Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. FVI801322, John M. Tomberlin, Judge.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Carlton and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Hollenhorst, Acting P. J.
Following a jury trial, defendant Jeffrey Thomas was convicted of inflicting corporal injury to Joyce Barnes (Barnes), a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and simple assault (§ 240). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence in connection with inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) On September 2, 2008, he was sentenced to nine years in state prison. He appeals, contending: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant; (2) the trial court erred in failing to exclude his statement to the arresting officer on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); (3) the trial court erred in excluding the Barnes’s prior misdemeanor convictions; and (4) there was prosecutorial misconduct.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
On May 16, 2008, at 2:59 p.m., Barnes called 911 and asked that police be sent to an address on Rimrock Road because her “boyfriend busted [her] over the head and [she was] bleeding.” She described her boyfriend as a Black male, age 42, named Jeff Thomas.
Barnes was present in the courthouse on the date of defendant’s preliminary hearing. She did not show up for trial because she had been hospitalized for an acute sinus infection, which had caused her blood pressure to rise to a dangerous level, and she had suffered dizziness and other serious medical symptoms.
San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Deputy Desirie Renzo responded to the scene at 3:15 p.m. and found Barnes in front of a neighbor’s apartment bleeding from the head. In addition to the laceration to her head, Barnes had a sideways welt across most of her back, slight bruising on her face, and a half-inch cut on her left hand. Inside her apartment, officers found a two-foot piece of rebar in the kitchen on a counter. According to Barnes’s medical records, she reported that she was struck with a rebar.
In Barnes’s kitchen, there was a broken window above the sink and blood splatters on the kitchen floor, a door, a door frame, a wall, and the cabinets. There was dirty water in the sink and a mop suggesting the floor had been mopped. There were bloody handprints on a wall in the hallway. In the master bedroom, there was blood splatter on a pair of shorts found on the bed. In a dumpster across the street from the apartment, officers found a rolled-up rug. Inside were two bloody towels.
Defendant was not in the apartment when the deputy arrived. However, later that evening around 7:04 p.m., Detective Timothy Visosky went to the apartment and found defendant sitting on a couch. Defendant was arrested. As they were walking to the patrol car, defendant asked why he was being arrested. The detective said that he knew what defendant had done. Defendant replied, “‘Yeah, I know. I hit her.’”
At the jail, Detective Visosky booked and interviewed defendant. Defendant gave the apartment address where he had been arrested as his address. Defendant admitted that Barnes was his girlfriend and they had gotten into an argument about a relationship defendant had had with another woman. Defendant said he shoved Barnes, and she had fallen and hit her head. When the detective reminded defendant that he had admitted hitting Barnes when he was arrested, defendant denied saying that. When asked if Barnes had hit him, defendant said, “Well she was, acting, stretching at me man, and I just pushed her back.”
II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Section 273.5, subdivision (a), provides, in pertinent part, that any person who willfully inflicts “corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition” upon a “cohabitant,” is guilty of a felony. On appeal, defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the finding that he and Barnes were cohabitants, because there was no evidence of how long they had been living together or that they had been living together “‘for a substantial period of time.’”
A. Standard of Review.
“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to see if it contains reasonable, solid evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Belton (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 432, 437.)
B. Analysis.
Case law has broadly interpreted the cohabitation element of section 273.5. (People v. Moore (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1333 (Moore).) Cohabitant “requires something more than a platonic, rooming-house arrangement.” (People v. Holifield (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 999 (Holifield).) According to the Holifield court, cohabitation means two unrelated adult persons living together under the same roof for a substantial period of time resulting in some permanency of relationship. (Id. at p. 1001.) Factors that may determine whether persons are cohabiting include but are not limited to sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same living quarters, sharing income or expenses, joint use or ownership of property, and the continuity of the relationship and the length of the relationship. (Ibid.) According to defendant, the record “lacks any proof that Barnes and [he] lived together for a substantial or significant period.” We disagree.
In Holifield, the victim alone paid the rent on the motel room where she had lived for about a year. She and Holifield had been seeing each other “off and on for four years.” (Holifield, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 995.) During the three months before the assault, Holifield stayed in at least three other places for weeks at a time, taking his possessions with him whenever he left. He stored clothing and personal possessions at three other residences and did not have a key to the victim’s room. The couple did not share rent or make joint purchases, did not spend much free time together, and had “‘infrequent’” sexual relations. The victim described her relationship with Holifield as one of friends or roommates and not “‘intimate.’” (Id. at p. 996.) On these facts, the reviewing court upheld a finding that the couple was cohabiting. (Id. at p. 1002.)
In Moore, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, Moore arguably maintained substantial relationships with two women in different locations during the same time period. (Id. at p. 1335.) The reviewing court concluded that for purposes of criminal liability under section 273.5, a defendant may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people at different locations, during the same time frame, if he maintains substantial ongoing relationships with each and lives with each for significant periods. (Moore, supra,at p. 1335; People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 18-19.) The reviewing court based its finding that Moore and his girlfriend/victim were cohabitants, under section 273.5, on the nature of the relationship and not on the mere amount of time they were acquainted with each other. The reviewing court stressed the nature of the relationship, finding that Moore had a “substantial relationship” with the woman he assaulted, as they had a sexual relationship, shared the lease of their apartment, and he used their apartment address for his mail and driver’s license. (Moore, supra, at p. 1335.)
Applying the familiar principles of substantial evidence review and thus assuming the jury resolved factual conflicts against defendant (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331), we find substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant and Barnes were cohabitants at the time of the offense. In her 911 call, Barnes gave the apartment address as her home address and identified defendant as her boyfriend. She further implored the operator not to call back because “[h]e’s going to come in the house in a minute.” Defendant admitted that Barnes was his girlfriend, that they had argued about a relationship that he “had on the side,” and that “[t]his ain’t the first time this shit happened with [Barnes]. Man, it’s on record. Each time you guys came out man, it wasn’t no violence.” When defendant was arrested, it was at the apartment to which he had the keys. When he was booked, he gave the apartment address where he had been arrested as his address. And finally, Barnes was served with a subpoena for the trial at the apartment address.
In closing argument, defense counsel referred to the fact that defendant was having a relationship “on the side.” “On the side” suggests that defendant was involved in a main relationship. Given Barnes’s reaction and defendant’s acknowledgement of such reaction, clearly the main relationship was between defendant and Barnes.
In his reply brief, defendant claims this statement “does not prove that whatever dispute prompted the calls occurred at a shared residence rather than at a friend’s house, a bar or on a public street.” However, the purpose of this statement is to serve as evidence of the significant period of time in which the two have been together. Such evidence is then considered with other evidence identifying the apartment as their shared residence.
Based on the above evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Barnes and defendant had been living together for a substantial or significant period and thus were cohabitants within the meaning of section 273.5, subdivision (a).
III. ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT TO DETECTIVE VISOSKY
While Detective Visosky and defendant were walking to the patrol car, defendant asked why he was being arrested. In response, the detective said that defendant knew the reason. Defendant admitted, “Yeah, I know. I hit her.” At defendant’s request, the trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the issue of whether the detective had obtained defendant’s admission after his arrest and without Miranda warnings. Defendant argued that the detective’s response sought to elicit an incriminating statement. The trial court disagreed, finding that Detective Visosky’s statement was not a question and that defendant’s reply was a voluntary statement. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to exclude his statement on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.
A. Standard of Review.
“No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) “[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege....” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 478-479.) These procedural safeguards include a police advisement that the individual has the right to remain silent; that anything he says may be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and that if he cannot afford one, one will be appointed to him free of charge. (Id. at p. 479.) The advisement of Miranda rights is required only when a person is subject to custodial interrogation. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 647-648 (Mickey).)
When considering a claim that a statement was inadmissible at trial because it was obtained in violation of the Miranda rights, the scope of review is well established. “‘We must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.]....’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1033.) “‘“[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,” either deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and “a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 527.) The reviewing court then independently determines whether the challenged statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 178.)
B. Analysis.
As noted above, Miranda rights are given only when a person is subject to custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation has two components. First, the person being questioned must be in custody. Second, there must be an interrogation. (Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 648.) “The phrase ‘custodial interrogation’ is crucial. The adjective encompasses any situation in which ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ [Citation.] The noun ‘refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) An objective standard applies. (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 637.) “[N]ot all conversation between an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation.” (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 985 (Clark), overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) For example, voluntary statements are not subject to the requirements of Miranda. (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 337.)
According to defendant, this case is similar to People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510. In Davis, the defendant was in a holding cell next to the codefendants. The detective recorded their conversations. (Id. at p. 552.) Although there were no fingerprints found on the weapon, the detective’s parting words were, “Alright remember that Uzi?” (Id. at pp. 552-553.) The defendant replied, “Yeah.” (Id. at p. 553.) The detective added, “Think about that little fingerprint on it....” (Ibid.) One of the codefendants asked whether the detective was talking about everyone, and the defendant replied, “No man he talking about me.” (Ibid.) Our state’s highest court held that “remember that Uzi?” was clearly a question which had been asked in violation of Miranda. (People v. Davis, supra, at p. 555.) The detective’s follow up statement was the functional equivalent of interrogation, because it implied the defendant’s fingerprint had been found on the weapon. (Ibid.)
Defendant argues that a similar result is required here, because the average suspect would interpret Detective Visosky’s statement, “‘You know what you did?’” as “inviting him to confirm what it appeared the police already knew.”
In contrast, the People argue the facts in this case are more like those in Clark. In Clark, after the defendant had invoked his Miranda rights and while he was being transported to the hospital so the police could obtain a blood sample, he asked if the penalty for murder was thirty years. (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 982.) The officer replied that he had never seen anyone serve more than seven and a half years unless the person was a mass murderer. (Ibid.) The defendant then confessed. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the conversation did not constitute an interrogation, because “there was no reason for [the officer] to have known that his casual estimate of possible penalties would produce an incriminating response from this defendant.” (Id. at p. 985.) The Court held: “The record does not establish that defendant was subject to ‘compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning.’ [Citation.] Rather, the record demonstrates defendant’s desire to unburden himself by confessing the murder. Defendant’s expression of guilt was volunteered and was not the result of impermissible police interrogation. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 986, fn. omitted.)
Given the facts before this court, we find the People’s argument more persuasive. Defendant takes the detective’s follow up statement in Davis out of context. The reference to the fingerprint is inextricably linked to the detective’s question, “Remember that Uzi?” Such is not the case in Clark. In Clark, the defendant initiated the discussion. In Davis, the detective did the initiating. This case is similar to Clark. Defendant asked Detective Visosky a simple question, to which the detective gave a simple answer. There was no reason for the detective to have known that his answer would produce an incriminating statement. Rather, like the situation in Clark, the circumstances here suggest that defendant’s statement was volunteered and not the result of impermissible interrogation.
IV. EXCLUSION OF BARNES’S PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS
Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Barnes’s prior violent misdemeanor convictions and threats to Jocelyn Jackson (Jackson) allegedly proffered to show Barnes’s character for violence. He argues it was admissible under Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a)(1).
Allegedly, defendant was in a relationship with Jackson while in a relationship with Barnes.
A. Background Facts.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to introduce evidence of Barnes’s prior misdemeanor convictions for purposes of impeaching her out-of-court statements and showing her violent character. For impeachment purposes, the court allowed Barnes’s misdemeanor convictions for (1) giving false information to a peace officer (§ 148.9); (2) vandalism of less than $400 (§ 594, subd. (a)); (3) giving false information to a peace officer relating to the Vehicle Code (Veh. Code, § 31); and (4) assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court refused to admit her prior misdemeanor assault and battery convictions to prove her character for violence.
Following the People’s case-in-chief, defense counsel sought permission to introduce testimony by Jackson that she was in a relationship with defendant and had received a telephone call from Barnes in which Barnes used profanity, called Jackson a “bitch,” told her she was dumb, and threatened to “F” her up. According to defense counsel, Jackson’s testimony would corroborate defendant’s statement in his interview that he and Barnes argued about another woman, and it would establish a motive for Barnes to lie about what had happened to her, i.e., revenge or vindictiveness. The trial court found the proffered testimony to be irrelevant. The People contend that defense counsel failed to argue the proffered testimony was relevant to show Barnes’s character for violence. Defendant responds that the issue was clearly raised.
B. Standard of Review.
Character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove a person acted in conformity with it on a given occasion. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Evidence Code section 1103 sets forth exceptions to this general rule, however. “One exception allows a criminal defendant to offer evidence of the victim’s character to show the victim acted in conformity with it. [Citation.]” (People v. Myers (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 546, 552, citing Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1).) In general, a defendant in a prosecution for a homicide or an assaultive crime who has raised self-defense is authorized under Evidence Code section 1103 to present evidence of the violent character of the victim via the victim’s subsequent acts of violence, as well as prior acts of violence, to show the victim was the aggressor. (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 446-448.) If the defendant offers evidence showing the victim has a violent character, then the prosecution may offer evidence of the defendant’s violent character to show the defendant acted in conformity with it. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (b).) The trial court, however, has broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude such character evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352; see also People v. Shoemaker, supra, at p. 448.) We review a trial court’s ruling on an evidentiary question for abuse of discretion. (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 955, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)
C. Analysis.
According to defendant, Barnes’s prior violent crimes and threats to Jackson were relevant and would have “bolstered [defendant’s] self-defense case.” He argues that, if he had been allowed to introduce such evidence, “the jury undoubtedly would have perceived the altercation in a different light. [Specifically, i]t would have understood both how probable it was that [Barnes] had started a violent fight and... why [defendant] might reasonably have felt the need to use a greater level of force to protect himself than one would expect a man to need in a fight against a woman.”
On the record before this court, we discern no error. While defendant claims the evidence would have bolstered his self-defense case, the People accurately point out that such issue was not adequately raised at the time of the hearing. Given defendant’s ultimate defense that Barnes made up the story because she was upset about the other woman, it appears that trial counsel never focused on a self-defense theory. Rather, defendant denied using any force against Barnes, claiming he merely shoved her back and she fell and hit her head. He explained that he left the apartment and was later assaulted by other men. Absent some evidentiary support for a self-defense type theory, the violent nature of the victim is irrelevant. (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 912-913.)
Notwithstanding the above, there was no evidence that established Barnes’s prior misdemeanor convictions involved defendant. We agree with the trial court, “[I]f it doesn’t involve these individuals, it doesn’t interest me. It’s way beyond this case, so the [Evidence Code section] 352, it’s not going to come in. It’s not going to come in for the issue of the behavior other than to show the issue of honesty and credibility as it impacts on the case from the statements, hearsay statements that are allowed in, so I am going to make—I am not going to grant your motion with respect to the request to prove violence of the alleged victim.” Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Barnes’s prior misdemeanor convictions to be irrelevant. For the same reasons, we conclude the trial court properly excluded Jocelyn Jackson’s testimony. “The court is not required to admit evidence that merely makes the victim of a crime look bad.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 523 [court rejected defendant’s attempted introduction of toxicology reports showing presence of cocaine and alcohol in the victim’s blood where results were irrelevant to issues presented].)
D. Harmless Error.
The People contend that, even if the trial court erred in excluding the proffered evidence, such error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant’s guilt. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We agree.
According to the People, Barnes’s statements to the 911 operator and medical personnel were corroborated. After being arrested, defendant admitted he had hit Barnes. Barnes’s injuries were consistent with her statements and inconsistent with defendant’s claim of what had happened. The condition of the apartment supported Barnes’s version of what happened. In fact, it appears that someone attempted to clean up the crime scene. Upon learning of Barnes’s injuries, defendant did not express any surprise or concern. And finally, defendant’s claim that he had been assaulted by some men lacked credibility given the facts that he could not identify his assailants and he had failed to report the crime. Thus, we conclude that even if the trial court had allowed the evidence of Barnes’s prior convictions, as well as her threats to Jackson, it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have received a more favorable outcome.
V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
During closing argument, defense counsel suggested that Detective Visosky was lying when he testified that defendant admitted hitting Barnes. On rebuttal, the prosecutor countered: “[Defense counsel] accused Detective Visosky of lying, committing perjury, so let’s take a look at that. That’s a very serious thing to say. First of all, what motive does Detective Visosky have to do that, to commit perjury? You can imagine it’s a very serious thing for an officer to commit perjury. If he is found to have committed perjury, he loses his job and is criminally prosecuted. He would never be able to be hired again by another law enforcement agency. He would be useless as a witness with a prior perjury conviction. What motive does he have? He testified he had never met the defendant before that day. There is no bad blood between him and the defendant. He has no reason to fabricate a confession. That didn’t happen. [¶] If he did make up this confession, it wasn’t something that he did on the eve of trial when he figures, Um, the victim may not be able to testify. I better come up with a confession. On May 16th, the date of the incident, Detective Visosky clearly was arguing with the defendant about whether he admitted hitting her. He says, hey—he says, you hit her. You said you hit her, and the defendant says, no, I didn’t. Obviously, that was an issue back then on May 16th. It wasn’t something he just thought of at the last minute here.”
“Is Detective Visosky telling you the truth or not?”
Defendant complains the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for Detective Visosky. Defendant concedes that trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s closing remarks, which form the basis of his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The failure to object to a prosecutor’s remarks regarding a witness’s credibility as misconduct waives objection on appeal. (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 211.) However, defendant argues that no admonition by the court would have cured the harm. Furthermore, he claims that if this court concludes the issue has been forfeited, then he is entitled to relief for the ineffectiveness of his counsel. Regardless of whether defendant forfeited his claim and/or received ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant’s claim of prosecutor misconduct fails on the merits.
“‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are well established. “‘A prosecutor’s... intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.”’” [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves “‘“the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.”’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
“Regarding the scope of permissible prosecutorial argument,... ‘“‘a prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.’ [Citation.]....”’
“Prosecutors, however, are held to an elevated standard of conduct.... ‘A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state. [Citation.]’” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819-820.)
“A prosecutor is prohibited from vouching for the credibility of witnesses or otherwise bolstering the veracity of their testimony by referring to evidence outside the record.... However, so long as a prosecutor’s assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses are based on the ‘facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,’ her comments cannot be characterized as improper vouching. [Citations.]” (People v. Frye (1998)18 Cal.4th 894, 971.)
We conclude the prosecutor’s comments about Detective Visosky do not constitute misconduct. At trial, the detective testified that defendant admitted hitting Barnes at the time of his arrest; however, the detective had failed to include it in his report. Defense counsel cross-examined the detective, pointing out there was no recording of defendant’s admission, and that the police report was not accurate because it failed to mention the admission. On redirect, the prosecutor asked whether the report was “inaccurate or just incomplete.” The detective stated it was just incomplete. The prosecutor further asked if the detective lied and made up the statement made by defendant. The detective answered in the negative and further testified that he did not know defendant before the day of his arrest, nor was there any bad blood between them. The detective denied having any motive to lie or that he would get a pay raise or anything if the case against defendant resulted in a conviction. Given the facts of the record and the inferences reasonably drawn there from, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument properly responded to defense counsel’s accusations. There was no impermissible vouching. Rather, the prosecutor’s observation that Detective Visosky would not risk his career just to convict defendant was a reasonable inference considering the evidence admitted at trial.
Regarding the prosecutor’s statement that it is a serious thing for an officer to commit perjury, defendant contends that “none of this information about departmental policy towards perjury is in the record.” The People respond that “it is common knowledge that people who commit perjury can be prosecuted, and that if a police officer commits perjury, that can be the end of his or her career.” We agree. There is nothing inappropriate about this argument. Rather, it is merely a reminder that witnesses who provide false testimony face perjury charges. The prosecutor only offered this argument after defense counsel implied that the detective lied about defendant’s admission. It was a fair response to defense counsel’s argument, not an improper attempt to bolster the detective’s credibility.
VI. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, J., KING, J.