Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KA081161,Charles E. Horan, Judge.
Nolan F. King for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Beverly K. Falk, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
After the denial of his motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence, defendant Steven Toth, III, pled guilty to one felony count of possession of child pornography. (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a).) In this appeal from the judgment, defendant challenges the validity of the search warrant. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m) [denial of suppression motion may be reviewed on appeal notwithstanding a guilty plea].) Based on our determination that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, we reject defendant’s contentions. The judgment is affirmed.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
The following information is taken from the probable cause declaration of Detective Deborah Campbell of the Glendora Police Department.
In September 2006, Campbell interviewed a 24-year-old male, identified in the declaration as “Phil” or “Doe,” who came to the police station to report that he had been sexually molested between the ages of 12 and 20 by a man named Steve. Phil reported that he had met Steve when he was 12 years old after reading the following message on a bathroom stall at the Glendora Public Library: “‘I’m looking for boys who want a blow job, 12-17 years old. Call Steve [at this phone number].’” When Phil called the number and spoke with Steve, they had phone sex and agreed to meet the following week at the library. After they met at the library, they agreed to meet a week later at Pompei Park in Glendora. When they met at the park, they “walked into the tree area and lay down on a blanket ‘Steve’ brought with him. [Phil] said ‘Steve’ orally copulated him to ejaculation. [Phil] said he did not perform any sex acts on ‘Steve’ at that time. [Phil] estimates over the course of the next 8 years he met with ‘Steve’ at Pompei Park approximately 20 times and each time ‘Steve’ would orally copulate him to ejaculation. [Phil] said only one time during their relationship did he orally copulate ‘Steve.’” “[Phil] said on some occasions there was digital penetration of Steve’s finger into [Phil]’s anus.” “[Phil] said on one of their meetings, ‘Steve’ drove [Phil] to his home in the northeast area of Glendora. [Phil] said it was near the area of Sierra Madre and Loraine. [Phil] said there was a steep driveway, but could not be more specific. [Phil] said during this meeting both of them took off their clothes and ‘Steve’ rubbed his penis against [Phil]’s body to the point of ejaculation.”
Campbell investigated Phil’s allegations. Campbell traced Steve’s telephone number to defendant (Steven Toth, III) “at 741 Huerta Verde.” Campbell located a 1994 police report regarding a complaint that had been lodged against defendant for peeping into a neighbor’s bedroom window. The 1994 report listed defendant’s address as 741 Huerta Verde and listed the same phone number that Phil had found posted on the bathroom stall at the library. Campbell went to defendant’s home and confirmed that it was located, as Phil had described, in “northeastern Glendora” and had a “steep driveway.”
Campbell stated that according to the 1994 police report, when defendant was questioned about the neighbor’s complaint, defendant “confessed he had not actually been looking for his cat (which officers saw at his home)[, but] had specifically gone to the [neighbor’s] residence... and was within 3 feet of the front west side window which he believed was a bedroom window belonging to a teenage girl.”
On November 22, 2006, Detective Henderson “made a pretext phone call to” defendant in which Henderson pretended to be Phil. During the phone call, defendant confirmed that they had first met at the Glendora library, that he still lived on Huerta Verde, that their relationship had lasted five or six years, and that they had not spoken for about three years.
Campbell described the telephone call as follows: “[Defendant] originally sounded distracted when speaking with Henderson. [Defendant] did confirm he still lived on Huerta Verde. [Defendant] commented several times that Henderson, aka ‘Phil’ sounded different than what he remembered. Henderson asks [defendant] how long it’s been since they last spoke and [defendant] said ‘Oh man, it’s been a couple, three years actually.’ [Defendant] asked how old ‘Phil’ was now and ‘Phil’ said he was ‘25.’ [Defendant] was reminded that ‘Phil’ was only 12 when they first met. [Defendant] interrupts ‘Phil’ and said ‘Wait a sec... I thought you were 18 when we met.’ [Defendant] further said ‘you say you were 12 and all, but it’s only been about 5 or 6 years that we were....’ At one point [defendant] appears to quiz ‘Phil’ by asking if he remembers where they first met and ‘Phil’ states it was at the library in Glendora to which [defendant] responds ‘yeah.’”
After conducting her investigation, Campbell applied for a search warrant. She submitted a supporting declaration stating that, based on her “training, experience, facts of the case, and witness statements,” she believed there was “sufficient probable cause” to conclude that defendant had sexually molested Phil. She conceded, however, that there were problems with Phil’s credibility in that he was “diagnosed as schizophrenic,” “takes medication,” and “has heard voices... mostly when he was experimenting with drugs, including PCP and LSD,” but she stated that she believed that Phil was a reliable witness whose information had led the police to locate defendant in the manner discussed above. She related that Phil had assured her that “he knows the difference between fact and fiction and that he did have a relationship with ‘Steve’ and it was not a figment of his imagination.” She attested that Phil: (1) “appears credible when spoken to”; (2) “insists he was 12 years old when he first met with” defendant; (3) “made the police report on the advice of his counselor”; and (4) “has stated he does not want to prosecute [defendant, but] said he would be willing to testify if other victims are located.”
Campbell submitted two supporting declarations, one that described the facts of the case (“Probable Cause Declaration”) and one that described her training and experience as a police officer (“Affiant Declaration”).
Based on her determination that Phil was a credible informant notwithstanding that he takes medication, was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and has heard voices mostly when using drugs, Campbell determined that there was probable cause to believe that defendant had sexually molested Phil. In light of her training and experience, she concluded that because “[i]t is common for a person who has a sexual relationship with a minor... to also be involved with other minors” and to “possess child pornography,” it was reasonable to believe that child pornography and evidence of other child victims would be found in defendant’s home. She stated that the recovery of this “evidence would help to locate other victims that [defendant] molested.” She believed that defendant was likely to have stored the targeted evidence “on a variety of media including, but not limited to: computers, printed material, electronic data processing and storage devices, VHS and 8 mm tapes, digital equipment and computer disks (floppy and compact disk), optical storage devices or other memory storage devices; peripheral input/output devices such as keyboards, printers, video display monitors, optical readers, and related communication devices such as modems; together with backup media, system documentation, and software.”
On December 12, 2006, a magistrate (Judge Steven D. Blades) issued the search warrant. On the next day, Campbell and several police officers executed the search warrant and seized the following items from defendant’s home: (1) child pornographic magazines including publications of the North American Man Boy Love Association; (2) pornographic photos taken in defendant’s backyard of a male approximately 15 to 19 years old; (3) numerous pornographic images of children that were stored on defendant’s laptop computer, including photos of two known child sexual abuse victims identified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children; and (4) a list of pornographic websites, including some that involved child pornography.
The search warrant authorized a search of the home’s interior living quarters and the surrounding grounds, garages, storage areas, outbuildings, trash containers, safes, lock boxes, and vehicles. The warrant applied to all electronic data processing and storage devices, video recording equipment, optical storage or other memory storage devices, peripheral input/output devices such as keyboards, printers, video display monitors, optical readers, related communication devices, modems, system documentation, software, and instruction manuals.
After being held to answer on one count of possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)), defendant pled not guilty. Defendant filed a motion to quash the warrant and suppress the evidence that was seized on the grounds that the search warrant was: (1) insufficient on its face (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i)); and (2) not supported by probable cause (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(B)(iii)). Defendant objected that there was a “clear leap in logic between the contents of the [probable cause declaration] and the evidence targeted in the search warrant.” Defendant argued that the probable cause declaration was erroneously based on Phil’s allegations, which were: (1) stale in that the alleged sexual encounters had “ended when Phil was 20 years old, approximately four (4) years before the interview by Det. Campbell;” (2) uncertain in that possibly all but the “first encounter between Phil and Steve... occurred after Phil had turned eighteen years of age, which would not have violated the law”; and (3) unrelated to the location to be searched and items to be seized in that the alleged sexual encounters had occurred at a public park and there was no mention of any use or possession of pornography.
The trial court (Judge Charles Horan) denied the suppression motion. The trial court agreed with Campbell’s assertion that “a person who molests children on an ongoing basis is apt to be a pedophile,” and pedophiles “often keep images of molested children.” The trial court found Phil to be a trustworthy informant notwithstanding that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, takes medication, and has a history of drug use. Based on Phil’s allegations, the trial court found there was probable cause to believe that defendant had sexually molested Phil for several years after posting his “phone number in a bathroom asking anybody and everybody underage to come and have their penis orally copulated.” The trial court found that Phil’s allegations were not stale, given the length and nature of the sexual relationship and the reasonable probability that other underage victims had come in contact with defendant through similar means. The trial court concluded that under the circumstances, it was “[e]mminently reasonable” for the police to look “for additional victims,” and for a “magistrate to conclude there may well be others [who] came in contact with the defendant.” The trial court noted that where a person’s sexual interest in children is such that “he would advertise for it in public restrooms, I think that it is more than likely that a person in that situation might well have possession of some or all of the items sought.”
The term pedophile was used by the trial court but not by Campbell.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“‘“An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] ‘The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquires is, of course, subject to appellate review.’ [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law,... is also subject to independent review.”’ (People v. Alvarez [(1996)] 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.)” (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279.)
The question is “whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit..., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in [the] place [to be searched].” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238.) Probable cause for a search warrant exists when the supporting information “is such that a reasonable person would believe that what is being sought will be found in the location to be searched.” (People v. Stanley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1554.)
“‘The magistrate’s determination of probable cause is entitled to deferential review.’ (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1041.)” (People v. Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715, 720.) In reviewing the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, the appellate court will not overturn the magistrate’s determination unless the supporting affidavit fails as a matter of law to support the finding of probable cause. (Ibid.) An affidavit must be interpreted in a practical and common-sense manner and its sufficiency must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.)
II. The Statement of Probable Cause
In this case, the magistrate issued the search warrant based on Campbell’s affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts set forth in the “attached and incorporated Statement of Probable Cause.” The two documents that comprised the Statement of Probable Cause were Campbell’s “Probable Cause Declaration” and “Affiant Declaration” (jointly, the declarations). It is undisputed that both declarations were attached to the search warrant that was reviewed and approved by the magistrate.
At the hearing on the motion to quash and suppress, defendant objected that the declarations were not individually signed by Campbell under penalty of perjury. The trial court ruled that the declarations did not “have to be signed as long as the warrant is signed. That’s typically the way it’s done.” The trial court deemed it sufficient that the warrant contained Campbell’s signed affidavit, which attested to the truth of the facts set forth in the “attached and incorporated Statement of Probable Cause.”
On appeal, defendant concedes that the declarations were attached to the search warrant, but disagrees that they comprised the “attached and incorporated Statement of Probable Cause.” He argues that at best, only the Probable Cause Declaration was incorporated by the affidavit’s reference to the “attached and incorporated Statement of Probable Cause.”
The contention lacks merit. Given that both declarations were physically attached to the search warrant, there is no doubt that they comprised the “attached and incorporated Statement of Probable Cause.” Under the circumstances, no reasonable magistrate would have concluded otherwise.
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Leonard (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 878, 883-884, is misplaced. In Leonard, the appellate court overturned a search warrant because it lacked a sworn statement attesting to the truth of the facts contained in the attached and incorporated statement of probable cause. Although the affiant in Leonard had attested to the existence of probable cause to believe that the items would be found at the location to be searched, the affiant had not sworn to the truth of the facts contained in the attached and incorporated statement of probable cause. In this case, however, Detective Campbell attested that the “facts expressed by her in the attached and incorporated Statement of Probable Cause are true.” Accordingly, Leonard is of no assistance to defendant.
III. Substantial Evidence of Phil’s Credibility as an Informant
Defendant argues that Phil was not a credible informant because he was diagnosed as schizophrenic, takes psychotropic medication, and has a history of drug use. He argues that the statement of probable cause is insufficient to support a finding in favor of Phil’s credibility because: (1) Phil had to estimate the number of his sexual encounters with defendant between the ages of 12 and 20; (2) with the exception of the first encounter, Phil never stated whether the remaining encounters occurred before or after his 18th birthday; and (3) Phil never provided a physical description of defendant nor made a photographic identification of defendant.
Applying the deferential substantial evidence standard (People v. Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 279), we conclude that the statement of probable cause contains substantial evidence to establish Phil’s credibility. Henderson’s pretext phone call with defendant confirmed many of the details provided by Phil, including the location of their first meeting, the fact that defendant still lives at the same address, the length of their relationship, and the time that had passed since their last conversation. In addition, the 1994 police report confirmed that defendant had the same phone number, both then and now, that was found by Phil on the restroom stall. Even if, as defendant contends, the record reasonably supports an inference that a number of sexual encounters occurred after Phil’s 18th birthday, the record also reasonably supports an inference that a number of sexual encounters occurred while Phil was a minor.
IV. Substantial Evidence that Defendant Is a Pedophile
Based on its determination that the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had sexually molested Phil after soliciting boys ages 12 to 17 for oral sex in the library restroom, the trial court concluded there was probable cause to believe that child pornography and evidence of other child sexual molestation victims were likely to be found in defendant’s home, because a “a person who molests children on an ongoing basis is apt to be a pedophile,” and pedophiles “often keep images of molested children.” Support for this conclusion was provided by Campbell’s declaration, which stated in relevant part that “[i]t is common for a person who has a sexual relationship with a minor for purposes of sex to also be involved with other minors. It is further your affiant[’]s opinion based on my training and expertise that persons who engage in sexual activity with minors also possess child pornography.”
It is permissible for law enforcement officers to rely upon their experience and training in order “to interpret the facts in a search warrant application,” and for magistrates to rely upon an officer’s expertise “as a factor supporting probable cause. [Citation.]” (People v. Nicholls (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 703, 711 (Nicholls).) The trial court’s conclusion in this case is consistent with other cases that “‘have recognized that from the nature of the crimes and the items sought, a magistrate can reasonably conclude that a suspect’s residence is a logical place to look for specific incriminating items. [Citations.]’ (People v. Miller (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 194, 204; see also People v. Superior Court (Brown) (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 160, 167-168.)” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1206.)
In Nicholls, the police obtained a warrant to search for child pornography on the defendant’s laptop computer, which was stored in his parents’ garage. While the defendant was being held on sexual molestation charges involving his 10-year-old daughter (§ 288, subd. (a)), the police concluded there was probable cause to obtain a search warrant based on a conversation in which defendant told his mother that he had stored his computer in her garage and “not to let anyone ‘mess’ with it.” (Nicholls, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 715.) Defendant moved to quash the warrant, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because there was no evidence that pornography was involved in the alleged molestations or that he possessed any child pornography. The appellate court upheld the search warrant, stating: “Here, there was abundant evidence of child molestation, and the affidavit recited not only generalities about child molesters but also the statements of the child-victim describing incidents of molestation and defendant’s expressed concern that no one ‘mess’ with his computer. Together with defendant’s expressed concern about his computer, there was sufficient foundation that defendant was a member of the class of persons who tended to keep child pornography on a computer.” (Id. at p. 713.)
Nicholls supports the trial court’s determination in this case that, in light of defendant’s public solicitation of young boys for oral sex, which led to several years of sexual molestation of Phil, there was probable cause to believe that “defendant was a member of the class of persons who tended to keep child pornography on a computer” (159 Cal.App.4th at p. 713) and was likely to have molested other minor victims.
Defendant contends that “[t]he trial court casually accepted a search warrant blithely signed off by a reviewing magistrate authorizing a search of Appellant’s home for evidence of child pornography though the underlying documents were based upon... unfounded speculation and stale information not constituting probable cause.” Defendant asserts that the declaration of probable cause “provides no basis... as to why the person known as Steve or this Appellant would be involved with any other person under 18 years of age. Det. Campbell’s opinion is nothing more than a simple blanket assertion without evidentiary support. [Record reference omitted.] The activities alleged by Phil involved almost exclusively oral copulation on Phil by Steve and never evidenced they had anything as serious as a ‘sexual relationship,’ as it is phrased in the [probable cause declaration]. [Record reference omitted.] In addition, Det. Campbell does not state what she meant by ‘involved with other minors.’ Unless that ‘involvement’ concerned illegal activity, it might [mean] nothing more than she might find evidence the person worked at the local YMCA or other legal acts ‘involving’ minors.”
We disagree with defendant’s suggestion that oral copulation of a minor is not “serious.” Oral copulation of a minor under the age of 14 is not only a violation of sections 288 (lewd or lascivious acts with victim under the age of 14) and 288a, subdivision (c)(1) (oral copulation with a minor under 14 years of age), but is a crime that strongly indicates the suspect is a pedophile. One who commits oral copulation of a minor falls within the category of persons who engage in “lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288) and continuous sexual abuse of children under the age of 14[] (§§ 288.5, 2962, subd. (e)(2)(I)-(J).) These are the type of offenses that pedophiles commit. ([American Psychiatric Assn. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994) Pedophilia, § 302.2] at pp. 527-528.)” (People v. Starr (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1207.)
We disagree with defendant’s contention that because the alleged “encounters ended when Phil was 20 years old, approximately four (4) years before the interview by Det. Campbell,” the probable cause was stale when the search warrant was issued. In this context, the test is whether there was proof “of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time. Whether the proof meets this test must be determined by the circumstances of each case.” (Sgro v. United States (1932) 287 U.S. 206, 210-211.) The “‘mere lapse of substantial amounts of time is not controlling in a question of staleness.’ United States v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir.1988). ‘We evaluate staleness in light of the particular facts of the case and the nature of the criminal activity and property sought.’ United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.1993) (internal quotation omitted). The information offered in support of the application for a search warrant is not stale if ‘there is sufficient basis to believe, based on a continuing pattern or other good reasons, that the items to be seized are still on the premises.’ United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 722 (9th Cir.1984).” (United States v. Lacy (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 742, 745-746.)
In this case, there was substantial evidence that defendant was a pedophile who blatantly solicited young boys for oral sex at the public library and then performed oral sex on Phil from the ages of 12 to 20. Oral copulation with a minor under 14 years of age (§ 288a, subdivision (c)(1)) may be treated as both “a felony offense involving an act of violence and a felony offense involving great bodily harm” (§ 292), and a “‘sexually violent offense’” under The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b)). Section 290 requires that all “persons convicted of a crime involving a forcible sexual act, or one involving a victim under the age of 14,... must register as sex offenders irrespective of whether they engaged in oral copulation or sexual intercourse. (See §§ 264 [rape], 288 [lewd or lascivious acts with victim under the age of 14], 288a, subd. (c)(1) [oral copulation with a minor under 14 years of age], 288a, subd. (c)(2) [forcible oral copulation], 290, subd. (a)(2) [convictions requiring registration].)” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1198.)
As a society, we have deemed “‘[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children [to be] a government objective of surpassing importance.’ ([New York v. Ferber (1982)] 458 U.S. [747,] 757.)” (In re Duncan (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1348, 1359.) “‘“‘The purpose of [the mandatory lifetime registration requirement under] section 290 is to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in the future. [Citation.]’”’ (In re Alva [(2004)] 33 Cal.4th [254,] 264, quoting Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527; see People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 357.) In recent years, section 290 registration has acquired a second purpose: to notify members of the public of the existence and location of sex offenders so they can take protective measures. (See Stats. 1996, ch. 908, § 1, subd. (b), p. 5105.)” (People v. Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1196.) The registration requirement reflects the view that pedophilia is a mental disorder that is difficult to treat. (People v. Starr, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205 [“California courts have consistently classified pedophilia as a mental disorder in other statutory commitment proceedings. (People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 466 [pedophilia a ‘mental disorder’ under Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)]; People v. McCune (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 686, 692 [state hospital commitment under § 1026.5 proper for the ‘mental disorder’ of pedophilia]; People v. Sherman (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 10, 15 [‘Appellant’s mental disorder that brings him under the purview of the MDSO [mentally disordered sex offenders] statutes is pedophilia’]; People v. Lamport (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 716, 718 [pedophilia a ‘mental disorder’ which predisposes the defendant to engage in sex with minors].) Courts from other states have also concluded that pedophilia is a mental disorder. (In re Commitment of Zanelli (1998) 223 Wis.2d 545, 551 [589 N.W.2d 687, 691]; In re Pugh (1993) 68 Wash.App. 687, 693 [845 P.2d 1034, 1037-1038].)”].)
The law, therefore, reflects the belief that a person who desires to orally copulate children under 14 years of age and acts on those desires is a pedophile who, upon conviction of a violation of section 288a, subdivision (c)(1), is subject to mandatory lifetime registration requirements under section 290 due to the likelihood that such a person will reoffend. In addition, because Phil was 12 years old when the alleged molestations began, the statute of limitations for prosecution under section 288, subdivision (a) (lewd acts on a child under the age of 14), or 288a, subdivision (c)(1) (oral copulation with a person under the age of 14) will not expire until his 28th birthday, which means that the allegations are not stale for statute of limitations purposes. (§ 801.1 [prosecution for a violation of section 288 or 288a involving a victim under the age of 18 may be commenced any time prior to the victim’s 28th birthday].) Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that, under these circumstances, it was “[e]mminently reasonable” for the police to seek a warrant to search defendant’s home for evidence of other victims.
By upholding the warrant, we are not, as defendant claims, suggesting that in all cases a convicted or suspected pedophile’s home is a proper subject of a search warrant. Each case must be judged on its particular facts and circumstances. The relevant factors here support the issuance of the warrant. It bears repeating that the warrant at issue sought child pornography and evidence of the existence of other victims. With regard to the latter, it was reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that defendant likely had engaged in the same illicit activity with other minors, as he openly advertised his desire to orally copulate young males and had a continuous illegal sexual relationship with the informant for six years. As we have discussed, the magistrate may rely on the nature of the crime to conclude certain evidence may be found at a suspect’s residence. We note defendant does not argue there is no logical basis for one to conclude that one who orally copulates underage males is likely to possess child pornography. Instead, he claims the affidavit provided no basis for concluding he and the informant had an illegal sexual relationship and established no nexus between the alleged activity and defendant’s home, as there was no evidence the informant had ever been inside. In concluding it was probable illegal pornographic material would be found in defendant’s home, the magistrate also properly considered the officer’s opinion, based on her training and experience, “that persons who engage in sexual activity with minors also possess child pornography.” (See Nicholls, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 711.)
“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238.) A commonsense reading of the affidavit in this case supported the conclusion that there was a fair probability the officers would find child pornography and evidence of other victims of sexual abuse. While defendant would have us read the affidavit and determine that it merely showed he had a relationship with a single individual and provided no basis to believe he possessed pornographic material, given the particulars of defendant’s conduct with the informant, it is certainly within the realm of reason to conclude otherwise.
Another circumstance we must consider is that the statute of limitations has not run on any crime defendant committed against the informant and very likely had not run on the crimes against other victims the warrant may have uncovered. The fact that the evidence found could be used in a prosecution that had to be brought within a finite period of time means there is a limit to an officer’s ability to seek a warrant based on stale information.
In the final analysis, the magistrate’s “‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts’” (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 236) and “is to be sustained by reviewing courts as long as there was a ‘substantial basis’ for his conclusion that the legitimate objects of the search were ‘probably present’ on the specified premises.” (Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 153.) Here, the affidavit supported the magistrate’s conclusion that the objects of the search were probably present in defendant’s home.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J.MANELLA, J.
The Affiant Declaration stated: “Your affiant, Deborah Campbell, is a police officer for the city of Glendora and has been so employed since 1990. Your affiant attended the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Academy at STAR Center in Whittier. Your affiant worked patrol for 7 years before handling a 3 year assignment in the detective bureau handling sex crimes, child abuse and crimes against persons. I then rotated back to patrol for 5 years before being re-assigned to the detective bureau for my current assignment handling child abuse, juvenile crime, sex crimes and various other cases. Your affiant had conducted investigations and/or made arrests for the following major crimes: Attempted murder, rape, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, child abuse, child sexual assault, battery, burglary, theft and narcotics violations. Your affiant has interviewed hundreds of victims, witnesses and suspects. [¶] Your affiant has obtained an Associate of Arts Degree in Liberal Arts from Rio Hondo College in 2005. I attended 2 years at U.C. Riverside between 1987 and 1989 and a semester at Cal State Fullerton. I have received training in the following areas: [¶] DUI Investigations 32 hours, Under the Influence training 24 hours, Interview and Interrogation Training 72 hours (2 separate courses), Child Abuse Investigations 40 hours, Sexual Assault Investigations 35 hours, Voice Stress Analyzer Training 88 hours (2 separate courses), Field Officer Training 40 hours.”
The search warrant authorized the seizure of: (1) child pornographic images, data, computer generated images, or information; (2) any photographs or images of minors who may have had contact with defendant; (3) any information that may lead to the identity and age of the minor children depicted in the photographs, images, or materials described above; (4) any evidence of the distribution of child pornography; and (5) any notes, diaries, logs, files, or other correspondence regarding adult-child sexual conduct.