The court continued: "Nor did any due process violation occur. (See United States v. Russell, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 431-432 . . . [due process may bar criminal convictions if 'outrageous' conduct by law enforcement officers]; cf. People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 695-697 . . ., and cases cited.) Assuming arguendo that the Russell doctrine applies in this state (but see Thoi, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 696), the mere use of underage decoys to enforce the liquor laws would not constitute outrageous conduct.

We noted, however, that a contrary conclusion had been reached in Peoplev. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 789] ( Thoi). ( Provigo, at p. 570.)

Unlike some other jurisdictions, in California entrapment focuses upon police conduct and not the defendant's predisposition. ( People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 694 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 789].) Under California law, "matters [such as] the character of the suspect, his predisposition to commit the offense, and his subjective intent are irrelevant."

Nor did any due process violation occur. (See United States v. Russell supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 431-432 [36 L.Ed.2d at p. 373] [due process may bar criminal convictions if "outrageous" conduct by law enforcement officers]; cf. People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 695-697 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 789], and cases cited.) Assuming arguendo that the Russell doctrine applies in this state (but see Thoi, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 696), the mere use of underage decoys to enforce the liquor laws would not constitute outrageous conduct.

We agree with the trial court's conclusion. People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689 (Thoi), is instructive. The defendant in that case, a medical doctor, was convicted on multiple counts of Medi-Cal fraud and other offenses.

The issue has thus been waived on appeal. ( People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 698 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 789].) Given the nature of the note — a request of the prosecutor, not the court — we also find no error.

[¶] An appellate court will only find entrapment as a matter of law where 'the evidence is so compelling and uncontradicted the jury could draw no other reasonable inference.'" (People v. Lee (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 829, 836, quoting People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 694.) "While case law concedes the possibility of such a finding by an appellate court, it would be a rare result indeed."

( Smith, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1223–1224, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 80 P.3d 662, citing Hampton, supra, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646; Russell, supra, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637; Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163; McIntire, supra, 23 Cal.3d 742, 153 Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527.) The Smith court acknowledged this court, in People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 261 Cal.Rptr. 789 ( Thoi ), previously concluded the outrageous conduct defense is “superfluous” in entrapment cases. (Smith, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1225, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 80 P.3d 662.)

(See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1193 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1] ["Inasmuch as defendant both suggested and consented to the responses given by the court, the claim of error has been waived."]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 402 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432] [claim of error was "waived by defense counsel's agreement with the trial court that informing the jury of the consequences of a deadlock would have been improper"]; People v. Bohana (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 360, 373 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 845] [counsel invited and consented to failure to instruct on lesser offenses in response to jury inquiry]; People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 698 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 789] [error invited or waived, where counsel "actively and vigorously lobbied against further instruction"]; People v. Kageler (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 738, 746 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 235] [where clarification would have adversely affected defense, failure to object had possible tactical motive and could be viewed as "`tacit approval'"].) But this rule obviously cannot apply unless it appears that counsel was aware of the court's response at before the time it was effected.

( People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 689-690 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947]; CALJIC Nos. 4.60, 4.61, 4.61.5.) Even if we were to accept the premise of appellant's argument that Gonzalez was the unwitting agent of Medina in seeking to procure appellant's commission of a crime, appellant's own testimony regarding his casual acquaintance with Gonzalez and the alleged actions and statements by Gonzalez about his financial needs are not the kind of conduct which would "likely induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense" of sale of narcotics. ( People v. Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 689-690; cf. People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 695 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 789]; People v. Harris (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 324, 332 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 493].) In short, even if there was error in the trial court's refusal to give the subject instruction, there was no prejudice to appellant's case.