People v. Tooker

12 Citing cases

  1. People v. Cobbin

    692 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 12 times

    1984); People v. Lewis, 659 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1983); People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979). In this case, the mere fact that the suspect was running away from an older man did not furnish the officers with probable cause to arrest the defendant.

  2. People v. Tottenhoff

    691 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 24 times

    1983); People v. Schreyer, 640 P.2d 1147 (Colo. 1982); People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979). Because a limited seizure of the person is authorized on a standard less than that of probable cause, it must be brief in duration, limited in scope, and narrow in purpose.

  3. People v. Weeams

    665 P.2d 619 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 8 times
    In Weeams, we upheld the use of handcuffs "[u]nder the narrow circumstances surrounding an apprehension of criminal suspects reasonably believed to be armed...." 665 P.2d at 623.

    " The factual background in this case is more egregious than People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979). In Tooker, we refused to approve an extended intrusion pursuant to an investigatory stop since no actual crime had been reported and no weapons were used or observed.

  4. People v. Hazelhurst

    662 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that the fellow officer rule justified the defendant's arrest

    174 Colo. at 509, 485 P.2d at 497. See also People v. Johnson, 199 Colo. 68, 605 P.2d 46 (1980); People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979); People v. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P.2d 373 (1977). The investigatory stop by the deputy sheriff and the state trooper was based on information provided to them by fellow officers.

  5. People v. Roybal

    655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    In Roybal, the issue was whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant after a collision, when there was no evidence that defendant's misconduct caused the collision.

    Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); People v. Schreyer, 640 P.2d 1147 (Colo. 1982);People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979). We believe the trial court correctly concluded that the defendant's detention was an arrest, not an investigatory stop, so the standards to test the constitutional validity of a brief investigatory stop are not applicable here.

  6. People v. Schreyer

    640 P.2d 1147 (Colo. 1982)   Cited 23 times
    In Schreyer, the informants observed the defendants walking around cars in a neighborhood and then placing unspecified objects into their car.

    Although an investigatory stop itself does not constitute an arrest, whenever detention and questioning by a police officer are more than brief and cursory, there is an arrest which must be supported by probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979). See also People v. Gouker, 628 P.2d 149 (1981).

  7. People v. Archuleta

    616 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    The record demonstrates that these criteria were satisfied. Officer Avery knew that a woman had left the murder scene with Simon Luna. He had a description of the car they were driving. He later followed an identical car, driven by a woman, to the East Side Tavern. An inquiry disclosed that the car was registered to Simon Luna. After the car was towed, the two women were the only patrons who did not drive away when the tavern closed. Because these interrelated factors were sufficient to arouse a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity [ People v. Johnson, 199 Colo. 68, 605 P.2d 46 (1980); People v. Waits, 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d 391 (1978); People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979)], Officer Avery possessed enough information to stop the defendant for investigatory purposes shortly after she left the tavern. The ensuing detention was brief and the information requested was exactly that allowed by statute.

  8. State v. Cootz

    110 Idaho 807 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 18 times

    When an investigative Terry detention exceeds the limited purposes for which it is allowed, the permissibility of the intrusion is determined by the same standard as a warrantless arrest. State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 677 P.2d 522 (Ct.App. 1984); People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979). We believe the same is true when the authority granted by a detention warrant is exceeded, as it was in this case.

  9. People v. Stark

    682 P.2d 1240 (Colo. App. 1984)   Cited 1 times

    Here, Pinder was investigating a non-violent crime, and had no independent information on which to base a belief that defendant was armed or dangerous. See Ybarra v. Illinois, supra; People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979). Therefore, even if we assume arguendo that defendant's relationship with Chase was sufficient to support a reasonable and articulable suspicion, the character of the detention was unreasonable in light of its purpose and was beyond the ambit of an investigatory stop.

  10. State v. Cook

    106 Idaho 209 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 35 times
    Noting that the inevitable discovery doctrine was really an extension of the concept of an independent source to cover hypothetical—rather than actual—sources of evidence

    An investigative stop will ripen into an arrest, which must then be supported by reasonable cause, if the detention becomes overly intrusive. People v. Tooker, 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979); State v. Tourtillott, 43 Or.App. 5, 602 P.2d 659 (1979), aff'd 289 Or. 845, 618 P.2d 423 (1979), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972, 101 S.Ct. 2051, 68 L.Ed.2d 352 (1980). Accordingly, an arrest is deemed to have occurred, and must be tested against the requirement of reasonable cause, when the actions of the police go beyond those authorized for an investigative stop.