" Former jeopardy is not limited to Double Jeopardy claims, but includes statutorily prescribe situation in which former prosecution is asserted as bar to subsequent prosecution. S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/3-3; See People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App. 3d 516; People v. Franklin, 159 Ill. App. 3d 56. Applicability of common law. No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in this Code (Criminal Code of 1961) or in another statute of this State.

They differ, however, as to whether the various offenses arise from the same act.          We find that People v. Thomann, 197 Ill.App.3d 516, 518, 143 Ill.Dec. 820, 554 N.E.2d 755 (1990), is analogous to the present case and ultimately dispositive of defendant's compulsory joinder claim. In Thomann, the defendant was prosecuted for possessing and disseminating on July 14, 1988, a videotape containing child pornography.

In response, the State initially contends that the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the case based on former jeopardy grounds amounts to an interlocutory order which is not appealable. • 1 The State's argument was recently rejected in People v. Thomann (1990), 197 Ill. App.3d 516, 554 N.E.2d 755. The Thomann court noted that Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (134 Ill.2d R. 604(f)) provides that a defendant may appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding based on "former jeopardy" grounds. The court concluded that the supreme court, by using the phrase "former jeopardy," intended to include not only traditional double jeopardy grounds, but also those situations as set forth in section 3-4 of the Code wherein a former prosecution is asserted as a bar to a subsequent prosecution.

People v. Miller, 35 Ill.2d 62, 219 N.E.2d 475 (1966); People v. Culhane, 34 Ill. App.3d 158, 340 N.E.2d 63. Supreme Court Rule 604 contains such statutory exceptions, and the only part of that rule applicable in the instant case is Rule 604(f), which permits a defendant to appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding where that motion was based on former jeopardy principles. See, e.g., People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App.3d 516, 554 N.E.2d 755 (1990); People v. Hogan, 186 Ill. App.3d 267, 542 N.E.2d 178 (1989). However, the scope of review of an order in a Rule 604(f) appeal is limited to a former jeopardy analysis and does not extend to a review of alleged errors that could not independently form the basis for appellate jurisdiction under Rule 604(f).

As our appellate court has held, "[t]here is no fundamental unfairness in prosecuting a defendant in separate trials for similar statutory violations based on separate and distinct acts." People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App.3d 516, 521 (1990). In our view, defendant is attempting to enlarge the reach of the compulsory-joinder statute by way of the speedy-trial statute.

Accordingly, the charges were not subject to compulsory joinder. See also People v. Astorga, 245 Ill. App.3d 124, 130-32 (1993) (simultaneous possession of a stolen scale and possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver were not based on the same act); People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App.3d 516, 519-20 (1990) (possession of videotape of child pornography on one date was separate act from possession of advertisements containing similar material nearly two months later); People v. Navis, 24 Ill. App.3d 842, 846 (1974) (act of driving while intoxicated was independent of and had no relationship to the simultaneous act of driving while license revoked). Defendant herein argues that the two offenses are based on a single act, driving under the influence, and relies on People v. Mullenhoff, 33 Ill.2d 445 (1965).

" Id. The supreme court disagreed: " ‘[t]here is no fundamental unfairness in prosecuting a defendant in separate trials for similar statutory violations based on separate and distinct acts.’ " Id. (quoting People v. Thomann, 197 Ill.App.3d 516, 521, 143 Ill.Dec. 820, 554 N.E.2d 755 (1990) ). Given that the sexual assault charges were not subject to compulsory joinder with the home invasion charge, the defendant's speedy trial rights on those offenses were not violated because defendant "faced the prospect of being tried on the sexual assault charges sometime in the future." Id. at 222, 244 Ill.Dec. 361, 725 N.E.2d 1248. The court then issued its holding: "[W]e hold that where the State chooses to join new charges after the filing of the original charges, the Williams rule is inapplicable.

Section 3-3 "`establish[es] an addition to the grounds of double jeopardy in this [s]tate.'" People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App. 3d 516, 518, 554 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1990), quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 3-4, Committee Comments, at 127 (Smith-Hurd 1989). The State argues that the present prosecution is not "for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged on the former prosecution, as provided in [s]ection 3-3" (see 720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(1) (West 2000)), because the Coles County State's Attorney could not "properly initiate charges for offenses that [did] not occur in his county."