Moreover, although it is not necessary to prove the identity of the owner or possessor of the property, in each case cited by the parties there was some evidence indicating that a person or entity had an interest in the property at the time of the arson that the defendant had no right to impair. See, e.g., People v. Gaither, 103 Ill. App. 2d 47, 55 (1968) (named person testified that she leased an apartment in the building); People v. Tisley, 20 Ill. App. 3d 145, 148 (1974) (evidence showed that a contract purchaser had an interest in the building); People v. Ross, 41 Ill. 2d 445, 450 (1968) (record showed that bank had received a court order of possession of the premises through foreclosure); Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 637-39 (witnesses testified to the names of the co-owners of the premises and other witnesses testified that they were lessees of apartments in the building at the time of the fire); Rawls, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 703-04 (witness testified that she lived in an apartment in the building and that the apartment was damaged by the fire). The type of evidence that satisfied the State's burden of proof in these cases is lacking in this case and we conclude that the evidence contained in the record is insufficient to prove that someone other than defendant had an interest in the property at the time of the fire.
See also, People v. Gaither (1968), 103 Ill.App.2d 47, 243 N.E.2d 388, in which the named person was neither the owner nor the lessee of the entire building, but was merely the lessee of one of the apartments in the building.) Additionally, in People v. Tisley (1974), 20 Ill.App.3d 145, 313 N.E.2d 204, the requisite property interest was extended to a contract purchaser; and in People v. Ross (1968), 41 Ill.2d 445, 244 N.E.2d 608, to a mortgagee who had received a court order of possession through foreclosure. In fact, in People v. Rawls (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 702, 15 Ill.Dec. 396, 373 N.E.2d 742, the reviewing court found that all the State need prove was the mere existence of persons, and not their specific identities, whose interests in the building defendant could not defeat or impair.
The Illinois courts repeatedly have held that a lessee of a building or other property has an interest "which the offender has no authority to defeat or impair." See People v. Rawls,People v. Tisley, 57 Ill.App.3d 702, 15 Ill.Dec. 396, 373 N.E.2d 742 (1978); 20 Ill.App.3d 145, 313 N.E.2d 204 (1974); People v. Johnson, 3 Ill.App.3d 158, 279 N.E.2d 47 (1971); People v. Feinberg, 2 Ill.App.3d 83, 276 N.E.2d 95 (1971); People v. Gaither, 103 Ill.App.2d 47, 243 N.E.2d 388 (1968). We hold that "any interest" in K.S.A. 21-3718(1)(a) includes a leasehold interest in real property.