Opinion
May 13, 1985
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Browne, J.).
Judgment reversed, on the law, that branch of defendant's motion which was to suppress the statement given by defendant to Detective Bruno Saia granted and new trial ordered.
Upon remittal, the People and the defendant submitted the matter to Criminal Term on a stipulated set of facts and the court records. Based upon those submissions, Criminal Term held that 21 days of the period in question were chargeable against defendant as a reasonable period of delay caused by his omnibus motion. In so holding, Criminal Term found that 21 days was a reasonable and necessary period for the transcription and production of the Grand Jury minutes needed by the court to decide the defendant's omnibus motion. As the stipulated record before Criminal Term adequately supported such a finding, we affirm that finding of fact. In the course of its decision which, inter alia, remitted the case back to this court, the Court of Appeals stated that "if 10 or more days of that period are ascribed to defendant's omnibus motion made on November 13, 1978, the statutory period had not elapsed, and it was not error to deny defendant's motion to dismiss" ( 60 N.Y.2d 119, 124, supra). Having found that at least 10 days are chargeable to the defendant, we conclude that there was no violation of defendant's speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (CPL 580.20).
In addition to the speedy trial issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was error to have denied that branch of defendant's motion which was to suppress testimony by a detective relating to a statement obtained from the defendant in violation of his right to counsel. Hence, the judgment appealed from is reversed, the defendant's suppression motion is granted to the extent that the statement given by him to Detective Bruno Saia is suppressed, and a new trial is ordered. Titone, J.P., Gibbons, Thompson and Niehoff, JJ., concur.