Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. MA035443, Hayden Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia A. Thomas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Jason Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BIGELOW, J.
Patrick Leroy Theriault pled guilty to a charge of possession of methamphetamine in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) after the trial court denied his suppression motion. He also pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 422 and admitted a prior strike for assault with a firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(2), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Theriault claims on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 6:30 p.m. on May 28, 2006, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Mikeal Smith was on a routine patrol with his partner, Deputy Horning, when he noticed an older Chevy truck approaching from the opposite direction. The truck had what looked like a large floral lei or necklace hanging from the review mirror. The deputies conducted a traffic stop, believing the lei obstructed the driver’s view. When the driver, Theriault, stepped out of the vehicle, he consented to a search of his person. Deputy Horning found a small plastic bindle containing .52 grams of methamphetamine on him. After he was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436), Theriault told Deputy Smith he purchased the methamphetamine for $20 and he intended to sell it to a friend of his girlfriend for $30.
Before trial, Theriault moved to suppress evidence of the methamphetamine found during the search on the ground the deputies had no legal basis for the traffic stop. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) Deputy Smith testified at the hearing that he recalled the floral lei hung from the rearview mirror and covered “maybe the top quarter of the window” “entirely across the whole width of the window.” Deputy Smith further testified he did not seize the lei nor sit in the driver’s seat to determine whether it did obstruct the driver’s view. Deputy Smith admitted Theriault committed no other traffic violation, such as driving erratically or failing to stop at a stop sign. The trial court denied Theriault’s motion, finding “it appears from what has been offered . . . the officer would have a lawful right and duty to stop the vehicle.” Theriault thereafter pled guilty as previously described and was sentenced to 32 months in jail, representing the low term of 16 months doubled to 32 months for the prior strike.
DISCUSSION
Theriault renews his argument that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing failed to establish the officer had a reasonable belief to conduct a traffic stop. On appeal from a motion to suppress, we consider whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and review de novo the facts most favorable to the People to determine whether the officer’s conduct in performing the traffic stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 641-642 (White).)
“[A] police officer can legally stop a motorist only if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. [Citations.]” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926.) Here, Deputy Smith believed Theriault had violated Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)(2), which prohibits driving a vehicle with an object that obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear view through the windshield or side windows. A floral lei which stretches across the entire width and covers the top quarter of a car’s windshield can reasonably be suspected to be an obstruction prohibited by section 26708.
The lei in our case is easily distinguished from the air freshener in White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pages 641-642, which only covered .05 percent of the total surface of the car’s windshield. We also reject Theriault’s remaining arguments, which attempt to cast doubt on Deputy Smith’s testimony because he did not know the precise measurements of the object, whether it also hung from the visor or whether it in fact obstructed Theriault’s view. None of these arguments provides sufficient basis to reverse the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. As described above, Deputy Smith “provided specific and articulable facts that supported an objectively reasonable conclusion that the [object] in defendant’s vehicle violated Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)(2). And, unlike in White, there was no evidence presented by the defense that the air freshener did not obstruct the driver’s view.” (People v. Colbert (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, Acting P. J., FLIER, J.