Opinion
G052225
02-27-2017
In re T.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.L., Defendant and Appellant.
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. DL048094-003) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Fred W. Slaughter, Judge. Affirmed. John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The court found true an allegation that T.L. (minor) committed a felony offense of battery causing serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)), and found not true an allegation that minor committed assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The court declared minor a ward of the court and imposed probation.
This case began with a fistfight. It is unclear who started the initial fight, but shortly after the fight ended, minor initiated a second fight, causing injuries to the victim. On appeal, minor contends a key confession was obtained in violation of her Miranda, rights, and that the evidence does not support a finding that minor caused the victim's injuries. We disagree on both fronts and affirm.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
FACTS
Minor and victim were once friends but had a falling out over social media in October 2014. As a result, minor went to victim's house, screamed threats, and ultimately got into a fistfight with victim.
Approximately three months later, minor contacted victim via social media seeking to mend fences. Victim was receptive and the two agreed to meet around 11:00 p.m. at a park. Victim brought her boyfriend who stayed in the car while victim went into a baseball field dugout to meet minor. The two had conversed for about 10 minutes when a man approached them; minor said the man, who was minor's boyfriend, was checking on her. The man then walked up and asked for a cigarette, which minor gave him. According to victim, minor then abruptly turned and punched her in the face, leading to a scuffle. Minor testified just the opposite — that it was victim who abruptly punched her. However, the court ultimately determined victim was more credible than minor. Victim took minor to the ground and ended up on top of her, at which point minor's boyfriend pulled victim off. Victim's boyfriend arrived and pushed minor's boyfriend off of her. Victim then grabbed her keys and minor's pack of cigarettes and left the dugout. Victim testified that the only injury she had at that point was a bump on her forehead from the first punch.
As victim walked back toward the parking lot, minor and minor's boyfriend followed. Victim got into her boyfriend's car, but he refused to do so, so she got back out of the car to get him in. Minor was arguing with victim's boyfriend and also making threats against victim to the effect of, "Let's go, pussy, I'm done, let's fight, I'm done with this, I want to hurt, I'm so done with this." Minor then rushed at and attacked victim. Minor struck victim "a few times." Neither minor's boyfriend nor victim's boyfriend hit victim. Victim's boyfriend was also struck and began bleeding, at which point minor and her boyfriend fled. During the fight, victim sustained a cut to her left arm, a cut to her knee, a cut on her back, and a cut on her shoulder. Victim called the police and reported the incident.
Officer Austin Martinez responded to the call. Martinez went to minor's home. Minor was not there so Martinez spoke with minor's mother. Minor's mother then called minor and Martinez spoke with minor on speaker phone. Minor told Martinez about the first fight in the dugout but did not mention the second fight.
At that point Martinez asked minor to come to the police department. Once minor arrived, Martinez noticed redness on the right side of her face, though no bruises, substantial bumps, or bleeding. At the police department minor reiterated her version of the first fight and this time also mentioned the second fight. In particular, minor stated that after victim and her boyfriend returned to their car, minor ran up to the car and said something to the effect of, "I'm not done, let's go round two," prompting the second fight. At that point, Martinez arrested minor and read her a Miranda advisement. Minor agreed to waive her Miranda rights and recounted what happened at the park in the same manner.
DISCUSSION
Minor first contends her statement to Martinez, "I'm not done, let's go round two," was obtained in violation of Miranda. Prior to trial, minor's counsel moved to suppress all statements minor made to law enforcement. The court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing at which both Officer Martinez and minor testified.
Martinez's testimony at the 402 hearing largely tracked his trial testimony with some added details. For example, when he initially called minor and asked her to come to the police station, minor refused but agreed to wait for an officer to come to her to take a statement. Later it was arranged that her mother would bring minor to the station.
When minor arrived at the station, Martinez had a conversation in the "records portion" of the police department, which is set up in two sections. There is a public area which has a ballistic window separating the public from the rest of the police station, and another section that does not have ballistic glass but that requires one to be "buzzed in" to gain access (which we refer to as the restricted area). Martinez conversed with minor in the restricted area while her mother waited in the public area. Martinez and minor were separated by a counter approximately four feet tall and three feet wide.
Martinez informed minor that she was not under arrest, the exit door was unlocked, and she was free to leave at any time. After minor admitted to saying "I'm not done, let's go round two," Martinez deemed minor to be the aggressor and arrested her. The conversation up to that point lasted 10 to 15 minutes. Martinez then walked minor back to the booking cell and read her Miranda rights. Minor said she understood her rights. Afterwards, minor recounted the events and again admitted to saying "let's go to round two." In the course of the conversation, Officer Martinez did not make any threats or promises to minor. The conversation after the point of arrest lasted approximately 15 minutes. In denying the suppression motion, the court expressly found Martinez's testimony credible.
Minor's principal argument is that she was in custody at the outset of the interview at the police station, and that any confession obtained after her arrest constituted an unlawful two-step interrogation in violation of Missouri v. Siebert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 (Siebert).
Minor also argues her statements were involuntary. But the argument is not well developed, merely stating that the circumstances outlined above made her statements involuntary under the "totality of the circumstances," which she describes as a "deliberate violation of her rights." That hyperbole is far removed from what happened. The court found her statements were voluntary and we agree. --------
"In reviewing Miranda issues on appeal, we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences as well as its evaluations of credibility if substantially supported, but independently determine from undisputed facts and facts found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was legally obtained." (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 502.)
"Under the familiar requirements of Miranda, . . . a suspect may not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel in the event the suspect is indigent." (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440.) "An interrogation is custodial, for purposes of requiring advisements under Miranda, when 'a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' [Citation.] Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. [Citations.] When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have understood his situation." (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 394-395.)
"Courts have identified a variety of relevant circumstances. Among them are whether contact with law enforcement was initiated by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview; whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect; where the interview took place; whether police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; whether they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person's conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; whether there were restrictions on the person's freedom of movement during the interview; how long the interrogation lasted; how many police officers participated; whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation. [Citations.] [¶] No one factor is dispositive. Rather, we look at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest." (People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162.)
Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude minor was not in custody prior to her arrest. She voluntarily went to the police station. (Indeed, minor initially refused to go to the police station, but later voluntarily appeared at the station with her mother.) She was told she was not under arrest, that the door was unlocked, and that she was free to leave at any time. In the grand scheme of interviews, 15 minutes is quite short. There were no abusive techniques used. This was simply an officer doing his job by questioning a person who had been involved in a fight that resulted in injuries. The only facts here possibly suggesting a custodial interrogation are that minor was a suspect and the interview occurred at the police station. But the United States Supreme Court has "explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required 'simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.'" (California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125.)
Nor was there a violation of the Siebert rule. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600.) Siebert precludes the use of a "police protocol for custodial interrogation that calls for giving no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until interrogation has produced a confession," followed by giving the Miranda warning and leading "the suspect to cover the same ground a second time." (Seibert, at p. 604.) Stated differently, the rule prohibits the police from deliberately committing a Miranda violation for the purpose of then obtaining a repeated confession after the warnings are given. The very foundation of the Seibert rule collapses if there is no Miranda violation committed in the first interview. And because we have held that minor was not in custody during the initial interview at the police station, there was no Miranda violation. It follows that minor's confession after being read her Miranda rights did not constitute an improper two-step interrogation in violation of Siebert.
Next, minor contends the evidence failed to establish that minor caused victim's injuries. Minor's argument boils down to two facts: Victim testified she did not realize she had suffered injuries until after the fight, and thus could not pinpoint how she received the injuries, and the fact that the two males got in the middle of the two girls fighting. In other words, she suggests the boyfriends could have inadvertently caused the cuts victim suffered. However, victim's boyfriend testified he did not hit victim, nor did he see minor's boyfriend hit her. And minor's boyfriend testified the two males were acting cooperatively, in a friendly manner, to try to break up the fight. Moreover, victim testified that neither of the males struck her. This evidence, together with the evidence of minor attacking victim and the number of cuts victim received, adequately supports the court's finding that minor caused victim's injuries.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IKOLA, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. THOMPSON, J.