Opinion
F062686 Super. Ct. No. 512021
12-21-2011
In re THOMAS M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THOMAS M., Defendant and Appellant.
Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
THE COURT *
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Nan Cohan Jacobs, Judge.
Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
*Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Gomes, J.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and John A. Bachman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is an appeal from an order continuing the wardship of minor, appellant Thomas M., after the court sustained a petition alleging the minor committed burglary in the first degree. Minor contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he "inten[ded] to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony" (Pen. Code, § 459) when he entered the home of his victims. We will affirm the wardship order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. on November 22, 2010, a girl rang the door bell at the Gonzales home. Carlos Gonzales, Sr., peered through a window but did not answer the door. A few minutes later, there was a loud noise from within the house. Carlos Gonzales, Jr., came out of his bedroom in response to the noise, and saw minor (then 13 years old) standing in the doorway to his parents' bedroom. He knew minor from earlier encounters, although he had not seen him in about a year. Gonzales, Sr., also arrived in the hallway and saw minor, whom he later identified from a photo lineup. Minor retreated into the bedroom, calling out, "Junior, Junior."
Gonzales, Sr., followed minor into the bedroom, where he saw another person, identified as minor's older brother (Luis, whose nickname was "Junior") coming through the bedroom window. Gonzales, Sr., struck Luis in the face; minor jumped over the arm of Gonzales, Sr., and out the window. Both boys fled. The Gonzaleses called the police.
At the jurisdictional hearing on the present petition, minor testified that he had been at the home of his brother's girlfriend all day on November 22, and had never entered the Gonzales home.
The court found the petition true.
Minor had been the subject of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions going back over two years. In May 2010, he was declared a ward based on a finding that he had committed grand theft from a person (see Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)) and placed on formal probation. Probation was revoked for use of marijuana, fighting and failure to attend school. He had been released from juvenile hall on October 27, 2010. After adjudication on the current burglary petition, the court continued minor as a ward of the court and ordered additional confinement.
DISCUSSION
The crime of burglary requires entry into the premises with the intent to commit larceny or any felony. (Pen. Code, § 459.) Minor's reply brief states his contention on appeal, as follows: "There is no question that appellant was intercepted in the act of trespassing on the property, and tried to avoid apprehension, but the inferences that may permissibly be drawn from these circumstances fall far short of the specific requirements of the burglary statute."
Many cases have held that evidence of surreptitious entry, flight upon confrontation, and failure to provide a reason for being on the premises constitute sufficient evidence from which a finder of fact may infer an intent to commit theft sufficient for conviction of burglary. Indeed, "[b]urglarious intent [can] be reasonably and justifiably inferred from the unlawful and forcible entry alone ...." (People v. Michaels (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 194, 199; see also People v. Martin (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 334, 339, People v. Stewart (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 687, 690-691.) Here, the evidence supported an inference that defendant's confederate rang the door bell in an effort to ascertain whether the occupants of the house were home. Having concluded that the occupants were gone, minor entered the house through a window and fled when he unexpectedly confronted the occupants. Further, he falsely denied being present in the house, evidence of consciousness of guilt. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the adjudication. (People v. Martin, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 339.)
Minor attempts to distinguish the present case on the basis that the illegal entry in previous cases "was late at night, at a time that strongly suggested a serious nefarious purpose." To the contrary, entry through a window after (erroneously) determining that the house was empty suggests an equally nefarious purpose and does not provide a basis upon which to distinguish the cases finding evidence of entry and flight sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction.
DISPOSITION
The order for continued wardship is affirmed.