Opinion
NO. 4-13-0895
02-13-2014
In re: Jm. T. and Ja. T., Minors, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JOSHUA THOMAS, Respondent-Appellant.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from
Circuit Court of
Champaign County
No. 11JA47
Honorable
John R. Kennedy,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE POPE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Knecht and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's order terminating respondent father's parental rights is affirmed. ¶ 2 In November 2011, the State filed an amended petition for adjudication of abuse and neglect as to five siblings. Respondent is the father of two of the children, Jm. T. (born June 2, 2009) and Ja. T. (born June 5, 2011). ¶ 3 On November 9, 2011, the mother of Jm. T. admitted she abused Jm. T. and two of his siblings by inflicting excessive corporal punishment and neglected Ja. T. by exposing her to the risk of excessive corporal punishment. Respondent proceeded with an adjudicatory hearing on November 9 and 29, 2011, after which the trial court found respondent had inflicted excessive corporal punishment on Jm. T. and two of his siblings and exposed Ja. T. to the risk of excessive corporal punishment. On October 27, 2012, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent's parental rights. On September 20, 2013, the court terminated respondent's parental rights. Respondent appeals, contending the court's finding he was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence, as was the finding it was in the minors' best interests to terminate his parental rights. ¶ 4 We affirm.
¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 On November 9, 2011, the minors' mother admitted she inflicted excessive corporal punishment on three of her children, including Jm. T., when she struck them with electrical cords, pursuant to section 2-3(2)(v) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(v) (West 2010)). She also admitted neglecting Ja. T. and another child by exposing them to the risk of excessive corporal punishment pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2010)). Respondent and the minors' mother lived together and respondent witnessed these beatings. In addition, the court found respondent had punched and struck two of the minors' siblings and had used a belt to strike another. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding the minors abused and neglected. In re An. C., 2012 IL App (4th) 120004-U. ¶ 7 On October 17, 2012, the State filed a motion seeking a finding of unfitness and the termination of respondent's parental rights to the minors. The State alleged respondent was unfit by failing to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the minors' removal (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2010)); (2) make reasonable progress toward the minors' return within nine months of adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2010)); and (3) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2010)). ¶ 8 The trial court heard evidence of unfitness on January 29, March 5, April 10, and April 18, 2013. On May 8, 2013, the court found respondent unfit on the first two grounds noted above. ¶ 9 On September 20, 2013, the trial court held a best-interest hearing for Jm. T. and Ja. T. and found it in both minors' best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. (The court also terminated the minors' mother's parental rights.)
¶ 10 A. The Fitness Hearing
¶ 11 The trial court heard evidence of unfitness over the course of several days, January 29, March 5, April 10, and April 18, 2013. We relate the evidence only as it applies to respondent. ¶ 12 Conrad Hayes, a group facilitator at Cognition Works, ran the parent-education group to which respondent was referred. Hayes testified it was difficult to get information and completed assignments from respondent. Although respondent completed the classes, he used silence as a tactic to avoid accountability. Hayes felt respondent had not taken responsibility for his parenting situation. Respondent failed to successfully complete the CHANGE program, a cognitive behavioral program to help people with maladaptive thinking patterns, as a result of too many unexcused absences. ¶ 13 Christine Johnson, a clinical therapist at Lutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI), completed a mental-health assessment for respondent. Goals for respondent included identifying past neglect of his children and developing ways to do things differently in the future. His attendance with Johnson was fine, but he was unsuccessfully discharged from therapy in December 2012 because he was not able to identify "his part in why his children [were] taken." Johnson stated respondent was not really able to take responsibility and needed to "step up to the plate." Respondent expressed frustration about not being able to visit with his children. (Visits had been suspended following the physical abuse. Respondent and the minors' mother were charged and convicted of aggravated battery to a child relating to the abuse.) ¶ 14 Nicole Martin, a case manager with the Champaign County Regional Planning Commission, worked on employment, education, and housing issues with respondent. He met with Martin as requested and found a job. However, he was supposed to be living in separate housing from the minors' mother, but he continued to live with her. They were being evicted, and Martin noted respondent was unable to achieve stable housing. Martin also worked with respondent on obtaining his General Equivalency Diploma, but she ended up closing the case because of too many missed appointments. ¶ 15 Anita Faulkner, a child welfare specialist with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), was the initial caseworker for respondent and his children. The children and other adult family members had reported to Faulkner respondent had been physically abusive to their mother, that he hit and pushed her. In December 2011, Faulkner testified she met with respondent in the county jail. Respondent denied engaging in domestic violence, but he admitted the police had been called to the house when he and the mother argued. She had referred respondent for a substance-abuse assessment after he revealed he consumed alcohol and marijuana on a regular basis. When he was released from incarceration in January 2012, Faulkner supplied respondent with a list of service providers to call to set up services. When she met with respondent in February, she learned he had not followed through with any of the service providers. He was to have a domestic-violence screening, a drug-abuse screening, enrolled in parenting classes, and individual counseling. Respondent was cooperative during the integrated assessment. ¶ 16 Autumn Berbaum testified she was the case manager for the family from April 2012 until July 2012. She primarily communicated with the mother because respondent would not answer his phone when she called. She referred respondent for a substance-abuse evaluation several times and he eventually obtained one. He was recommended for level-two services but never started the classes. He started parent-education classes but had not completed them by the time she was no longer involved. ¶ 17 Brianna Coffey worked as the case manager for LSSI from July 2012 until late January 2013. During this time, respondent was evicted from his residence in Rantoul for nonpayment of rent and while Coffey worked with him, he never obtained permanent housing. Coffey testified respondent was referred for level-one substance-abuse treatment but did not enroll until months later, in late September 2012. Overall, respondent was compliant with drug screens. Visitation was suspended so the children could make progress in their own counseling. They were not emotionally ready to visit with their parents. ¶ 18 On the final day of the hearing on fitness, April 18, 2013, respondent did not appear. His attorney was present and announced in the absence of his client, he had no evidence to present. ¶ 19 During arguments by the guardian at litem (GAL), counsel pointed out as of August 29, 2012, respondent had completed a parenting class but had not taken responsibility for his actions. He had been dropped from domestic-violence treatment because of unexcused absences, and he had just completed a substance-abuse evaluation but had not begun treatment. The GAL asked the trial court to find respondent unfit. ¶ 20 On May 18, 2013, the trial court announced its ruling in open court. As to respondent, the court found he was proved unfit by clear and convincing evidence for failing to make reasonable efforts or reasonable progress within nine months of the adjudication of neglect and abuse. The court found the State had not proved the third ground-failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility. ¶ 21 The trial court found respondent had been released from incarceration in December 2012, but it took him a significant time, three months, to contact the caseworkers. This in turn delayed his referral for services. His attendance at counseling was sporadic and his progress was slow. While he completed parenting education, he did not progress, and he did not accept responsibility for his actions. Accordingly, the court found respondent unfit by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 22 B. The Best-Interest Hearing
¶ 23 The trial court held the best-interest hearing on September 20, 2013. Respondent testified at the hearing to a log of calls he made to LSSI, noting the dates, times, and responses, or lack thereof, to his calls. ¶ 24 The trial court had written best-interest reports submitted by LSSI and the court-appointed special advocate (CASA). The LSSI report indicated two siblings of the minors had between 70 and 100 marks and scars on their necks, temples, buttocks, chests, and legs when a family member took the children to the police department. Jm. T., who was two years old then, had several marks and scars on his body, including a recent mark in the shape of a loop on his back and inner thigh. ¶ 25 The LSSI report indicated at the time of the case review (ACR) in March 2013, respondent was living with a new girlfriend in Rantoul. Since the ACR, LSSI had had little to no contact with respondent. He had not contacted his LSSI caseworker by phone or at previous court hearings to inquire as to services or referrals. Respondent had never completed domestic-violence treatment or substance-abuse treatment. ¶ 26 Jm. T. and Ja. T. were living together in a traditional foster home. Both minors had developed a bond with their foster parents and appeared happy in their placement. LSSI recommended the trial court terminate respondent's parental rights. ¶ 27 The trial court also considered a written report of the CASA assigned to the case. The report, dated August 9, 2013, reflected the minors had been in foster care for 22 months. Jm. T. was four years old and Ja. T. was two years old at the time of the report. They had not visited with their biological parents during those 22 months. The CASA had visited with the children in person 18 times in their foster home and at school or day care. Their seven-month-old sibling, born during the pendency of the case, also lived with them. The minors called the foster parents "mommy" and "daddy." The children were secure in their home and the CASA observed mutual affection between the foster parents and the children. The foster parents provided a loving, routine, and stable environment for the children. Day care providers reported the children came to day care clean and appeared well-adjusted, happy, and loved. The children enjoyed monthly visits with their older half-siblings placed elsewhere. These visits were coordinated by the foster mother. The foster parents told the CASA they loved Jm. T. and Ja. T. unconditionally and were willing and able to adopt them. The CASA recommended the court terminate respondent's parental rights. ¶ 28 The trial court then found it was in the best interests of the minors to terminate respondent's parental rights. The court noted the parent-child relationship had been severed beyond repair by the abuse and neglect suffered by the children. The court found efforts to restore that relationship would be unsuccessful. The court further found the children's need for permanency, security, a continuing relationship with a parent, and the opportunity for sibling relationships all favored termination of respondent's rights. ¶ 29 This appeal followed.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 On appeal, respondent argues the State failed to prove him unfit by clear and convincing evidence and the trial court's order terminating his parental rights was not in the best interests of the minors.
¶ 32 A. Fitness Determination
¶ 33 A parent will be deemed unfit if the State proves, by clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the grounds of unfitness enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2010)). See In re A.L., 409 Ill. App. 3d 492, 499, 949 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (2011). This court will not overturn a finding of parental unfitness unless the finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning "the correctness of the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a review of the evidence." In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 960, 835 N.E.2d 908, 913 (2005). ¶ 34 In this case, respondent was found unfit on two grounds listed in section 1(D): he failed to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the minors' removal (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2010)) and (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors within nine months of the neglect adjudication (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2010)). ¶ 35 We note the State need only prove one statutory ground to establish parental unfitness. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244, 850 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). Accordingly, we begin our analysis with respondent's argument the trial court's finding he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors was against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 36 A trial court judges reasonable progress according to an objective standard. See In re Jordan V., 347 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1067, 808 N.E.2d 596, 605 (2004). For a court to find progress was reasonable, the record must show, at a minimum, measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of returning the child to the parent. See In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067, 859 N.E.2d 123, 137 (2006). A court will find progress to be reasonable when it can conclude it will be able to return the child to parental custody in the near future. A.L., 409 Ill. App. 3d at 500, 949 N.E.2d at 1129 (quoting In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991)). ¶ 37 For the 22 months the children were in foster care, respondent was not permitted to visit with them because the severity of the abuse suffered prevented them from being emotionally able to visit. Further, respondent's failure to complete services created an obstacle to visitation. Respondent never completed substance-abuse treatment or domestic-violence counseling. Following his release from incarceration in December 2011, respondent wasted three months before contacting DCFS or LSSI to enroll in services. The trial court's finding respondent was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The children had already spent 22 months in foster care and were no closer to going home than they were at the start of the case.
¶ 38 B. The Best-Interests Determination
¶ 39 After a parent is found unfit, the trial court shifts its focus in termination proceedings to the child's interests. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (2004). At the best-interest stage, a "parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364, 818 N.E.2d at 1227. Before a parent's rights may be terminated, a court must find the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, it is in the child's best interests those rights be terminated. See D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366, 818 N.E.2d at 1228. ¶ 40 When considering whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interest, the trial court must consider a number of factors within "the context of the child's age and developmental needs." 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2010). These include the following:
"(1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; (4) the child's sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least[-] disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child's community ties; (7) the child's need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of¶ 41 The trial court's finding termination of parental rights is in a child's best interest will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Anaya J.G., 403 Ill. App. 3d 875, 883, 932 N.E.2d 1192, 1199 (2010). A decision will be found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence "if the facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite conclusion." Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1072, 859 N.E.2d at 141. ¶ 42 Here, Jm. T. and Ja. T. had been in foster care for 22 months. Fourteen of those months were with the current foster family. The children thought of their foster parents as their mother and father. They were safe, secure, happy, and loved. Another younger sibling lived with them in their home and their foster mother coordinated monthly visits with their older half-siblings who were placed elsewhere. The foster parents loved the children unconditionally and were willing and able to adopt them. The trial court's finding it was in their best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights was supported by more than a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to terminate respondent's parental rights to Jm. T. and Ja. T.
every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child." Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1072, 859 N.E.2d at 141; 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(a) to (4.05)(j) (West 2010).
¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 44 The trial court's orders finding respondent unfit and terminating his parental rights are affirmed. ¶ 45 Affirmed.