on Trahan's red, watery eyes; slurred speech; unsteady gait; alcohol-smelling breath; and unsatisfactory results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the officers arrested Trahan. Trahan took two breath analyzer tests, three minutes apart, showing blood alcohol levels of.17 percent and.16 percent. On July 3, 2008, the prosecutor filed a felony complaint.
On August 14, 2008, the prosecutor filed an amended information, charging Trahan with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (§ 23152, subd. (a)) and one count of driving with more than a.08 percent blood alcohol level (§ 23152, subd. (b)). With respect to both counts, the information alleged that Trahan's blood alcohol level was in excess of.15 percent (§ 23578) and that Trahan had incurred three prior convictions within the preceding 10 years for driving under the influence (§ 23550, subd. (a)). Specifically, the amended information alleged the following prior convictions:
Violation
Date of Offense
Date of Conviction
Docket No./Court
§ 23152, subd. (a) § 23550, subd. (a)§ 23578
August 25, 2003
July 31, 2006
SCD181346 San Diego County
Aggravated DUI
December 17, 2003
CR2003-027110 Maricopa County, Arizona March 3, 2004
Aggravated DUI
March 20, 2003
CR2003-032467 Maricopa County, Arizona March 3, 2004
Trahan agreed to a bifurcated trial of the information's charges and the alleged priors. In September 2008 a jury found Trahan guilty of both counts and found true the enhancement allegation relating to the excess blood alcohol concentration. Trahan then waived a jury on the prior conviction allegations, and the trial court held a bench trial on those allegations.
In the bench trial, the court judicially noticed the fact of Trahan's San Diego conviction, in which he pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, and the existence of the change of plea form underlying that conviction, in which Trahan admitted the allegations of the information that he had three prior DUI convictions in Arizona, including two in 2004 and one in 1996. The prosecution sought to rely upon the change of plea form as proof of the prior Arizona convictions, but the trial court stated the change of plea form was insufficient to prove all three prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution then presented the testimony and report of a forensic technician, identifying Trahan's fingerprint records as matching those taken during his booking in the prior San Diego conviction case. The specialist gave no opinion as to the thumbprints contained in the records of conviction from the two Arizona cases.
The trial court took judicial notice of additional certified court documents from the San Diego prior conviction and certified court documents from the two Arizona convictions. Trahan's counsel argued that the Arizona conviction records were insufficient to show that Trahan committed the Arizona offenses because the case numbers in the Arizona conviction records did not match the case numbers listed on Trahan's San Diego conviction change of plea form.
Specifically, on one of the Arizona convictions, the plea form showed a case number with one erroneously-added digit and one omitted digit. For the other Arizona conviction, the plea form erroneously lists the Arizona statute section under which Trahan was convicted, rather than the case number.
After reviewing the judicially noticed records, the trial court found "beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has suffered three or more prior convictions. Those prior convictions being case No. SCD181346, Maricopa County case No. CR2003 027110, and Maricopa County Arizona case No. CR2003 032467." The trial court further stated, "I do note that the change of plea form has a list of priors, and the dates of conviction do not match exactly with the priors as set forth on People's Exhibit 2 and People's Exhibit 3. But I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the identity and the dates of conviction have been found to be those of the defendant in this case, Daniel Schorn Trahan." Trahan timely appealed.
II
DISCUSSION
Trahan contends the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to find he had suffered the two prior Arizona convictions for driving under the influence.
A. Standard of Review
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support prior conviction findings under the same standard used in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. (People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1067.) "[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) To be substantial, the evidence must be " 'of ponderable legal significance... reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.' " (Id. at p. 576.)
B. The Record Contains Substantial Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings That Trahan Suffered the Prior Arizona Convictions
1.Governing law.
"It has long... been the rule in California, in the absence of countervailing evidence, that the identity of [a] person may be presumed, or inferred, from identity of name." (People v. Mendoza (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 390, 401; People v. Mason (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 311, 314 (Mason) ["... California cases hold that, in the absence of other and contrary testimony [fn. omitted], the identity of names, coupled with proper proof of prior convictions, is sufficient to sustain a finding that defendant was the person involved in the earlier cases."].) In addition to identity of name, courts rely on other types of evidence to establish the defendant's identity as the individual who suffered a prior conviction, including evidence that the defendant's birth date is the same as that contained in a prior conviction record and evidence that a defendant previously resided near the location of the prior conviction. (People v. Towers (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1286 (Towers); People v. Sberno (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 392, 398 (Sberno).)
2. Evidence Presented at Trial That Trahan Shared the Same Name, Physical Characteristics and Birth Date as the Defendant in the Arizona Convictions Is Sufficient to Support the Trial Court's Prior Conviction Findings.
Trahan contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that he was the person who suffered the two prior Arizona convictions. Although Trahan acknowledges that identity of names can be a sufficient basis for sustaining a prior conviction finding, he argues that "most of the cases that find sufficient evidence to prove the defendant is the person who suffered the prior conviction have relied upon more than what the trial court here deemed sufficient." For two reasons, we disagree and hold that the evidence relied upon here by the trial court was sufficient to prove the prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, the combination of Trahan's last and middle names is sufficiently uncommon that the trial court properly could infer, in the absence of any countervailing evidence, that he was the person who is named in the Arizona conviction records. (See, e.g., People v. Sarnblad (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 801, 805 [rejecting need for photographic or fingerprint evidence where name "Donald Sarnblad" was sufficiently uncommon for inference of identity based on the name]; People v. Brucker (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 230, 242 ["Brucker" sufficiently uncommon to support presumption that defendant "Brucker" was same as defendant in instant case]; Mason, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 314.)
Second, the evidence showed that the defendant who suffered each of the Arizona convictions shared Trahan's birth date, Social Security number and physical characteristics. (Towers, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286 [birth date, birthplace and tattoo supported finding defendant was individual who suffered prior convictions].) In addition, Trahan listed an Arizona address on the change of plea in the prior San Diego conviction, thus buttressing the trial court's finding Trahan was the defendant who suffered the prior Arizona convictions. (Sberno, supra, 22 Cal.App.2d at p. 402 [defendant's prior conviction supported by similarity of uncommon name, prior conviction's location and defendant's admission he had " 'done time' "].)
Citing People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, the Attorney General contends the change of plea form from the prior San Diego conviction constitutes a conclusive admission of the prior Arizona convictions, arguing that the prior Arizona convictions were an element of the offense underlying the prior San Diego conviction. We disagree and note generally that prior convictions are considered sentencing factors rather than an element of the crime. (People v. Casillas (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 171, 184, quoting Thompson v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 144, 149-150.) We need not address this issue, however, because as we explain above, we conclude substantial evidence, apart from the prior San Diego conviction, supports the existence of Trahan's prior Arizona convictions.
In light of the case law cited above, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Trahan suffered the prior convictions in the Arizona cases.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., NARES, J.