• 3-5 What defendant fails to fully comprehend is that the protection secured by invoking the fifth amendment must be confined to those instances where the witness has reasonable cause to suspect the possibility of subsequent prosecution from a direct answer. ( People v. Thornton (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 983, 986, 458 N.E.2d 1150, 1153.) A witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself.
The protection secured by the fifth amendment is confined, however, to those instances where the witness has reasonable cause to believe he might subject himself to prosecution if he answers. Mason v. United States (1917), 244 U.S. 362, 61 L.Ed. 1198, 37 S.Ct. 621; People v. Baker (1988), 123 Ill.2d 233, 243-44; People v. Katsigiannis (1988), 171 Ill. App.3d 1090, 1101; People v. Thornton (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 983, 986; People v. McLaren (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 368, 373. The privilege against self-incrimination does not exist where there are no reasonable grounds to fear self-incrimination.
Rather, it is for the trial court to determine the propriety of invoking the fifth amendment privilege in any proceeding. ( In re Zisook (1981), 88 Ill.2d 321, 332, 430 N.E.2d 1037, cert. denied (1982), 457 U.S. 1134, 73 L.Ed.2d 1352, 102 S.Ct. 2962; People v. Thornton (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 983, 986, 458 N.E.2d 1150), and it must be perfectly apparent under all of the circumstances that the answers cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the party claiming the privilege. ( 120 Ill. App.3d 983, 987, 458 N.E.2d 1150.)
Our supreme court reversed, holding that a witness in a criminal case has the privilege to refuse to answer questions which tend to incriminate him, but that the protection secured by the fifth amendment is confined to where the witness has reasonable cause to believe he might subject himself to prosecution if he answers. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d at 304, citing Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 61 L. Ed. 1198, 37 S. Ct. 621 (1917); People v. Baker, 123 Ill. 2d 233, 243-44 (1988); People v. Katsigiannis, 171 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1101 (1988); People v. Thornton, 120 Ill. App. 3d 983, 986 (1983); People v. McLaren, 77 Ill. App. 3d 368, 373 (1979). The court went on to hold that the privilege does not exist where there are no reasonable grounds to fear self-incrimination.
The defense cross-examined defendant, including questioning him concerning his knowledge and experience with guns, but defendant similarly invoked the privilege in response to all questions. On the following day of trial, the trial court found defendant in direct contempt of court and sentenced him to a term of six months' imprisonment to be served consecutively to a previously imposed six-year sentence for an unrelated offense. • 1-3 The fifth amendment guarantee against testimonial compulsion ensures that no witness will be required to give testimony that may tend to incriminate him. ( People v. Thornton (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 983, 986-87, 458 N.E.2d 1150.) However, the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination may only be exercised where the witness has reasonable cause to suspect the possibility of subsequent prosecution from a direct answer.
Had they persisted in refusing to testify and appealed a final order of contempt to this court, a reviewable issue would have arisen. (See People v. Thornton (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 983, 987, 458 N.E.2d 1150.) The fact that the contemnors here failed to persist in asserting their fifth amendment rights does not, however, allow the defendants to raise the issue in their appeal. People v. Godsey (1978), 74 Ill.2d 64, 73, 383 N.E.2d 988.