The cases cited by respondent, in support of his assertion that he was merely "there" but not accountable, are inapplicable to this case. The evidence in People v. Tillman (1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 265 N.E.2d 904, showed that the defendants were not present at the time and place of the acts of others which constituted robbery, attempted murder, and murder. ( People v. Tillman (1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 749, 265 N.E.2d 904.)

) In order to prove accountability under this section of the Criminal Code, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) defendants solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid another person in the planning or commission of the offenses; (2) this participation must have taken place either before or during the commission of the offenses; and (3) it must have been with the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offenses. People v. Ramirez (1968), 93 Ill. App.2d 404, 236 N.E.2d 284; People v. Tillman (1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 2 d 743, 265 N.E.2d 904. It is not enough to show that defendants' acts facilitated the commission of the later offenses by another.

* * *" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 5-2. • 4, 5 In People v. Tillman, 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 265 N.E.2d 904, this court set forth three propositions which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to hold a defendant guilty on an accountability theory: "Under section 5-2(c) of the Criminal Code, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt three propositions: (1) That defendants solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid another person in planning or commission of the offenses; (2) that this participation must have taken place either before or during the commission of the offenses; and (3) that it must have been with the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offenses."

A person conscious that a crime is being committed in his or her presence will not be held accountable merely for failing to oppose or stop the crime. People v. Jones, 86 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282 (1980); People v. Tillman, 130 Ill. App. 2d 743, 750 (1971). Rather, an accomplice must take some part, perform some act, or owe some duty to the person in danger that makes it incumbent on him or her to prevent the commission of the crime.

Brown v. Perkins, 1 Allen, 89, 98. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.); Bailey v. United States, 416 F.2d 1110, 1113 (D.C. Cir.), and cases cited; United States v. Kelton, 446 F.2d 669, 671 (8th Cir.); People v. Tillman, 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 750-751; Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 373-374. The distinction between participation and mere presence was never clearly presented to the jury.

People v. Johnson, 220 Ill. App. 3d 550, 555 (1991); People v. Clayborn, 194 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1083 (1990). This evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant shared a common design with the others to invade Sanchez's home and steal the marijuana. ¶ 17 Citing People v. Tillman, 130 Ill. App. 2d 743, 750-51 (1971), defendant argues that evidence that a defendant received proceeds from the crime is insufficient to establish guilt by accountability. However, Tillman actually held that "the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants shared in the proceeds of the crime."

We recognize that such an open-ended response may invite the inference that she had knowledge that a crime was being committed, but that statement without more does not establish guilt by accountability. See People v. Tillman, 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 750, 265 N.E.2d 904, 909 (1971). We conclude that the facts at bar are substantively different from the facts in Adams, therefore requiring a different result.

( People v. Holtz (1920), 294 Ill. 143, 128 N.E. 341.) Defendant's reliance upon People v. Lewellen (1969), 43 Ill.2d 74, 250 N.E.2d 651, and People v. Tillman (1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 265 N.E.2d 904, is misplaced. Neither case is analogous to the instant situation.

In Illinois, to be held accountable for a crime, the evidence must show that the defendant (1) solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid another in the planning or commission of the offense and (2) that defendant's participation took place before or during the offense and (3) that defendant's participation was accompanied by the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate commission of the offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 5-2; People v. Tillman (1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 265 N.E.2d 904.) Here, it was the State's theory that Gomez, pursuant to his admission to being the driver of the getaway car, was accountable for the shooting.

Defendant Spencer argues that his convictions, based on accountability, were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt in that all of the elements necessary to show accountability were not established. He correctly states that accountability requires proof of three elements: (1) that he solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid another in the planning or commission of the offense; (2) that his participation took place before or during the offense; and (3) his participation was accompanied by the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate commission of the offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 5-2; People v. Tillman (1971), 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 265 N.E.2d 904.) Spencer contends that the first and third elements were not proved here. • 1 With regard to the first element, defendant contends that because Washington testified that he alone shot the victims, and that the shooting was done in self-defense, Spencer could not have aided in the planning or commission of the crimes.