2(a)(7)) provides that a sentencing court may consider as a reason to impose a more severe sentence the fact that the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. In People v. Thomas (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 969, 395 N.E.2d 601, on which the defendant relies, we questioned the validity of deterrence as an aggravating factor. ( 76 Ill. App.3d 969, 976, 395 N.E.2d 601, 605-06.)

required to consider it (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(7) (West 2020)). Defendant cites People v. Colter, 181 Ill.App.3d 392 (1989), and People v. Thomas, 76 Ill.App.3d 969 (1979), for the proposition that deterrence cannot justify a lengthy prison sentence. We reject the assertion that these cases control the outcome in this instance, as both relied on the unique facts surrounding the defendants' offenses and imposed probation instead of imprisonment following review.

See Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154. He argues that, in the face of all the mitigating factors, the single aggravating factor of deterrence was insufficient to justify such a long sentence. He quotes People v. Thomas, 76 Ill. App. 3d 969, 976 (1979), in which the Fifth District said: "The concept of punishing one individual to possibly deter others is questionable both in terms of utility and fairness. To make an example of an offender so as to discourage others from criminal acts is to make him suffer not for what he has done alone, but because of other people's tendencies.

Nor did it refer to People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882, where the court held that where a sentencing court had not considered improper matters, a sentence should not be overturned unless the court breached its discretion. The stated Knowles rule was followed by the Appellate Court for the Fifth District in People v. Thomas (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 969, 395 N.E.2d 601, and recited, on occasion, in other opinions. Similarly, in People v. Huffman (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 525, 397 N.E.2d 526, this court cited Knowles in reducing a sentence of imprisonment to probation where the court had stated that the purpose of the sentence was to avoid deprecating the seriousness of the offense.

Defendant claims the court's reference during the sentencing hearing to deterrence of others, while not necessarily error, was suspect. He cites People v. Thomas (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 969, 976, 395 N.E.2d 601, 605, to argue deterrence of others is a suspect factor to consider in sentencing. The decision in Thomas does not help defendant.

That sentence which has the greatest potential for restoring the offender to a useful and productive place in society while at the same time adequately punishing the offender for his misconduct and safeguarding the public from further offenses is the one which should be imposed. ( People v. Thomas (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 969, 976.) The reviewing court is not a sentencing court, and it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have balanced the factors differently.

Further, the fifth district has specifically interpreted the first aggravating factor, with its reference to causing "serious harm," to be parallel to the first mitigating factor and its reference to not causing "serious physical harm." People v. Andrews (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 1109, 435 N.E.2d 706, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill.2d 572; People v. Thomas (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 969, 395 N.E.2d 601. The reasoning in cases like our People v. Johnson (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 156, 437 N.E.2d 436, appeal denied (1982), 92 Ill.2d 570, negates the State's argument.

She was raped, she was robbed and she was struck on the face with the gun by the defendant and cut about the forehead when she tripped while fleeing from the defendant. The defendant cites People v. Thomas (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 969, 395 N.E.2d 601, and People v. Knowles for the proposition that sentences in excess of the minimum should not be based solely on the factor of deterrence. However, in the case at bar, there were other factors in the record which fully justify the penalties imposed: the harm caused and the threat of serious harm (Ill.

A sentence which has the greatest potential of restoring the offender to a useful and productive place in society while at the same time adequately punishing the offender for his misconduct and safeguarding the public from further offenses is the one which should be imposed. People v. Thomas (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 969, 395 N.E.2d 601. With respect to the constitutionally dictated goal of rehabilitation, we review the five-year sentence here as erroneous in defendant's case under the standards of both People v. Perruquet and People v. Choate.