"Absent [such] obligation, a witness thus called becomes the people's witness and subject to the settled rules concerning the examination of any witness voluntarily called by either party."People v Raider, 256 Mich. 131, 135-136; 239 N.W. 387 (1931); People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973).People v Fidel, 37 Mich. App. 338, 342-343; 194 N.W.2d 732 (1971); People v White, 401 Mich. 482; 257 N.W.2d 912 (1977).
A potential witness falls within the accomplice exception if he or she could have been charged with the same crime as the defendant. People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691, 696; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973). Even assuming that defendant's testimony as to the existence of this person was true, the testimony clearly shows that this person could have been charged with receiving and concealing stolen property of a value exceeding $100.
A potential witness need not be actually charged with the crime in order to fall within the accomplice exception. People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691, 695; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973). A potential witness falls within the accomplice exception if he or she could have been charged with the same crime as the defendant.
Although the prosecution has a duty to endorse on the information and call all res gestae witnesses, it is not obligated to endorse or produce accomplices. People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973), People v Szymanski, 52 Mich. App. 605; 218 N.W.2d 95 (1974). The prosecutor was not obligated to endorse or call the missing codefendant, Leon. There was no showing of prosecutorial impropriety or bad faith in the state's inability to find or arrest Leon and, thus, no denial of fundamental fairness to defendant.
A person may be treated as an accomplice for purposes of the res gestae rule even though never formally charged or convicted, provided that he or she could have been charged with the same offense as the defendant. People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691, 696; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973). Each case must be judged according to its own facts.
People v Jerome I Smith, supra, 723. The Jerome Smith case was cited for the proposition that "carrying" is a separate element in People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691, 697; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973), and in People v Meadows, 26 Mich. App. 675, 678; 182 N.W.2d 721 (1970). Similarly, "carrying" was recognized as a distinct element of the crime in People v Blalock, 44 Mich. App. 336, 337; 205 N.W.2d 185 (1973).
One well-recognized exception to this rule is that the prosecution is under no obligation to indorse an accomplice or participant in the crime, even if known to the prosecution prior to or at trial. People v Raider, 256 Mich. 131; 239 N.W. 387 (1931), People v Lyle Brown, 37 Mich. App. 25; 194 N.W.2d 450 (1971), People v Irwin, 47 Mich. App. 608; 209 N.W.2d 718 (1973), lv den 390 Mich. 803 (1973), People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973), People v Penn, 70 Mich. App. 638; 247 N.W.2d 575 (1976). Nor is the prosecution required to produce or call an accomplice even though indorsed on the information.
Therefore, their endorsement and production by the prosecution was not required. People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691, 694-696; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973), People v John Moore, supra, 154. Defendants' claim that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence is not properly before this Court, as defendants failed to move for a new trial on that ground in the court below.
Wisniewski was an accomplice because of his deep involvement in the fraudulent transaction. In People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691, 696; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973), we said: "* * * a person is an `accomplice' if he could be charged with the same offense as the accused is charged."
It is well-established that accomplices are not res gestae witnesses for purposes of indorsement. People v Threlkeld, 47 Mich. App. 691; 209 N.W.2d 852 (1973), People v Szymanski, 52 Mich. App. 605; 218 N.W.2d 95 (1974), People v Phillips, 61 Mich. App. 138; 232 N.W.2d 333 (1975). III