Opinion
2018–06045 Ind.No. 17–07024
11-13-2019
Philip H. Schnabel, Chester, NY, for appellant. David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Robert H. Middlemiss of counsel), for respondent.
Philip H. Schnabel, Chester, NY, for appellant.
David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Robert H. Middlemiss of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, BETSY BARROS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER Appeal by the defendant from an amended judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Craig Stephen Brown, J.), rendered May 9, 2018, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie Wittner, J.), upon a finding that he violated a condition thereof, after a hearing, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon his previous conviction of assault in the second degree.
ORDERED that the amended judgment is affirmed.
On October 20, 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree in exchange for a promised sentence of a period of probation. In December 2017, the defendant, who had moved to Orange County, was charged, inter alia, with violating a condition of his probation after he was arrested and charged with assault in the third degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree. After a hearing, the County Court determined that the defendant violated a condition of his probation. Subsequently, the court revoked the sentence of probation and imposed a term of six years' imprisonment plus a period of three years' postrelease supervision on the previous conviction of assault in the second degree.
The defendant's contention that the County Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying, without further inquiry, his repeated motions for new assigned counsel, made on the date of the scheduled violation hearing and prior to the imposition of the amended sentence, is without merit. "The right of an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at defendant's option" ( People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822, 824, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233 ; see People v. Degracia, 173 A.D.3d 1199, 101 N.Y.S.3d 628 ; People v. King, 161 A.D.3d 772, 774, 77 N.Y.S.3d 70 ). A trial court's duty to consider substitution arises "only where [the] defendant makes a ‘seemingly serious request[ ]’ " ( People v. Porto, 16 N.Y.3d 93, 100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283, quoting People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d at 824, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233 ). Here, the record does not provide a basis to conclude that the defendant's motions were based on specific factual allegations of a serious complaint about his counsel (see People v. Stevens, 162 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 75 N.Y.S.3d 539 ; People v. King, 161 A.D.3d at 774, 77 N.Y.S.3d 70 ; People v. McErlean, 149 A.D.3d 872, 873, 51 N.Y.S.3d 616 ).
The amended sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
DILLON, J.P., MALTESE, DUFFY and BARROS, JJ., concur.